FAA & NTSB ; CAA ; DGAC etc.

The US Federal Aviation Administration, trying to shake criticism it has been too close to the industry it regulates, will drop its practice of calling airlines its customers and will beef up safety practices.

"When we say customer, we mean the flying public," FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said in announcing policy changes aimed at strengthening safety oversight (Sevrien : "surveillance") and streamlining avenues for whistleblowers and others to report problems without fear of reprisal or other pressure to remain quiet.

Some members of Congress, safety watchdogs, and whistleblowers have long complained of a revolving-door culture that fostered coziness between the FAA and major US airlines.

The issue erupted publicly last year when a whistleblower case over maintenance lapses at Southwest Airlines led to a congressional investigation and harsh criticism of FAA oversight (Sevrioen : "poor & lax supervision").

The agency fined Southwest USD$10 million for flying planes that had missed required safety inspections but later reduced the penalty by 25 percent.
Babbitt said the FAA would create an office to handle safety complaints from whistleblowers and the public. It is also improving procedures to ensure airlines comply fully with the hundreds of FAA directives issued each year, mainly on matters that require precise record keeping and a maintenance response.
Babbitt said he saw no signs the FAA was too close to airlines....

...... but noted the agency has a good working relationship with the industry, which he said benefits safety.

"We often turn to these people (airlines) to find solutions," Babbitt, a former airline pilot, said. "Just because you know their first names doesn't mean you're cozy."

Although there was a notable airline accident and a fatal collision between a tourist helicopter and a small plane this year, the industry that operates more than 30,000 commercial flights per day and flies more than 600 million passengers per year is safe, Babbitt said.
Babbitt said the airlines know the rules and promised that FAA would not hesitate to crack down on violators and ground planes if necessary.

(Reuters)

Unmanned aircraft are the way of the future, but that future is not now, Federal Aviation Administration J. Randolph Babbitt said Wednesday.
"(U)nmanned aircraft systems are not ready for seamless or routine use yet in civilian airspace," Babbitt said in [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] to the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]. "The idea of pilots flying remotely has been around for a long time. And it is, I truly believe, the way of the future. But where we are, on numerous fronts, they're not ready for open access to the (National Airspace System) and we can't give you the thumbs up. ... Right now, the era of the unmanned aircraft system in civilian airspace is just not here yet."
The advent of unmanned aircraft systems is similar to the introduction of the jet engine, Babbitt said. "We're talking about an exponential leap in capability, and that leap needs a contemporaneous jump in technology and procedures to do so safely."
One problem is ensuring unmanned aircraft can see and avoid other aircraft, Babbitt said. "Without a pilot who can look and scan to the left and the right -- just the way you and I do when we're backing out of a parking space -- there's a perceived level of risk that the American public isn't ready for."
Also, most unmanned aircraft systems have a single point of failure for hydraulics, electrical, flight control and satellite link, he noted. "When there's a single point of failure for something that runs into trouble every thousand hours, that's a problem."
The FAA is working on standards for routine commercial operations of small unmanned aircraft, and a multi-agency Unmanned Aircraft Systems Executive Committee has been established to develop solutions to allow incremental access of the systems into the National Airspace System, Babbitt said. Also, he said, a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] with private not-for-profit [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] is developing standards that will be the basis for regulations

A new federal directive will require Boeing to conduct speedy inspections to prevent potentially dangerous vibrations affecting certain flight-control surfaces on the tails of some of its 737 models, The Wall Street Journal reported.
The Federal Aviation Administration is expected to issue a new safety directive as early as Monday that requires inspections of the mechanisms that control part of the elevators on about 125 of Boeing's aircraft, the report said.
The inspections of the elevators, which help control a plane's pitch, must be completed in the next six to 30 days, depending on the age of the aircraft, the Journal said.

(Reuters)

SAFETY flights performed by aircraft fitted with Derby-built Rolls-Royce engines helped the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) reach its decision to reopen airspace above the UK.
Tests showed jet engines could cope with areas of low-density ash.

Earlier in the week, aircraft manufacturer Airbus performed a number of test flights through the volcanic ash cloud.
One of the planes used was a long-distance A340-600 aircraft, powered by Trent 500 built at Rolls-Royce's Sinfin plant.
The CAA said the tests showed the engines had "increased tolerance levels in low-density ash areas".
It made its decision to reopen airspace based on the results of these tests and advice from both Airbus and Rolls-Royce.

