TANKER USAF - Appels d'offres

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USAF KC-X Winner to Be Named Soon

The U.S. Air Force is planning to announce a winner for its KC-X aerial replacement tanker competition as soon as next week, according to numerous industry and military officials.
The service is expecting a protest from the losing bidder, and has prepared for this likely eventuality. The decade-long tanker replacement effort has been marred by scandal, bid protests, award reversal and, most recently, a data swap mishap that saw bidders receiving their competitor’s information.
“We have assumed that there might be a protest,” says Air Force Secretary Michael Donley. “We have taken a lot of care and time … to document all of the necessary aspects of our source selection” to support a Government Accountability Office review. The congressional audit office acts as the referee in federal bid disputes, although it is up to executive branch agencies to carry out any changes.
Boeing is proposing a version of the 767 while EADS is offering a modified Airbus A330. The source selection relies heavily upon the bidders’ prices, and up to 179 tankers will be purchased to begin replacing the aging KC-135.
A Northrop Grumman/EADS team won the last competition in 2008 (nearly three years after the last award), but a protest from Boeing prompted the Pentagon to stop work on that deal and start a new competition. Northrop abandoned EADS last year, and EADS stepped up with its own prime bid.
Boeing appears to be preparing for a loss, likely owing to an inability to beat EADS on price. An EADS win is viewed as critical by this company to greatly expand its footprint in the U.S. defense market, outside of helicopter work already under way.
A decision could happen as soon as Friday Feb. 25.

Ricc a écrit:EADS a baissé son prix.

" Quitte à perdre le contrat, autant savonner la planche pour Boeing,..."

...Qui a de la chance d'avoir James Bell !!! CFO fabuleux.

Et "hear, hear !", en ce qui concerne le compliment pour James BELL ! Là, Boeing a beaucoup de chance ! Beacoup de chance !

