Rockwell B-1 Lancer

President [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] re-established the program after taking office, keeping with his administration's [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] strategy that required a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien].

Nixon's Secretary of Defense, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien], reviewed the programs and decided to lower the numbers of FB-111s,
since they lacked the desired range, and recommended that the AMSA design studies be accelerated.

In April 1969 the program officially became the B-1A.

This was the first entry in the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien], first created in 1962. The Air Force issued a request for proposals in November 1969.

Proposals were submitted by Boeing, General Dynamics and North American Rockwell in January 1970.

In June 1970, North American Rockwell's design was selected and was awarded a development contract.

The original program called for two test airframes, five flyable aircraft, and 40 engines.

This was cut in 1971 to one ground and three flight test aircraft.

The company changed its name to [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] and named its aircraft division North American Aircraft Operations in 1973.

A fourth prototype, built to production standards, was ordered in the fiscal year 1976 budget.

Two hundred forty B-1As were planned to be built, with initial operational capability set for 1979.

Rockwell's design featured a number of features common to 1960s U.S. designs. Among these was the use of a "crew capsule" that ejected as a unit during emergencies, which was introduced to improve survivability in the case of an ejection at high speed.

Additionally, the design featured large variable-sweep wings in order to provide both high lift during takeoff and landing, and low drag during a high-speed dash phase.

With the wings set to their widest position the aircraft had considerably better lift and power than the B-52, allowing it to operate from a much wider variety of bases. Penetration of the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]'s defenses would take place at supersonic speed, crossing them as quickly as possible before entering into the less defended "heartland" where speeds could be reduced again.

The large size and fuel capacity of the design would allow this portion of the flight to be relatively long.

Premier B-1 à Palmdale

[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]

In order to achieve the required Mach 2 performance at high altitudes, the exhaust nozzles and air intake inlets were variable.^{[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]}

Initially, it had been expected that a Mach 1.2 performance could be achieved at low altitude, which required that titanium be used in critical areas in the fuselage and wing structure.

The low altitude performance requirement was later lowered to Mach 0.85, reducing the amount of titanium and therefore cost.

A pair of small [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] mounted near the nose are part of an active vibration damping system that smooths out the otherwise bumpy low-altitude ride.

The first three B-1As featured an [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] that ejected the cockpit with all four crew members inside.

The fourth B-1A was equipped with a conventional [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] for each crew member.

The B-1A mockup review occurred in late October 1971.

The first B-1A prototype (s/n 74-0158) flew on 23 December 1974.

Three more B-1A prototypes followed.

As the program continued the per-unit cost continued to rise in part because of high [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] during that period. In 1970, the estimated unit cost was $40 million, and by 1975 this figure had climbed to $70 million.

New problems and cancellation


In 1976, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] defected to Japan with his [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]. During debriefing he described a new "super-Foxbat" (almost certainly referring to the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]) that had [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] systems in order to attack cruise missiles.

This would also make any low-level penetration aircraft "visible" and easy to attack.

Given that its armament suite was similar to the B-52, and it now appeared no more likely to survive Soviet airspace than the B-52, the program was increasingly questioned.

In particular, Senator [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] continually derided it in public, arguing it was an outlandishly expensive dinosaur.

During the 1976 federal election campaign, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] made it one of the Democratic Party's platforms, saying "The B-1 bomber is an example of a proposed system which should not be funded and would be wasteful of taxpayers' dollars."

When Carter took office in 1977 he ordered a review of the entire program. By this point the projected cost of the program had risen to over $100 million per aircraft, although this was lifetime cost over 20 years.

He was informed of the relatively new work on [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] that had started in 1975, and he decided that this was a far better avenue of approach than the B-1. [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] officials also stated that the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) launched from the existing B-52 fleet would give the USAF equal capability of penetrating Soviet airspace.

With a range of 1,500 miles (2,400 km), the ALCM could be launched well outside the range of any Soviet defenses and penetrate at low altitude just like a bomber, but in much greater numbers at a lower cost.

A small number of B-52s could launch hundreds of ALCMs, saturating the defense.

A program to improve the B-52 and develop and deploy the ALCM would cost perhaps 20% of the price to deploy the planned 244 B-1As.

On 30 June 1977 Carter announced that the B-1A would be canceled in favor of ICBMs, SLBMs, and a fleet of modernized B-52s armed with ALCMs.

Carter called it "one of the most difficult decisions that I've made since I've been in office." No mention of the stealth work was made public with the program being [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien], but today it is known that in early 1978 he authorized the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) project, which eventually led to the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien].

Le B-1A. Photo National Museum of USAF

[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]

Même source. Avec un F-111

[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]

Domestically, the reaction to the cancellation was split along partisan lines.

The Department of Defense was surprised by the announcement; internal expectations were that the number of B-1s ordered would be cut down to around 150.

Congressman [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] (R-CA) claimed, "They're breaking out the vodka and caviar in Moscow."