Airbus, which operated the flights from its Toulouse base in France, said the volcanic ash cloud presented an opportunity to test its aircraft in such unique conditions.
The A340 was flown through the cloud in French and German airspace.
Afterwards the aircraft and the engine were subjected to a rigorous inspection. The findings were then shared with the CAA and Rolls-Royce.

Rolls-Royce confirmed it had been working closely with a multi- national, cross-industry group to ensure the level of the impact of volcanic ash from its engines was properly understood.
The president and chief executive of Airbus, Tom Enders, said: "We have been working in close coordination with the aeronautical community to provide all technical assistance we could."

The US Federal Aviation Administration is proposing to extend the fix to prevent leading-edge flaps from retracting during take-off on Rolls-Royce RB211-powered [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] 747s, to the other versions of the aircraft.

Both a R-R directive......

.....and FAA's latest notice of proposed rulemaking are designed to prevent the repeat of an 11 May 2009 incident in which a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] came close to stalling after the leading edge flaps retracted on rotation due to a faulty signal from the thrust reverser control system.
"The design for the thrust reverser signal to the flap control unit for the R-R RB211 series is the same as the General Electric CF6-80C2 series and Pratt & Whitney [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] series," says the FAA.

Specifically, the thrust reverser uses a position sensor to indicate that a thrust reverser sleeve is unstowed. The sensor's signal is also used as an input for the flap control unit.
"Aerodynamic forces can cause the thrust reverser sleeve to flex, which can be enough movement to cause the sensor to indicate that the sleeve is not fully stowed even though the sleeve has not moved from the stowed position," the FAA says.

Explaining the rationale for the immediate adoption of the thrust reverser signal fix directive for the RB211, the FAA says the position sensor that directs signals to the flap control unit is sensitive to smaller sleeve movements, and that there were similar service experiences of small sleeve movements that triggered the same "amber alert" of the BA aircraft. But those incidents were only single-engine occurrences.
In the BA incident the first thrust reverser deployment signal was received before take-off decision speed, and the second signal, which triggered the retraction, happened several seconds later after the pilots committed to take-off.
After examining in-service experience, the FAA reasons the GE and P&W engines are less sensitive to small thrust reverser sleeve movements. "In this case the risk is reduced and allows for less aggressive compliance time," the agency says.

Operators of the affected aircraft have 36 months from the proposed rule's effective date to comply with the changes to thrust control system wiring for the flap control unit in both types of engines outlined in Boeing service bulletins released in January.

• (a) données historiques (factuelles),
  
• (b) informations, disponibles pour tous dans le domaine public,
  
• (c) éléments pertinents au contexte de cet incident (avec les sources, bien sûr, comme d'habitude) allégué être enraciné dans le Compresseur Haute Pression / "High Pressure Compressor" (HCP), notamment pour vous indiquer pourquoi,
  
• ---- sur la base de faits objectifs, et craintes réelles, présentés par les Autorités américaines (FAA),
  
• ---- que je ne refoule pas -- surtout pas -- il est raisonnable de dire....
  
• ---- qu'il semblerait qu'il y ait une forte possibilité que.....
  
• ---- cette affaire relève surtout d'une question d'entretien-moteur,
  
• ---- et non pas d'une question fondamentale de moteur (conception, design, fabrication & ou réalisation de moteur "pur jus").
  

• Sauf erreur ou omission de ma part, en ce qui concerne les moteurs IAE V2500, il n'y a absolument aucun historique, ayant nécessité un AD des Autorités américaines (FAA) ou autres, d'un incident de 'criques' / "cracks" d'un disque de HPC ;
  
• il y a eu des AD, concernant les "cracks" de "Vortex Reducer", notamment sur la tout première version, soit la "-A1" du moteur IAE V2500 (IAE V2500-A1), "standard" qui a cédé la place au standard "-A5" (IAE V2500-A5) ;
  
• ce standard "-A5" avait reçu de grandes améliorations, par rapport audit "-A1", ... y compris celle d'un nouveau "Vortex Reducer" (appelons-le le VR-A5-01, pour la circonstance) .
  
• l'amélioration fut indéniable ; mais, même dans ce cas, il y a eu un besoin d'améliorer encore, et, disons que c'est le standard qu'on peut appeler, toujours pour la circonstance, "VR-A5-02" qui est en place aujourd'hui ;
  
• il y a même eu un AD tout récent (en 2010, ... mois d'avril), .... mais toujours pas pour "crack" d'un disque de HPC, et toujours déclenché par la découverte d'un "crack" sur "Vortex Reducer", ... et vraisemblablement celui qu'on pourrait appeler le "standard VR-A5-01" (point important, auquel nous reviendrons).
  