Recapping the KC-X contest

With the expectation that the USAF is going to announce its tanker award this week, we’re going to forego our Odds and Ends kick-off and deal with the tanker.
We’re going to try and synopsize many of the issues that are “out there” in cyber-land, to try and make some sense out of what sometimes seems to be a senseless process.
In no particular order, here we go:
Who’s going to win?
The consensus is EADS has the upper hand this time. Boeing executives think they will lose and EADS is optimistic. One noted consultant told us he thinks it is too close to call. We want a split buy; the KC-767 is better for the European theatre and the KC-45 is better for the Pacific. Politically, we think this is the only answer that works. Isn’t this sad?
Split Buy or not
DOD and USAF have said “no,” but the RFP does have a provision to allow for it. Boeing and EADS have said this would be uneconomic, but depending on the split, if any, this may be rhetoric. DOD and the Navy said ”no” on the Littoral Combat Ship and wound up doing it. We’ll just have to wait and see.
Why should a foreign company be allowed to compete for an American contract?
The question should more appropriately be, “Why not?” Competition is good, and it has been in this case. The 2001 lease deal for the Boeing KC-767 demonstrated, if nothing else, what happens when a sole-source contract is arranged without competition. Boeing, at the behest of the late Sen. Ted Stevens, proposed leasing 100 tankers to the Air Force for $200m each, or $20bn. At the end of the term, the USAF owned nothing. Competition leading up to the 2008 contract called for 179 tankers to be purchased for $35bn, or nominally $195m each. Actual bids came in closer to $175m each. There is an expectation that bids this time may be 5%-10% less than that in 2008.
Additionally, the 2008 effort resulted in Boeing improving its airplane from the original offering, and from the International tanker program for Japan and Italy, to the KC-767 Advanced Tanker. While this plane was cleverly if unfairly dubbed the Frankentanker by critics, it unquestionably was better than those previous airplanes.
Since the 2008 competition, Airbus has benefitted by maturing its KC-30A being developed for the Australian Air Force, testing all the systems on that airplane, many of which are common to the USAF KC-45 proposal. A lot of the testing, therefore, comes at the expense of the RAAF and this reduces the risk for the USAF.
Boeing, meantime, developed the KC-767 NextGen, which doesn’t appear to be the same level of mix-and-match as the KC-767AT but which is nonetheless the Son of Frankentanker (said affectionately in this case). Most noteworthy is the addition of winglets in the conceptual artwork, which theoretically further reduces fuel burn by another 3.5% or so, but oddly Boeing doesn’t tout this additional savings in its PR and advertising. So are the winglets part of this offer or not? Boeing won’t definitively say, though it suggests that they are.
So: lower price, less risk, better airplanes. Competition is good.
More to the point, the EADS/Airbus nations are NATO allies and under US law, NATO allies who chose to bid on US defense projects must be considered as if they are US companies.
Even if Boeing wins, US taxpayers have EADS to thank for a lower price and a better airplane than would have been the case without competition.
What about jobs?
Partisans for Boeing say American jobs are at stake. Boeing will support 50,000 US jobs directly and indirectly vs. outsourcing jobs to a European company, they charge.
EADS says it will support 48,000 US jobs, and it plans to introduce a new study this week to further bolster its case. With the difference being only 2,000 jobs, we’re not talking about a great deal in the unemployment scheme regardless of who wins.
Combat ready on Day 1
Boeing has made a tag line about its plane being Combat ready on Day 1, but as good as this line is, it is meaningless. All airplanes submitted are supposed to be combat ready on Day 1. If they aren’t one presumes they would fail one or more of the mandatory pass-fail requirements.
Our plane is less thirsty than your plane
Boeing in 2008 and again in 2010 promoted its KC-767 as using 24% less fuel than the KC-30/KC-45, which would save taxpayers at least $25bn over 40 years. Northrop Grumman made a feeble attempt to refute this in 2008 and EADS was more aggressive last year. EADS concedes that on training and ferry missions, its larger KC-45 is at a disadvantage to the KC-767, but on fuel delivery missions it says the KC-45 is 15%-45% more efficient on a gallon-cost delivery basis depending on the distance, a fundamental data point in the IFARA analysis. Boeing notes the EADS analysis was done by EADS but otherwise doesn’t dispute the figures. Boeing paid two independent companies for its 24% figure, both of which relied upon commercial airline operating figures filed with the US Department of Transportation.
On a pure operating basis, Boeing is right, but this doesn’t take into account payload efficiency. In the absence of the IFARA data and Boeing rebuttal, EADS seems to have the upper hand on this one.
IFARA what?
This is the analytical tool USAF uses to score efficiency on several metrics. In 2008, the KC-30 scored 1.92 and the KC-767AT scored 1.72 (the higher the score the more efficient the airplane). The KC-135 was the baseline at 1.00. When the USAF accidentally sent Boeing the EADS IFARA score last year and EADS the Boeing IFARA score, it should have come as no surprise that the KC-45 scored better again (but we don’t know what the scores actually were, though we will at some point after the award is announced).
Size matters
But it depends on your point of view how it does. Boeing says its KC-767 is closer in size to the KC-135, requiring less military construction costs than the larger KC-45 and the ability to park more airplanes on the ramp than can fit the KC-45. EADS concedes the point.
EADS says its airplane can deliver more fuel, carry more troops and deliver more cargo than the KC-767. Boeing concedes the point but says, “So what?” All the air force wants is a refueler and all the extra capability of the KC-45 is extra cost and no needed benefit. EADS doesn’t concede this point.
Mature workforce, mature plant vs. untrained workers and an open field
This is Boeing’s advantage, no question about it. EADS has to hire employees and train them to assemble the KC-45 at a plant it has yet to build in Mobile. Boeing has a workforce with decades of experience who have been building the commercial 767 from Day 1 at a plant that has been around since 1969. True, the assembly line switched in January from the out-dated one in place since 1980 to a “lean production” system, but this should be of little consequence.
It’s also true Airbus has the recent experience of creating a new assembly plant (in Tianjin, China) that came off without a hitch. But so-called “greenfield” plants and employees are risky—just say “Charleston”—and Boeing has the clear PR and experience advantage on this one. Other than one clever video and some occasional references, Boeing hasn’t talked much about this tremendous advantage. Much to our bafflement.
Decades of experience, Part 1
Well, yes and no. Until the highly troubled Japanese and Italian tankers were delivered in 2008 (two years late) and 2010 (five years late) Legacy Boeing hadn’t delivered a tanker since 1966 and McDonnell Douglas, now part of Boeing, hadn’t delivered one since 1986, and we suspect we’d be hard-pressed to find anyone still working at the companies then who are now who were involved in the tanker production. Promoting the history of the KC-135 tankers as if it were a current event, when the last one was delivered 45 years ago, or the KC-10 (25 years ago by another company at the time), is stretching it. It’s great for the historical record but as a talking point in another age, as a qualification it just doesn’t fly.
The KC-767J is a different version than that sought by the USAF and the Italian tanker—pretty similar to the USAF desires—was a highly troubled development, most notably with the wing pods.
Airbus delivered tankers (A310 conversions) from 2004-2007 to the German Luftwaffe; Canada also flies converted A310 tankers. These have wing pods developed by EADS; the refueling boom desired by the USAF comes with the KC-30A.
In terms of recent tanker experience, this is really a draw, including delays. Just as the KC-767 International program has, and continues to have, delays, Airbus’ KC-30A is now 27 months late and counting for Australia.
Decades of experience, Part 2
Where Boeing wins hands-down is its decades of experiences in tanker maintenance contracts for USAF. But the company doesn’t talk about this. Much to our bafflement. This is something EADS/Airbus cannot possibly match and it’s a real plus for Boeing. This is the talking point about tanker heritage we wish Boeing had used, for on this it is the undisputed leader.
WTO panel rulings
Don’t forget that for all the hubbub and rhetoric on both sides of the issue, the WTO technically hasn’t determined anything—only the WTO investigative panels have found Airbus and Boeing received illegal subsidies. The WTO’s governing body has yet to accept the panels’ findings. At this writing, the Airbus panel finding remains under appeal and the Boeing panel finding is still confidential, and hasn’t yet been subject to appeal.
Setting aside these little niceties, once the WTO governing board accepts the rulings, then remedies must be negotiated. Only after negotiations fail can sanctions be authorized and penalties imposed. This is years away.
Ah, yes, says Boeing, but military procurements are exempt from WTO rulings and Congress could do what it wants.
Now, isn’t this just a little bit of a double standard? On the one hand Boeing and its supporters want to use WTO rules to penalize EADS but on the other they don’t want to follow the rules governing when and how penalties can be imposed. Or they want to exempt the military procurement from WTO penalty rules yet use the panel findings to impose a penalty. We have a hard time following the fair-and-openness of this logic.
And how much should the penalty be? Boeing and its supporters use the figure of $5bn as the amount the A330-200 received (Airbus disputes this figure, saying the WTO panel ruling doesn’t have this figure in the report and the real number identified by the panel is a paltry $54m.) Boeing’s Congressional supporters in Washington State used a figure of $5m per airplane ($5bn divided by 1,000 orders and deliveries at the time of the panel report), a figure more than offset by the withdrawal of Northrop Grumman from the EADS team (see below). At December 31, the number of order and deliveries had risen to slightly more than 1,100, thus reducing the per-plane penalty. If you accept and use the Airbus interpretation, the per-plane penalty is less than $50,000 (fifty thousand), an inconsequential amount.
Furthermore, EADS notes the launch aid has been repaid with interest and Airbus is now paying royalties on the A330, something that has to be priced into its bid and something Boeing doesn’t have to do with the 767.
Lately EADS has pointed to NASA subsidies received in the development of the 767, but this wasn’t part of the European case against Boeing so as far as we are concerned, this is irrelevant.
So it will be interesting to see just how close the bid truly is. If it is $5m or less per plane, look for Boeing and its supporters to scream. If it is a much wider number, they may scream anyway but EADS and Airbus will be able to piously say inclusion of the penalty wouldn’t have made any difference—and we think they will have a valid point.
Are the WTO panel findings relevant? People with no skin in the game say no: Richard Aboulafia of the Teal Group, Michel Merluzeau of G2 Solutions, Jim McAleese of McAleese Assoc., all respected independent analysts, say no. So do we. At a panel a few months back, of five on the panel all five said no (including us and a consultant to Boeing). Loren Thompson, who was paid by Boeing to write a report about the illegal subsidies and the tanker competition, says yes. Boeing’s workforce and political backers say yes while EADS workers and political backers say no.
Be careful what you ask for
After winning the protest in the 2008 competition, Boeing and its supporters all but demanded the USAF base the new round on price rather than best value. With the USAF having chosen the KC-30 in 2008 on “more, more, more,” Boeing and Co. felt the life cycle costs—asserted to be 24% less than the KC-45—would lock in a win for Boeing this time. Northrop Grumman, which had not yet dropped out of Round 3, complained that such a competition wouldn’t unfairly disadvantage its tanker. When the USAF stuck to its guns, Northrop dropped out. And Boeing was hoisted on its own petard because with Northrop’s cost-and-profit basis (estimated by some to be as much as 15% of the 2008 bid price) now eliminated, EADS had a lot more pricing flexibility, more than enough in our estimation to offset the penalties of the WTO case even should the USAF take them into account. Take the 15% (or even 10%) off the $175m bid price and the WTO penalties are more than offset.
Boeing may well have been sunk by the best value approach again, but once Northrop was gone, Boeing suddenly was faced with bidding a price that might not allow enough room for a profit.
Doubtful? Recall that early on, executives began warning that they would not bid a price that wasn’t profitable or which was detrimental to shareholders. This came was recently as a February 2 Excellence Hour presentation by BCA CEO Jim Albaugh to employees.
What else affects the price?
There are a couple of other important factors that affect the cost of the Airbus and Boeing airplanes and therefore the price bid and these are:

• Development costs: Airbus Military has been lucky in one critical area as a result of the delay brought on by the 2008 protest and that is the additional R&D and testing time afforded Airbus for the KC-30A. This is the tanker for the Australian Air Force which Airbus says is 90% similar to the KC-45 offering for the USAF. This takes a lot of the cost and risk out of the Airbus/EADS pricing to the USAF.
  
• Boeing has made a major improvement in its production costs with the shift in January from its 30 year old line to a new, lean manufacturing line for the 767. This shaves about 20% from production costs (but add back in cost increases in materials and labor), a significant number Boeing factored into its bid cost and price.
  
• Airbus has a plane flying and in production and Boeing doesn’t. This is worth a lot, and the cost and risk to Boeing for the KC-767NG can only be guessed at by Boeing. It may be a very good guess, but it’s a guess nonetheless. Airbus has a much better handle on the costs and less risk in its pricing.
  
• A viable commercial product. Airbus has a healthy backlog for the A330 and Boeing has an anemic one for the 767. Airbus plans to boost the production rate to 10 a month and Boeing plans to boost the rate to two. The higher the production rate, the lower the cost. Advantage to Airbus.
  
• Life-cycle costs: Boeing and its supporters believed this would be a clear and clinching victory for the KC-767. The IFARA score, if 2008 is any guide, apparently suggests otherwise, as does the EADS delivery cost analysis. A net present value (NPV) analysis of future cost savings based on the delivery advantage of the KC-45 (per EADS, anyway) may well mean the insistence by Boeing and its supporters to include life-cycle costs might backfire. (Be careful what you ask for.)
  

These are all factors that have nothing to do with illegal subsidies and the advantage goes to EADS/Airbus.
Will there be another protest?
EADS says it won’t unless there is something especially egregious in the methods used, which to date it hasn’t seen. Boeing has obviously been laying the groundwork for a protest. But we certainly hope not. We’re tired of writing about the damn thing and the USAF needs a new airplane. Let’s get on with it.
When will the award be announced?
Expectations are Friday, Feb. 25, after the 4pm EST close of the stock market. It should be webcast on the Defense Department channel.

Tanker decision expected Thursday, Feb. 24, 5pm EST

It now appears the USAF will announce the tanker contract Thursday, Feb. 24, at 5pm EST. Expectations are that EADS will be awarded the contract, but there have been so many twists and turns that we’re not predicting the outcome.
The greater question will be, Will there be a protest? As we reported Monday, EADS says it won’t protest if it loses provided there is nothing egregious in the selection process. Boeing has clearly been laying the groundwork for a protest, but neither is it certain Boeing will do so if it loses.
Here is the timeline of what happens next:
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• The announcement is made.
  
• The Department of the Air Force has 10 calendar days to brief the losing side.
  
• The losing side can request an accelerated debrief.
  
• The losing competitor then has 10 calendar days from the time of the debrief to file the actual protest with the GAO.
  
• The GAO then has up to 100 calendar days to rule on the protest (they may take less time).
  
• The results can be: 1.) GAO finds no merit and throws out the entire protest; 2.) GAO sustains part of the protest; 3.) GAO sustains all of the protest.
  
• The GAO does not rule on whether or not the Department chose the right aircraft, which aircraft was better, etc. It only rules on whether the proper process was followed during the source selection.
  
• The Department can then accept the ruling and provide a timeline for how they will address the issues the GAO ruled on and determine whether and how it impacts the outcome. Or, they can note the GAO ruling but proceed as originally planned.
  

Jeannot a écrit:Le résultat c'est ce soir..... Croisons les doigts...

Jeannot a écrit:Fin du rêve... Il serait étonnant que EADS proteste... mais bon sait-on jamais ?

Jeannot a écrit:Attendons le debrief que l'USAF doit au perdant... mais le bal des robes reprend... les bons vieux ravitailleurs ont intérêt à être solides.

Le Pentagone brise le rêve américain d'EADS en choisissant les avions ravitailleurs de Boeing

L'armée américaine a annoncé jeudi qu'elle attribuait à l'avionneur américain l'appel d'offres qui dure depuis dix ans. Evalué à 35 milliards, il porte sur une première tranche de 179 appareils.

Dix ans après avoir lancé le projet, le Pentagone a annoncé hier soir tard, heure de Paris, que Boeing avait finalement remporté la dernière mouture de l'appel d'offres géant portant sur le renouvellement de sa flotte d'avions ravitailleurs. En retenant l'avionneur de Seattle, l'armée a évité au président américain de devoir batailler contre tous ceux qui n'aurait pas manquer de brandir la carte du patriotisme économique, EADS eut-il été déclaré vainqueur.

Evalué à 35 milliards de dollars, le marché porte sur une première tranche de 179 appareils, mais il pourrait grimper à 100 milliards à terme. Boeing avait raflé la mise au début des années 2000, mais la procédure avait ensuite été cassée pour corruption. Une deuxième tentative a débouché en mars 2008 sur la victoire du tandem Northrop Grumman-EADS. Las, après un recours du perdant, la Cour des comptes américaine avait invalidé la procédure pour vice de forme. La troisième tentative sera-t-elle la bonne ? EADS devrait se réunir la semaine prochaine pour décider - ou non -de faire appel. Le groupe européen a trois mois pour le faire.

Pour les alliés de Boeing, la cause est entendue. Patty Murray, la sénatrice démocrate de l'Etat de Washington, avait donné le « la » mercredi : « Je ne peux pas croire que notre pays prendra une décision en faveur d'une entreprise basée à l'étranger. Je ne le tolérerai pas », avait-t-elle martelé, ajoutant qu'il était inimaginable de perdre « notre savoir-faire aéronautique ». Même refus catégorique quant à l'hypothèse - dont on peut imaginer qu'EADS se serait satisfait -d'un partage du gâteau entre les deux avionneurs.
Dans un style plus mesuré, mais de manière toute aussi claire, le général John W. Handy, responsable de la flotte de ravitaillement et de transport américaine jusqu'en 2005, avait lui aussi pris position pour Boeing. « Les deux avionneurs fabriquent de bons avions », a-t-il déclaré, mais, du fait de son poids, « celui d'Airbus ne peut pas décoller de beaucoup de petits aéroports que nous utilisons aujourd'hui ». Le haut gradé n'avait pas hésité également à mettre en avant le risque en matière d'indépendance que ferait porter à la nation un achat étranger.

