Accident THY Boeing à Amsterdam. Fevrier 09

En fevrier 2009, un Boeing 737 de la cie turque THY s'est crashé à Schiphol dans un épais brouillard entrainant la mort de 9 personnes et des blessures serieuses pour 25 autres

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Certains des rescapés entamant une action judiciaire contre B

De Reuters :

AMSTERDAM, Sept 7 (Reuters) - Survivors of a Turkish Airlines crash at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport in February plan to sue Boeing in the United States for up to $20 million each, a Dutch law office said on Monday.

Nine people were killed when flight TK 1951 from Istanbul crashed on approach to Schiphol on the morning of Feb. 25 and Dutch investigators have said a faulty left-hand altimeter shut down the engine of the Boeing 737-800 before it crashed.

Boeing said in response it was "issuing a reminder to all 737 operators to carefully monitor primary flight instruments during critical phases of flight".

Dutch law office AKD Prinsen Van Wijmen (AKD) said 10 survivors of the crash have agreed on its advice to ask Clifford Law Offices to start proceedings in the United States against Boeing. The case could be lodged in two to six weeks.

"Boeing does not comment on open litigation," Boeing spokesman Jim Proulx said.

Frans Vreede at law firm AKD said other lawyers in the United States are also preparing cases against Boeing, adding Boeing is currently not willing to consider offering a settlement.

Severely injured passengers could claim up to $20 million in damages each, Vreede said.

(Reporting by Aaron Gray-Block; Editing by Jon Hemming)

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Ceci n'intéresse plus personne ? Il y a aura de la polémique !

Lien :
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DATE:06/05/10
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news
Turkish Airlines Boeing 737 stalled as faulty altimeter triggered thrust cut
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Dutch investigators have concluded that an incorrect reading of the radio altimeter led a Turkish Airlines [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-800's autothrottle to command a thrust reduction in both engines to 'idle', before the aircraft crashed short of touchdown at Amsterdam Schiphol last year.
Pilots of the aircraft did not notice the autothrottle's switch to 'retard flare' mode - normally engaged below 27ft on approach - because the 737, having intercepted the localiser later than normal, at 5.5nm from runway 18R, had to descend from 2,000ft to align with the glidepath.

This descent manoeuvre, says the Dutch Safety Board, "obscured" the mode change and the aircraft's subsequent behaviour.

But the investigation also states that the aircraft's approach was not stabilised at 1,000ft, because the pilots were late in completing preparations, and that the crew should have executed a go-around.

The right-hand autopilot continued to follow the glideslope, resulting in the aircraft attempting to maintain height with idle engine thrust. The nose-up pitch and falling airspeed eventually resulted in the aircraft's stalling - its stick-shaker activated at 460ft - and the crew failed to recover the situation in the remaining height.
Turkish Airlines normally requires both autopilots to be activated for an instrument approach. But an attempt to engage the left-hand autopilot was unsuccessful.

During the approach the first officer, who was operating as the flying pilot under supervision from a third 'safety' pilot, was using only the right-hand radio altimeter with the right-hand autopilot engaged. His displays did not register the incorrect reading from the left-hand radio altimeter, which had switched to an indication of minus 8ft.

The inquiry was unable to explain the reason for the malfunction, although it says the radio altimeter started reading incorrectly almost as soon as the aircraft took off from Istanbul.
Crucially, while the first officer was using information from the right-hand systems, the left-hand radio altimeter is the primary provider of information to the autothrottle.

The final investigation report states that this feature is a "relic" from the 737's certification in which the original design prioritised provision of information to the captain's position.
Changes in cockpit roles in the interim have resulted in pilots having an "incomplete, or even incorrect, mental model" of automated flight controls.

Although the left-hand radio altimeter was reading erroneously, the reading was not recognised as a failure, meaning there was no automatic transfer to the right-hand system. The faulty altimeter continued to feed the autothrottle, resulting in the reduction of engine thrust.
Along with the three pilots, flight TK1951 had four cabin crew and 128 passengers on board. Nine of the occupants, including four crew members, were killed in the 25 February 2009 crash.

Il y a à boire et à manger dans ce rapport, dirait-on !

Lien :
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DATE:07/05/10. SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news
VIDEO: Turkish Airlines disputes crash inquiry findings on stall recovery
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Turkish Airlines has expressed reservations about conclusions of the Dutch inquiry into the crash of a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-800 on approach to Amsterdam, notably over the crew's failed attempt to recover from the fatal stall.
The aircraft's autothrottle reduced the thrust to idle early in the approach, after receiving incorrect altitude information from a faulty left-hand radio altimeter, causing the jet to lose airspeed.
This went unnoticed by the crew until the aircraft threatened to stall, the stick-shaker activating with the 737 just 460ft above the ground.
The Dutch Safety Board inquiry found that the first officer, the flying pilot, responded immediately to the stick-shaker by pushing the control column and thrust levers forward, in line with stall-recovery procedures.

Ok ! "So far so good" ? Mais...... "Read on " !

But cockpit-voice recorder analysis shows that the captain also called that he was taking control, just as the thrust levers had been pushed halfway forward. "Assumingly, the result of this was that the first officer's selection of thrust was interrupted," says the final report into the crash.
Crucially, as the first officer relinquished the thrust levers to hand over control, the still-engaged autothrottle immediately retarded them again to the idle position.

Oh, oh !

"Directly thereafter, the autothrottle was disengaged," says the inquiry report. "But for a period of seven seconds the thrust levers were not moved forwards from the idle position."
While the investigation could not determine whether the captain had placed his hands on the thrust levers, it says that nine seconds passed between the activation of the stick-shaker and the movement of the thrust levers to maximum.
By this point the aircraft had already stalled and the remaining height of 350ft was "insufficient for the recovery procedure", it adds.

Turkish Airlines says the autothrottle "kicked back unexpectedly" and that [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] "had not mentioned", in its documentation, a need to disconnect the autothrottle during the procedure.

Cela se tend !

The carrier also describes the relationship between the left-hand radio altimeter and the autothrottle as "error-prone", adding that it was not explained in Boeing's documentation for flight crews until after the crash.

Oh, oh !

While acknowledging that disengagement of the autothrottle is not described in the recovery procedure, the Dutch Safety Board highlights the problems of incomplete knowledge of the aircraft's interdependent systems. It points to the crew's suffering from "automation surprise" with respect to the autothrottle's behaviour - during both the original loss of thrust on approach and the attempted stall recovery.

Surprenant & grave !

Turkish Airlines also claims that simulator tests show that a height of at least 500ft is required for the 737-800 to recover successfully from a stall, and that the ill-fated jet was already below this level when the pilots initiated the recovery procedure.

La lecture de ces deux posts soulève de graves points d'inquiétude !

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