• l'AD ne concerne que le "Vortex Reducer".
  
• Les VR sont des "time-limited life parts" / 'pièces à durée de vie limité par le temps'. Ces VR doivent être inspectés fréquemment, et, s'il y a le moindre signe précurseur d'une faiblesse, doivent être remplacés immédiatement.
  
• Positionné entre deux disques de HPC, tout VR affaibli peut se détériorer rapidement, d'une manière "non gérée", et non gérable, et, s'il se brise, peut causer une détérioration à l'un ou à l'autre des deux disques sains en question, ou aux deux ensemble, événement capable d'engendrer un incident qui pourrait consister en un "uncontained failure".
  
• Voilà le risque réel d'un danger réel, à potentiel grave.
  
• Et le VR (en mars / avril, 2010, ... date récente, donc) ne coûte que : US$ 80 (quatre vingts US$).
  

• En outre, en fouillant dans l'historique des 3 compagnies (en Inde) que sont, ou qu'ont été, Deccan, Kingfisher et Indigo, surtout en se référant aux acquisitions et aux dates des acquisitions, il est certain, que pour les avions liés aux 2 compagnies, Deccan et Indigo, et à leur commandes des précédentes 'fournées', il s'agirait, au mieux, des VR-A5-01.
  
• Et il est un fait que, pour les moteurs des avions concernés de Deccan et d'Indigo (ceux de Deccan étant sous Kingfisher, maintenant), il est certain qu'il n'y a pas d'accord "style IAE", du type "TotalCare".
  
• Sous les accords du genre "TotalCare" ou "Power by the Hour", les techniciens d'IAE, ou de CFMI, aussi, auraient changé systématiquement, de façon routinière, à chaque visite appropriée programmée, les VR, ... chose qui ne surait absolument pas être garantie, quand il n'y pas d'entretien contractuel "d'aftermarket".
  
• Enfin, on nous informe qu'il est possible, lors d'un entretien 'indélicat', effectué sans le doigté requis, qu'un VR soit endommagé par inadvertence.
  

• DATES: This AD becomes effective April 22, 2010.
  
• 
  
• Conclusion
  
  We have carefully reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD will affect six IAE turbofan engines installed on airplanes of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about one work-hour per engine to perform the actions, and that the average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. No parts are required. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $480.

• Unsafe Condition
  
  (d) This AD results from reports of fractured vortex reducers found at shop visits. We are issuing this AD to inspect for cracks in the vortex reducer. Cracks in the vortex reducer could result in an uncontained failure of the HP compressor stage 3-8 drum and subsequent damage to the airplane.

• Onetime Fluorescent Penetrant Inspection
  
  (f) Fluorescent penetrant inspect the vortex reducer for cracks when the HPC stage 3-8 drum has between 3,000 and 13,500 cycles- since-new (CSN) if all of the following conditions also apply:
  (1) The HPC stage 3-8 drum has ever operated in an engine at the V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2528-D5, V2530-A5, or V2533-A5 thrust ratings,
  (2) The vortex reducer had cycles accumulated on it when mated with the HPC stage 3-8 drum, and
  (3) The HPC stage 3-8 drum had fewer than 3,000 CSN when mated to the vortex reducer.
  (g) If the vortex reducer is cracked, remove both the vortex reducer and the HPC stage 3-8 drum from service.
  (h) After the effective date of this AD, do not return to service any HPC stage 3-8 drum that was removed as specified in paragraph (g) of this AD.

.....(d) This AD results from reports of fractured vortex reducers found at shop visits. We are issuing this AD to inspect for cracks in the vortex reducer. Cracks in the vortex reducer could result in an uncontained failure of the HP compressor stage 3-8 drum and subsequent damage to the airplane.

IAE today celebrated its latest milestone on the V2500 SelectOne™ program when the new engine entered into commercial service with launch customer, IndiGo, after being delivered on time on September 23^rd.
The aircraft, which is leased from Australia’s Allco Finance Group, is being utilized on new round-trip daily services between Jaipur and Ahmedabad, Chennai (via Mumbai) and Guwahati (via Kolkata); between Ahmedabad and Bangalore, Pune and Kolkata, and additional round-trip services between Mumbai and Jaipur.

IAE Executive Vice President – Customer Business, Ian Aitken, said: “Rather than being the end of the road, we view today’s entry into service with IndiGo as the start of a new journey. The airline has backed its engine order with our V2500Select® aftermarket service so we still maintain long-term responsibility for the engines.”