Les alliés de Boeing auraient eu aussi à coeur de ressortir la décision de l'OMC, qui a jugé illégale une partie des aides publiques reçues par Airbus. Et ce même si le gendarme du commerce international a également épinglé les soutiens dont a bénéficié Boeing et bien que le Pentagone a toujours refusé de prendre en compte cet aspect-là du dossier dans ses critères de décision.
Chiffres impossibles à vérifier


Nombre d'analystes donnaient pourtant l'A330 gagnant ces derniers jours. Comme Loren Thompson, un expert reconnu du secteur du Lexington Institute, un centre de recherche conservateur : l'appareil


européen devait l'emporter grâce à un prix inférieur et à une meilleure réponse aux scénarios d'emploi envisagés par le Pentagone, assurait-il au « Herald » de Seattle.
Pour faire valoir leurs atouts, les deux concurrents ont mis en avant ces dernières semaines les bénéfices économiques de leurs projets. Chacun a assuré pouvoir créer des milliers d'emplois (48.000 pour EADS, 50.000 pour Boeing), et faire travailler des centaines de sous-traitants (900 et 800 réciproquement). Des chiffres évidemment impossibles à vérifier...

Ce qui paraît plus réaliste en revanche, c'est que, avec sa victoire, Boeing se replace sur le marché des ravitailleurs. A ce stade, l'avionneur américain n'a enrôlé que l'Italie et le Japon avec son 767 militarisé, vendu à 8 exemplaires. De son côté, Airbus a vendu 28 A330. Avec les Etats-Unis, premier budget militaire mondial, comme client, la balance vient de changer de côté.

• Effectivemvement je suis déçu mais d'un autre coté j'avais du mal à voir "la Grande Amérique" accorder un élément important de sa défense à l'extérieur. Les chaussures des Marines sont faites en Chine mais les ravitailleurs de l'USAF doivent être construits par le soldat Boeing. Il n'était pas interdit de rêver. Et puis le tax payer US a ce qu'ik voulait !!! Peut être nous autres européens devrions faire la même chose... (Drone, F35, C130, F16, etc...)
  
• EADS va lancer une campagne juridique juste pour prouver sur les marchés extérieurs que le débat était pippé (à nouveau ?).
  
• EADS a bien joué et a forcé Boeing à faire une offre fixe au ras des paquerettes. Il n'est pas certain que EADS aurait pu gaggner de l'argent sur un contrat en $ sur une si longue période.
  
• Cet avion est un avion sur la papier et il n'est pas construit. Boeing a fait de belles promesses ! Alors bonjour les retards et les pénalités.
  

USAF selects Boeing for KC-X contract

claimed the KC-X contract on 24 February by easily beating the price of [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] North America’s proposal, according to US Air Force officials.

The success of the proposal based on the KC-767 Next Gen Tanker, which is to be renamed the KC-46A, seemed at odds with widespread buzz that the EADS KC-45 had gained an edge over Boeing on price.

“We are ready to build the KC-46A tanker now,” Dennis Muilenberg, chief executive of Boeing’s defence and space business, told reporters after the announcement.

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Within one award after winning the KC-X contract, Boeing released a new concept image showing the newly-awarded KC-46A refuelling a Boeing B-1B bomber.

Boeing’s actual offer came in lower than its competitor by more than 1%, or at least about $330 million, says Michael Donley, secretary of the air force.

That allowed the air force’s evaluation team to bypass a set of 96 non-mandatory requirements that would only have been triggered if there was less than a 1% differential between the two bids, Donley says.

The air force’s decision was met with “disappointment and concern” by EADS, which previously defeated a Boeing bid for the same contract in 2008. That award was later overturned after Boeing protested the outcome.

The [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] relaunched the competition in September, 2009 with a new acquisition strategy that forced the competitors into a pricing war.

EADS says its review of the air force’s decision “will take some time”. The KC-X bid offered the company an opportunity to establish a new manufacturing base in Mobile, Alabama, as well as forge a network of suppliers across the country. “We owe it to them to conduct a thorough analysis,” says EADS chairman Ralph Crosby.

Donley urged the losing bidder to respect the air force’s decision and allow the process to move forward.

“We hope that all parties recognise the thorough process and intense, multiple levels of review that have gone into this source selection and will respect this opinion and allow this important procurement to proceed unimpeded,” Donley says.

It is clear that Boeing had several advantages on price by offering the KC-767. The KC-45’s maximum takeoff weight is more than 25% heavier than the KC-767, and extra weight usually implies more cost to build.

Moreover, as a smaller aircraft the KC-767 is expected to burn less fuel in absolute terms. Rep Norm Dicks, a Washington-based Democrat, helped to improve this advantage by successfully pressing the USAF to increase the lifecycle measure for fuel burn from 30 years to 40 years.

“I think that’s an important part of the overall equation,” Muilenberg says.

However, EADS officials had become increasingly confident that the KC-45 would be competitive with Boeing's pricing on the KC-767. Last week, Crosby told reporters that he considered price an "opportunity" for EADS to win in the competition. He also indicated that EADS would protest only if the company discovered a signficant discrepancy between the evaluation criteria and the basis for contract award.

The air force intends to finalise a $3.5 billion contract to complete a system development and demonstration phase, which includes delivering four test aircraft. Boeing is required to deliver the first 18 KC-46As to enter service within six years of contract award. The production phase spans over 13 years for building all 179 aircraft.

Meanwhile, Boeing has confirmed that first flight is scheduled in 2015.

It remains unclear how much risk Boeing has accepted to meet the KC-X contract requirements. The company has never disclosed the exact configuration of the KC-767 New Gen Tanker airframe, nor its refuelling systems.

“We won’t be rolling out any of those” details in the near future, Muilenberg says.

The air force has been seeking to award a contract to replace its aging Boeing KC-135s for most of the last decade.

“I’m pleased at how this produced an outcome … that we will get about delivering a capability that’s long overdue,” Gen Norton Schwartz, chief of staff of the air force, “and we’ll stop talking about it".