In contrast, it appears the Soviets were more concerned by large numbers of ALCMs representing a much greater threat than a smaller number of B-1s. Soviet news agency [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] commented that "the implementation of these militaristic plans has seriously complicated efforts for the limitation of the strategic arms race."

Western military leaders were generally happy with the decision. NATO commander [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] described the ALCM as an "attractive alternative" to the B-1.

French General Georges Buis stated "The B-1 is a formidable weapon, but not terribly useful. For the price of one bomber, you can have 200 cruise missiles."

Flight tests of the four B-1A prototypes for the B-1A program continued through April 1981.

The program included 70 flights totaling 378 hours.

A top speed of Mach 2.22 was reached by the second B-1A.

Engine testing also continued during this time with the YF101 engines totaling almost 7,600 hours.

Shifting priorities

It was during this period that the Soviets started to exert themselves in several new theaters of action, in particular through [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] during the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] starting in 1975 and the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] in 1979.

The U.S. strategy to this point was [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] of [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] and war in Europe, which almost all military planning had been focused on.

These newer actions revealed that the military was simply incapable of supporting any sort of effort outside these narrow confines.

The Army responded by accelerating its [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] concept but suffered from major problems with airlift and sealift capability.^{[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]}

In order to slow an enemy invasion of other countries, air power was critical; however the key Iran-Afghanistan border was outside the range of the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]'s carrier-based attack aircraft, leaving this role to the Air Force.

Although the B-52 had the range to support on-demand global missions, its long runway requirements limited the forward basing possibilities.

During the 1980 presidential campaign, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] campaigned heavily on the platform that Carter was weak on defense, using the cancellation of the B-1 program as a prime example, a theme he continued using into the 1980s.

During this time Carter's defense secretary, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien], announced the stealth bomber project, apparently implying that this was the reason for the B-1 cancellation.

B-1B program

On taking office, Reagan was faced with the same decision as Carter before: whether to continue with the B-1 for the short term, or to wait for the development of the ATB, a much more advanced aircraft. Air Force studies suggested that the existing B-52 fleet with ALCM would remain a credible threat until 1985, as it was predicted that 75% of the B-52
force would survive to attack its targets.

After this, the introduction of the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] missile, the MiG-31 interceptor and the first Soviet [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] systems would make the B-52 increasingly vulnerable.

During 1981, budget funds were given to a new study for a bomber for the 1990s time-frame.

These studies led to the Long-Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA) project which compared the B-1, F-111 and ATB as possible solutions.

An emphasis was placed on the design being multi-role, as opposed to a purely strategic weapon.

At the time it was believed the B-1 could be in operation before the ATB, covering the time period between the B-52's increasing vulnerability and the introduction of the ATB.

Reagan decided the best solution was to purchase both the B-1 and ATB (later B-2), and this eventually led to Reagan's 2 October 1981 announcement that 100 aircraft of a new version of the B-1 was being ordered to fill the LRCA role.

In January 1982 the U.S. Air Force awarded two contracts to Rockwell worth a combined $2.2 billion for the development and production of 100 new B-1 bombers.

Numerous changes were made to the design to better fit it to real-world missions, resulting in the new B-1B.

These changes included a reduction in maximum speed, which allowed the variable-aspect [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] to be replaced by simpler fixed geometry intake ramps in the newer design.

This reduced the B version's radar signature; the reduction in [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] was seen as a good trade off for the speed decrease.

High subsonic speeds at low altitude became a focus area for the revised design, and low-level speeds were increased from about Mach 0.85 to 0.92.

The B-1B has the capability for maximum speeds of Mach 1.25 at higher altitudes.

The B-1B's maximum takeoff weight was increased to 477,000 pounds (216,000 kg) from the B-1A's 395,000 pounds (179,000 kg).^{[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien][Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]}

The weight increase was to allow for takeoff with a full internal fuel load and for external weapons to be carried.

Rockwell engineers were able to reinforce critical areas and lighten non-critical areas of the airframe, so the increase in [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] was minimal.

In order to deal with the introduction of the MiG-31 and other aircraft with [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] capability, the B-1B's [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] suite was significantly upgraded.

Opposition to the plan was widespread within Congress. Critics pointed out that many of the original problems remained in both areas of performance and expense.

In particular it seemed the B-52 fitted with electronics similar to the B-1B would be equally able to avoid interception, as the speed advantage of the B-1 was now minimal. It also appeared that the "interim" time frame served by the B-1B would be less than a decade, being rendered obsolete shortly after the introduction of a much more capable ATB design.

The primary argument in favor of the B-1 was its large conventional payload, and that its takeoff performance allowed it to operate with a credible bombload from a much wider variety of airfields.

The Air Force spread production subcontracts across many congressional districts, making the aircraft more popular on [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

B-1As #2 and #4 were modified to include B-1B systems.

The first one was completed and began B-1B flight testing in March 1983.

The first production B-1B was rolled-out on 4 September 1984 and first flew in 18 October 1984.

The 100th and final B-1B was delivered on 2 May 1988; as a point of controversy, even before the last B-1B was delivered the Air Force had determined that the plane was vulnerable to Soviet air defenses.