Bruce Ashby, Chief Executive Officer of IndiGo added: “We’re obviously delighted to be the first airline to benefit from the additional advantages that V2500 SelectOne™ offers. We recognized the opportunity for additional savings this new, more fuel-efficient engine could offer us. We are very focused on minimizing operating costs to ensure that our fares remain competitive and we can retain our position as the largest low-fare airline in India.”
IndiGo placed the single largest order for the V2500 in 2005 when it purchased engines for a fleet of 100 A320s, supported by a comprehensive V2500Select® aftermarket agreement. The value of the engine deal alone was $1.7 billion at list prices.

Forumiste Excité a écrit: "Le récente épisode des fissures sur les disk de compresseurs HP des VR2500, dont Indigo a aussi été victime ,......" .....
"J'espère que IAE et RR auront fait le boulot nécessaire (Et les corrections pour l'avenir !)"

• "Où est-il enregistré & 'catalogué officiellement, ... le fait qu'il y ait eu (je cite) 'des fissures sur les disk de compresseurs HP des VR2500' ?
  
• "Ou est-il enregistré & catalogué officiellement que la Cie. IndiGo ait été victime d'un tel problème?"
  
• "Où est l'AD y afférent ?"
  
• "Et si les phrases s'avéraient infondées, .... être une fiction, quelle serait l'action appropriée contre l'auteur, ... et les 'sites de l'Internet' ou Forums qui l'hébergent ? "
  

vonrichthoffen a écrit: L'Inde se trouverait sur une autre planète que Toulouse ou Derby ?
Ca ressemble surtout à des temps de chauffe non respectés, par exemple des temps de taxi relativements courts sur un moteur puis décollage immédiatement derrière, le tout avec des avions à la couenne en terme de payload.

• nous ne trouvons toujours aucune trace de mention de 'fissures sur les disques du Compresseur HP';
  
• 
  
• il n'est pas impossible que la responsabilité de Kingfisher soit engagée, .... car, à ce jour, nous ne trouvons toujours pas de trace du genre d'accord (tel que celui conclu par IAE & IndiGo) entre IAE & Kingfisher. Si Kingfisher est responsable de son entretien, et que la Cie. n'ait pas fait de manière constante les inspections appropriées, ou exécuté les tâches de 'réparation' appropriées, ou demandé au motoriste de les faire, .... Kingfisher pourrait avoir à faire face lui-même à ses problèmes (car ils pourraient s'avérer être bel et bien les siens, .... à tous points de vue, .....même si je pense-- avis personnel-- que ni RR ni IAE, ensemble ou séparément, ne laisseraient jamais tomber Kingfisher, ou un quelconque client) ;
  
• 
  
• dans cette affaire, l'AD semble réfléchir la conclusion que, aux yeux des Autorités concernées, l'affaire du "vortex reducer" est la "root cause", ... et que le reste n'est que conséquences (à potentiel grave, bien sûr), ... d'où le "fix", comme mesure conservatoire, ... "en aval", .... ce qui offre de très nets avantages en matière de sécurité, et, bien entendu, assure l'apport d'une composante supplémentaire dans la "chaîne qualité" / '"eloignement du risque" !
  
• 
  

The [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]has issued an [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] calling for immediate inspections of[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien], -3B and B1 engines for potential fan disk failure, following the discovery of parts from the shattered engine which broke apart in mid-air while powering a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] on 25 January (2007).

Inspection of the parts, which were recovered from countryside southwest of Denver, Colorado, indicated that the fan disk was caused by a crack which had developed in the bore of the disk itself. Close inspection of the pieces revealed this had been caused by an electrical arc-out defect which left a blemish on the inside of the bore.

J'ajoute, que à travers tout ce bruit ... eh bien l'aviation n'a jamais été aussi si sûre, côté moteurs (Cf le récent article sur les Etops) et j'ai lu récemment que cela faisait 14 ans que la structure d'un avion n'avait pas été si sérieusement endommagée, par une explosion de moteur !
Les disques qui partent en morceaux, c'est heureusement très rare de nos jours !

.......... American 767 At LAX June 2, 2006

......... some shots from an American 767 At LAX that had a turbine wheel failure @ 100% take off power...ya just gotta see this...

The results of turbine wheel failure at 100% take off power. Puncture of both wing tanks & lft center tank with nearly 8K lbs fuel on board caused massive fire damage. .........