Boeing The Clear Winner Of KC-X: Pentagon

Additional capabilities beyond the mandatory requirements were not a factor in the U.S. Air Force’s selection of Boeing’s 767-based tanker, now designated the KC-46A, as the service’s KC-X replacement aerial refueler, Pentagon officials said late Feb. 24.
EADS North America’s larger Airbus A330-based KC-45A, winner of the previous KC-X competition, was the losing bidder. Officials announced the Boeing award shortly after 5 p.m. EST in Washington.
Additional “non-mandatory” requirements were only to be considered if the evaluated prices of the two proposals were within 1% of each other. “Both offerors met the mandatory requirements, and there was a greater than 1% difference in total price, so non-mandatory capabilities were evaluated, but not used in the source-selection,” Air Force Secretary Michael Donley says.
“Boeing was the clear winner,” says Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn. Under the revised source-selection criteria for the restaged KC-X competition, the price proposed by each bidder was adjusted by the Pentagon based on assessments of fleet mission effectiveness and lifecycle cost. Boeing argued its smaller 767-based tanker would consume substantially less fuel.
Boeing has been awarded a $3.5 billion fixed-price incentive contract for engineering and manufacturing development and delivery of the first 18 aircraft by 2017. When Northrop Grumman/EADS North America won an earlier KC-X competition in February 2008 it was awarded a $1.5 billion development contract, including four aircraft. “This was a completely different competition,” Donley says.
The Air Force restarted the KC-X competition in July 2010, issuing a new request for proposals (RFP) that simplified the requirements, clarified the selection criteria and reduced the financial risks to the winner. The changes were made in a bid to prevent the protests that derailed the first competition.
Boeing revised its approach after losing the first competition, dropping plans to develop an aircraft combining elements of several different 767 models and basing its “NewGen” tanker bid on a 767-200 equipped with an upgraded KC-10 refueling boom and 787 cockpit displays. The company said its price would be lower the second time around.
EADS North America stayed with its winning KC-45 design, but entered the new competition as prime contractor after Northrop withdrew from the role in March 2010, arguing the revised RFP “clearly favored a smaller tanker.” EADS’ decision to lead the bid itself likely allowed the company to reduce its proposal price.
Following the protests that dogged previous attempts to buy new tankers, as well as major criticism of the Air Force’s acquisition process, Donley says the seven-month source-selection has generated an “extensive official record” of the procedures followed. The bidders had a good understanding how the evaluation was conducted, he says, clearly anxious to avoid a protest or congressional challenge this time around.
Still, the latest competition was already marred by an embarrassing data-swap mishap last fall. In the Nov. 1, 2010, data release, Air Force officials sent files containing interim Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (Ifara) information to the wrong industry teams. However, in an effort to level the playing field, USAF then released to both contractors the cover sheets outlining each bidder’s performance in the Ifara model so both sides now officially have the same information (Aerospace DAILY, Feb. 11).
Senate Armed Services ranking Republican John McCain (Ariz.) let it be known right after the new award was announced that he awaits the Air Force’s award explanation. “I look forward to the Air Force demonstrating over the next few weeks how today’s decision was made fairly, openly and transparently,” says the senator, who helped derail Boeing’s last tanker award by exposing Air Force and Boeing malfeasance. “Only such a process will ensure that we obtain the most capable aerial refueling tanker at the most reasonable cost.”

“Dewey defeats Truman” perfect prediction in KC-X tanker contest

Richard Aboulafia of the Teal Group said it best: the upset Boeing win over EADS in the KC-X tanker contest is the “Dewey Defeats Truman” moment of this contest.
For those who don’t know this reference, see [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]
Aboulafia predicted EADS would win. So did Michel Merluzeau of G2 Solutions in Kirkland (WA). And Loren Thompson, a paid Boeing consultant. We did, too. So did Daniel Tsang of Aspire Aviation and even the Boeing shills in Europe did.
Boeing officials thought they were going to lose and so did its supporters in Congress.
Norm Dicks (D-Boeing/WA), a strong Boeing supporter, was prepared for the loss and was elated he was wrong.
Here is some good coverage of the surprise decision.
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]. Reaction, and how Boeing won.
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]: EADS wants details before making decision on protest. This article contains disappointing comments from the political supporters of EADS.
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]: EADS loss threatens goal to diversify from commercial, increase US DOD revenue.
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]: EADS senators slam Chicago politics.
Our take:
We won’t know in detail why Boeing won and EADS lost for some time, but to us there are obvious reasons.

• First, let’s start with the basic fact that the competition this time was a price shoot-out. Northrop Grumman and EADS, which were still partnered at the time, objected that this put their airplane at a disadvantage to the smaller KC-767. These companies argued that the competition should be based on the “best value” that enabled Northrop to win the 2008 competition that was later overturned when the GAO found the USAF changed in midstream to best value without telling Boeing. NGC withdrew from the 2010 competition. EADS, after being asked by the USAF to compete, took the plunge alone but with the feeling at the time it was an uphill battle.
  
• Boeing successfully argued in the public domain that its tanker used 24% less fuel than the EADS KC-45, hammering this message home for two years before EADS responded (Northrop had made a feeble response in 2008). EADS finally countered, conceding that Boeing had the advantage on training and ferry flights but argued it had the advantage on fuel delivery mission costs. Only the debrief will reveal who was right overall.
  
• Boeing and EADS agreed that on MilCon (military construction costs), both airplanes would require expenditures. Only the debrief will reveal what the delta was between them.
  
• Boeing’s shift to a lean 767 production line in Everett saves an estimated 20% in production costs compared with the line that had been in place since the 767 began production in the early 1980s. This is a huge savings, even when offset some by the normal increase in parts and labor.
  
• The lower base price of the commercial 767 clearly was an advantage.
  

Even ignoring the WTO panel finding that Airbus received illegal subsidies for the A330-200, on which the KC-45 was based, and the withdrawal of Northrop and its reported 10%-15% mark up wasn’t enough to offset the final pricing offered by Boeing. The USAF said the difference was beyond the 1% threshold (but did not say by how much) that would have triggered the best value extra credit considerations that would have favored Airbus.
Based on these key factors, we don’t see a protest. We’ve had a perfect record so far in predicting these contests, however: we thought Boeing would win in 2008 and it didn’t; we thought Boeing would lose the protest and it didn’t; and we thought EADS would win this year and it didn’t.
But at least we’re in good company, as everyone else got it wrong, too.
EADS lost but won, too
EADS lost the tanker contract and with it the grand plan to build a US assembly plant for the A330 that would have reduced its exposure to the Euro and establish a US production footprint.
But the company won, as well. The Defense Department classified EADS as a qualified US prime contract, a huge step for future work. It was the absence of this qualification that required EADS to partner with Northrop in the first place.
EADS also surely won the gratitude of DOD for making the bid. After Northrop withdrew, the USAF was faced with a sole-source supplier situation without competition. This would have put it in an unfavorable position to get the best price and the best product. Having competition assured the best airplane offering and a competitive price. Not only is the DOD better off, so are the US taxpayers.
And EADS has a better airplane to offer future non-US customers.
Finally, though this will be well down the road, EADS might be positioned for a future KC contract.

Les représentants du Pentagone expliqueront lundi à EADS les raisons de leur choix en faveur de Boeing.

L'américain a remporté le contrat du siècle pour 179 ravitailleurs d'une valeur de 35 milliards de dollars.

[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]
«Déçu et perplexe». C'est ainsi que Louis Gallois, président exécutif d'EADS, se définissait hier matin après que le Pentagone a décidé d'attribuer, tard dans la soirée de jeudi, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] au détriment du géant aéronautique européen.

De façon générale, les réactions restent mesurées car le Pentagone n'a pas encore justifié son choix auprès des deux compétiteurs.

Il a indiqué que le contrat, d'une valeur de 35 milliards de dollars, a été attribué au terme d'un processus de sélection «équitable, ouvert et transparent».

Ses représentants seront d'ailleurs auditionnés devant la Commission de la défense du Congrès pour le vérifier.

Et, cela, dès que possible. Le républicain John Mc Cain, le plus important membre de cette commission, se fait fort d'éplucher en détail la décision du Pentagone.

Depuis le début des années 2000, ce candidat malheureux face à Barack Obama lors de la présidentielle de 2008, veille à ce que la compétition ne soit pas bien biaisée par Boeing comme ce fut le cas par deux fois en 2001 et en 2002.

«Nous attendons les explications des représentants du Pentagone que nous rencontrerons lundi», a annoncé Louis Gallois.
«Notre offre était excellente sur le plan technique mais nous n'avons pas voulu casser les prix afin de rester rentables.

Boeing ne semble pas avoir fait le même choix», poursuit-il.

«L'offre de Boeing était au moins 1% moins chère que celle d'EADS», assure un proche du dossier.

Or, le Pentagone avait averti: le prix est un critère déterminant. Un différentiel de 1% seulement entraîne l'élimination du candidat.

«Boeing a engrangé un gros succès quand il a obtenu que les critères purement financiers priment alors que dans le précédent appel d'offres c'étaient les critères qualitatifs.

Ceux-là même qui avaient assuré la victoire d'EADS en 2008 car son avion est meilleur», décrypte un bon connaisseur du dossier.

Le [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien], était en effet plus cher : 185 millions de dollars contre 125 millions pour le Boeing B767 NewGen.

S'il s'avère que c'est bien le prix qui a fait pencher la balance, un recours devant le GAO, l'équivalent de la Cour des comptes aux États-Unis, ne serait pas justifié.

De toute façon, EADS y réfléchira à deux fois avant de contester un client aussi puissant que le Pentagone.

De même que les 200 entreprises américaines partenaires d'EADS.

Les Rockwell, Eaton, Goodrich et autres Hamilton Sundstrand sont également des fournisseurs de Boeing.

«EADS pourrait gagner la seconde tranche»

Dans cette affaire, EADS n'a en outre pas tout perdu. Sa candidature a contraint Boeing à baisser drastiquement ses prix «et d'empêcher des surprofits».

Le constructeur américain prend un contrat à prix fixe dans le respect d'un calendrier serré. Boeing doit livrer 179 appareils qui constituent la première tranche d'un marché gigantesque de 400 ravitailleurs KC-135 à remplacer.

Dans un premier temps, Boeing s'est engagé à développer, construire, certifier son appareil afin d'être capable de livrer 18 exemplaires d'ici à 2017. «Boeing se retrouve dans la situation qu'a connu EADS avec l'A400M.

Pour barrer la route aux offres américaines, Airbus a accepté un prix et un calendrier irréalistes.

On sait où cela l'a mené: un dérapage financier qui atteint au bas mot 7 milliards d'euros et un décalage de livraisons de quatre ans.

L'avenir dira si Boeing peut vraiment tenir ses engagements alors que deux autres de ses programmes, le B 787 et le B 747-8 ont accumulé les surcoûts et les retards», développe un très bon connaisseur du dossier. «EADS pourrait gagner la seconde tranche», ajoute-t-il.

Contrairement à Airbus dans le cas de l'A400M, Boeing ne part pas de rien.

L'américain construit des ravitailleurs depuis plus de soixante ans, il a déjà une ligne de production et des personnels formés à Everett (État de Washington). Boeing a créé l'équipe «One Boeing», un «team» mixte avec des personnels issus de la branche aviation commerciale, défense, sécurité pour piloter ce projet.

L'enjeu est de taille pour l'américain: il sauve sa ligne de production et les effectifs affectés au B767. Il reste présent dans l'aéronautique militaire après avoir perdu les appels d'offres pour les avions de combat et les patrouilleurs remportés par Lockheed et Northrop respectivement. Et ce programme va créer 50.000 emplois chez Boeing et ses partenaires dans 40 états.

Pricing the KC-X: $162m estimate for Boeing, $169m for EADS

One of our readers, with the screen name OV-099, provided a comment on our Dewey Defeats Truman post calculating the possible prices on the KC-45 and the KC-767.
OV-099 has been a long-time poster and when the occasion arises, does in-depth analyses on financial terms. We’ve cross-checked his work with others and found his numbers-crunching to be pretty spot-on.
With that in mind, we asked OV-099 to take a final look at his original posting with the thought of elevating it to a primary post. He has slightly revised his numbers. What follows is his analysis of how much EADS and Boeing priced their KC-45 and KC-767 in the bids to the USAF. His analysis is below the jump.
Update, 1-:30 am: OV-099 has further refined his analysis; the update is below.

How are we going to estimate Boeing’s and EADS’ bid price?
We have a few metrics to work with.
1) Northrop Grumman’s final offer price for the 2008 KC-X competition was $184 million in 2008 dollar value; or 188.2 in 2011 dollar value.
2) In the 2008 competition the IFARA Fleet Effectiveness Value for the KC-767AT and KC-30 was 1.79 and 1.9 respectively**.
3) Loren Thompson’s claim that the KC-30 scored ”well ahead” of the KC-767 in the IFARA assessment.
First, let’s calculate the fuel burn differential of the two aircraft.
Boeing has been claiming that the KC-30 burns 25 percent more fuel than the KC-767. If we use that 25 percent figure, the fuel burn differential should be around 2850 lbs per hour in favour of the KC-767 (767-200 fuel burn: 11400 lbs per hour).
We want to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) for the difference in fuel burn between the two aircraft (using Boeing’s fuel burn figures).

	Year	Cost of JP8 Then Year $	Discount Factor
A	2010	$3.03 (44.8 cents per lb)	0.9783
B	2040 Mean Indicator Value	$5.71 (84.5 cents per lb)	0.2730
C	2071 Last KC-X retired	$11.2 (165.7 cents per lb)	0.0697

A (2010): (2850 lbs per hour) x (179 a/c) x (489 hrs/year) x $0.448/pound x 0.9783 (Discount Factor)
B (2040): (2850 lbs per hour) x (179 a/c) x (489 hrs/year) x $0.845/pound x 0.2730
C (2071): (2850 lbs per hour) x (179 a/c) x (489 hrs/year) x $1.657/pound x 0.0697

Year	NPV	NPV (D) (2010 + 2040)/2	NPV (E) (2040 + 2071)/2	NPV (D + E)/2
2010	$109 million
2040	$57.5 million
2071	28.8 million
		$83.3 million	$43.2 million
				$63.2 million

Not wanting to do the NPV calculation for the fuel burn differential for every year, we’ve used the NPV for the year 2040 as a “mean indicator value”. Using this “mean” NPV figure for the entire life-cycle calculation of 40 years; would seem to indicate that the fuel burn differential is around $2.5 billion (in favour of KC-767)
Again, this is the number we get when using Boeing’s claim that the A330-200 burns 25 percent more fuel than the 767-200 (presumably the 767-200ER). This is a Boeing “best case” scenario in relation to the NPV fuel cost calculations, and a far cry from Boeing’s claim that the Air Force would likely have to pay up to $30 billion more in fuel cost for operating the KC-30 over that of the KC-767. In fact, Boeing’s claims regarding the NPV fuel burn delta between the KC-30 and KC-767 is way off base by more than one order of magnitude!
2^nd, let’s examine the IFARA claims from Loren Thompson that allegedly Boeing officials close to the competition , after reviewing EADs’ IFARA data, had concluded that EADS held a substantial edge in the Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment. Of course, he could have been blowing smoke, but it’s not surprising that the IFARA assessment for the KC-46A would be lower than that of the KC-767AT.
In the previous KC-X competition, the IFARA Fleet Effectiveness Value was 1.79 for the KC-767AT (Frankentanker) and 1.9 for the KC-30; or about 6 percent better IFARA scoring for the KC-30.
Boeing has not revealed much about the KC-46A, but Iet’s assume that it’s based on a 767-200ER, a less capable plane than the proposed KC-767 Advanced Tanker (AT) that Boeing offered last time around. I wouldn’t say that 6 percent is a “substantial edge”. Sure, it’s an edge , but for it to be substantial, I’d reckon that it must be at least double that; or 12 percent. That would mean that the KC-46A’s IFARA score would be about 1.7, and doesn’t look unreasonable in regard to the 1.79 scored by the 767-200AT.
Using 1.7 for the KC-46A and 1.9 for the KC-30, we have:
Fleet Effectiveness Difference = (1 – 1.7/1.9) x 179 = 19 (rounded up)
3^rd, as for the MILCON adjustment, the best we could do is to make an educated guess, but I’d be surprised if the adjustment is more than $500 million in favour of the KC-46A.
4^th, Estimating EADS’s bid price.
It’s not unreasonable to assume that the Average Unit Price (AUP) for EADS’ final offer could have been as much as 15 percent lower than NG’s final bid in 2008. Northrop Grumman would have had different profit requirments and added one level of cost to the value chain as well. Add to that the fact that the KC-30 is almost through certification and that most of the devlopment costs have been sunk.
Now, let’s say EADS was “conservative” and made an offer 10 percent lower than NG’s inflation adjusted offer from 2008 ($188.2 million for first 68 airframes). EADS’ AUP offer would then be $169.38 million and their Total Proposed Cost (TPP) would be $30.3 billion.
EADS’s IFARA adjustment = 19 x AUP = 19 x $ billion = $3.22 billion
EADS’ Total Evaluated Price (TEP) = $30.3 billion -$3.22 billion = $27.08 billion
5^th, Estimating Boeing’s bid price.
If EADS’ TEP was $27.08 billion, then Boeing’s TEP would have to be lower than $27.08 billion in order for EADS’s TEP to be one percent higher than that of Boeing’s TEP. Since Boeing was said to be the “clear winner”, let’s assume that that means EADS’ TPP was around 2 percent higher than Boeing’s TEP which would lead to a Boeing TEP of $26.55 billion.
Now we would have to add the fuel burn and MILCON adjustment to Boeing’s TEP of $26.55 billion; or $2.5 billion and $0.5 billion respectively.
Having used Boeing’s claimed fuel burn figures for the A330-200 (and not EADS’ figures), I’m estimating that Boeing’s Total Proposed Price (final offer) was $29.55 billion.
Since the EMD is allowed to be over budget by up to 25 percent, we have: 1.25 x $3.5 billion = $4.38 billion. $0.875 + Boeing’s TPP = $30.42 billion. This figure is consistant with the statement that the KC-46A program is valued at over $30 billion (EMD phase valued at over $3.5 billion).
If the KC-30 doesn burn as much as 25 percent more than that of the KC-46A, then Boeing’s TPP would, of course, be less than $29.55 billion. This would seem to suggest that the Average Unit Price for the KC-46A is about $165.1 million.
The $3.5 billion EMD contract accounts for the first 18 aircraft; or $194.4 million per unit.
Boeing TPP –EMD = $26.05 billion
So, the flyaway unit cost for the remaining 161 KC-46As would be about $161.8 million.

What The Boeing Tanker Win Means

The question sweeping the U.S. defense establishment is: How low did Boeing go?
Nearly three years after the U.S. Air Force’s selection of a Northrop Grumman/EADS A330-based tanker was found by government auditors to be flawed, the service has now chosen a Boeing design to replace its aging KC-135 refuelers. The Air Force based its selection largely on life-cycle price, and Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn says: “Boeing was a clear winner.”
Three years ago, Boeing’s price was roughly $8 million more per aircraft than EADS’s and its development price was higher, according to sources close to the duel. Right up until the source selection announcement last week, many defense analysts suggested EADS would underbid Boeing in order to establish a final assembly facility for Airbus aircraft in the U.S.
“It is very fortunate for Boeing that they got a second chance because their first bid was not competitive,” according to one defense industry analyst. John Young, the Pentagon procurement chief during the last source selection, says, “The delay [in fielding the aircraft] is unfortunate and it clearly led both teams to sharpen their pencils.”
The Air Force’s decision to select Boeing will likely sidestep a protracted debate with Congress; Boeing supporters on Capitol Hill were poised to fight on the company’s behalf, further delaying USAF’s ability to field new tankers. Boeing’s lobby in Congress is far more substantial than EADS’s, which mainly relied on lawmakers from Alabama, where the A330 was to be built, for its political influence.
Dennis Muilenburg, president of Boeing Defense Space and Security, says this KC-X proposal had a “one Boeing” tactic, including a marriage of its culturally diverse defense and commercial businesses. “We worked this as one integrated Boeing company,” he says, adding that this approach drove efficiencies and value to for the most recent proposal.
During the 2008 competition, Boeing was criticized for seeking too much profit, thus allowing for a then-Northrop Grumman/EADS team to underbid. Also, Boeing Commercial Airplanes was seen as uncooperative with government cost estimators who wanted pricing details on the 767 platform.
Boeing protested, leading government auditors to find flaws in the source selection. During this period, company officials were aggressive, publicly taking their top customer to task. Internally, however, Boeing did some soul-searching. “That was always the fear—that [EADS] could underbid again,” says one former Boeing official. “This is the last major USAF acquisition program in the foreseeable future,” and this tanker work was viewed by some in the company as a must win.
The Pentagon’s decision—if it withstands a possible protest from EADS—could repair the chasm in the Boeing/Air Force relationship. It also shores up not only decades of business with its top defense customer as military budgets begin to flatten but also steady work for the waning 767 production line. Perhaps more critical to the commercial side of Boeing, the win stunts its European commercial rival’s efforts to establish a stateside manufacturing facility for airliners.
A win for either company would have been considered strategic—EADS was hoping to substantially boost its U.S. revenue and, perhaps more critical for the future of its commercial business, was its plan to build an A330 final assembly facility in Mobile, Ala. Since establishing its North American arm in 2003, EADS has had a goal of aggressively growing its U.S. business, and winning KC-X was the largest single step in that strategy. EADS is likely to pursue other Pentagon business, including some smaller helicopter programs, but nothing that would bring with it the scale and prestige of U.S. livery on an A330-based tanker.
EADS North America officials were due receive a debriefing Feb. 28on the loss. Board Chairman Ralph Crosby said his company would not protest the decision unless there is an obvious error on the part of Air Force acquisition. EADS North America officials “expressed disappointment and concern” about the decision. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz says he hopes this decision means people will “stop talking about it” and get on with fielding a tanker on schedule. The original Boeing lease—offered in 2002—called for tankers to be delivered in 2006. Investigations into the deal found a bloated price, a situation that kicked off the more recent competitions for a supplier.
A loss for Boeing would have been a blow, ending its five-decade monopoly on the U.S. refueling business as the Air Force’s interest in C-17s continues to be nonexistent. Boeing’s other defense hurdles include a downturn in missile defense opportunities and a recent guided weapon loss to Raytheon.
Pressure is now likely to mount for EADS North America to consider a U.S. acquisition to expand its stateside market share. However, uncertainty over the company’s shareholding structure and an anticipated management shuffle next year could further hinder efforts to execute its U.S. expansion anytime soon.
Though EADS has beat Boeing in previous competitions in Australia, Saudi Arabia, the U.K. and the United Arab Emirates, other countries may now turn away from the A330-based option in favor of the 767 tanker, now called the KC-46A, to achieve commonality with the U.S. fleet.
And, with 767 business established for at least 13 lots through the U.S. buy, the platform, though older than its A330 rival, could continue to challenge Airbus in the freighter market.
Boeing’s $3.5 billion contract covers the development of the system, and purchase of 18 aircraft (including those for test purposes), which will be fielded by 2017. The buy of 179 aircraft is estimated at up to $30 billion, Lynn says. Ashton Carter, the Pentagon procurement chief, says the contract will be signed soon, allowing work to begin smartly. If a protest is launched, a stop-work order will likely be issued immediately in accordance with procurement rules.
The development contract is fixed-price, a shift from the previous competition. However the process does carry risk. Production and flight-testing will be concurrent, says Jean Chamberlin, vice president of Boeing’s tanker program; if technical problems arise in flight-test, fixes may have to be retrofitted onto the aircraft. Although a different design, Boeing experienced substantial flight-test problems with its Italian 767-based tanker.
Production is slated to start in 2015, two years ahead of the first delivery. Initial flight test is also slated for 2015, Chamberlin says. The Pentagon has restructured the Joint Strike Fighter program twice in as many years to reduce concurrency. Though this stealthy fighter is more complex than a modified 767, lessons from JSF and many past programs have pointed to the benefits of discovering flaws in flight-test prior to production.
At the suggestion that Boeing bought into the program, risking its ability to make profit, Muilenburg said “We submitted an aggressive but responsible bid.”
If the decision manages to withstand scrutiny, and neither Congress or the protest reveal problems in the procurement process, this will be a pivotal step forward for an Air Force procurement corps beleaguered by missteps. They began, largely, with the Air Force/Boeing plan nearly 10 years ago to lease 767-based tankers, and continued with a problem in a competition to buy combat search-and-rescue helicopters among others. Perhaps the KC-X decision could be a fitting end to a decade of paralysis for Air Force weapons buyers.

08:30 GMT, March 1, 2011 CINCINNATI | GE Aviation will provide advanced technologies in mission control systems for the Boeing KC-46A aircraft, which was selected by the United States Air Force (USAF) for the tanker replacement program.

The initiative calls for 179 tankers to replace the current USAF tanker fleet.

GE Aviation was selected for the mission control system, which includes flight management systems.

GE’s flight management system (FMS) provides the ability to fly shorter flight paths and idle-thrust descents which reduces fuel consumption, thereby lowering emissions and community noise levels.

“We are committed to bringing our next-generation technologies to this new tanker platform, » said Lorraine Bolsinger, president and CEO of GE Aviation Systems.

« The flight management system will enable the aircraft to perform with navigation precision not currently available to the tanker fleet. Our technologies will help enhance operational efficiencies and will enable the aircraft to perform to the demanding mission requirements of the USAF Tanker. »

Software and hardware updates provide the latest technology to continue to meet the needs of the world’s evolving airspace, offering safe and efficient improvements to aircraft operations.

GE’s TrueCourse FMS is an ecomagination product.