American Airlines Boeing 767 doing a high power engine run had a #1 engine HPT failure. HPT let go and punctured left wing, #2 engine, peppered fuselage and set fire to the aircraft. The turbine disk exits the engine and slices through the aircraft belly and lodges in the outboard side of the #2 engine

American Airlines Boeing 767 N330AA flew as flight AA201 from New York-JFK (JFK) to Los Angeles (LAX). During a step climb from FL 360 to FL 380 en route to LAX, the pilots noted that the No. 1 engine was lagging the right engine by about 2 percent. The flight landed at LAX at 09:37. After the passengers had disembarked, the plane was towed to hangar nr.2 and was parked outside. Maintenance personnel were going to conducting a ground run to troubleshoot the reported discrepancy. Several engine runups to maximum power were performed on both engines. Then they did two runups to max power of just the nr. 1 engine. When retarding the throttle to idle, the engine experienced an uncontained rupture of the high pressure turbine (HPT) stage 1 disk. Debris punctured the fuselage and fell onto adjacent runway and taxiways. Runway 25R and Taxiways B and C were closed for several hours until the investigation and collection of the debris could be accomplished. The engine caught fire and the plane sustained significant damage to the left wing, fuselage, and tail section.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The HPT stage 1 disk failed from an intergranular fatigue crack because of GE's inadequate design of the CF6-80 series HPT stage 1 disk.

The inadequate design of the disk resulted in a high stress area in the blade slot bottom aft corner that was at or nearly at the material's capability so that there was no damage tolerance such that a small dent could cause a crack to initiate and propagate to failure.

Contributing to the disk's failure was the FAA's failure to mandate an accelerated inspection schedule after a previous CF6-80A uncontained HPT stage 1 disk failure had occurred and after other CF6-80A HPT disks had been found during routine overhaul to have cracks in the blade slot bottom aft corners."

Follow-up / safety actions:
On August 18, 2006, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive AD 2006-16-06 which included a schedule for maintenance -- removal, inspection, and reworking -- of CF6-80 series HPT stage 1 disks beginning at 6,900 cycles.

On Augst 28, 2006 the NTSB issued five recommendations (A-06-60/-64) to the FAA. Two of the recommendations were classified Urgent. Despite the AD that had been issued, the Safety Board proposed on an urgent basis that the FAA require that the disks be immediately removed for maintenance if they have been in service for more than 3,000 cycles since new or since the last inspection. This significantly more stringent standard would not permit disks to remain in service without inspection beyond the earliest known number of cycles at which cracks have been detected or failure has occurred.

Jeannot a écrit:L'EASA n'impose plus de contrôles répétés et rapprochés de certains éléments des T900 en exploitation

Airlines can stop Trent 900 checks: EASA

Operators of Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines will no longer be required to carry out repeated inspections of certain engine parts that were mandated by Europe's safety regulator after last November's uncontained engine failure on a Qantas Airways A380.
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has cancelled the most recent airworthiness directive it issued on 21 December 2010, which listed the requirements for operators to inspect the high pressure / intermediate pressure (HP/IP) structure of Trent 900s.

An uncontained failure of a Trent 900 on a Qantas A380 on 4 November had prompted the EASA to issue the airworthiness directives, which called on operators to carry out repeated inspections of their engines' low pressure turbine case drain, HP/IP structure air buffer cavity and oil service tubes to check for abnormal oil leakage.

Investigations into the Qantas incident have showed that the engine failure was a result of thinning in an oil feed tube, which led to an oil leak and fire. The thinning was introduced during the manufacturing process.

"Since the last airworthiness directive issued on 21 December, the EASA says "the latest progress of the ongoing investigation, further assessment of manufacturing data and additional stress analysis continue to support the above failure scenario".

"In addition, all HP/IP structures containing an oil feed tube with a wall section below a certain threshold, and therefore having a potential risk of fracture, have been removed from service," it adds.
Inspections so far have not identified other engines that are at risk to "develop a failure scenario similar to the uncontained engine failure event", says the EASA.
The safety regulator adds that the inspections are "intrusive" and "introduce some risk from possible maintenance errors".

"The root cause of the incident having been addressed through other adequate measures, it is considered prudent to cancel these inspections," says the EASA.

[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

....Toi qui est doué pour les AD !
Tu peux le trouver ??
Savoir surtout si les PB de Butée et de splines bénéficient de cette levée d'écrou !
(Ce qui indiquerait qu'une vraie réforme du côté des boites à roulements et de la rigidité de l'ensemble à été apportée )

Tu as raison, le tuyau mal usiné à été le déclencheur final et brutal ... de la cata, et surtout de son intensité !
Mais pas la seule raison, sinon il n'y aurait pas eu de chasse à la boite à roulements !

• deux événements à conséquences regrettables et à fort potentiel dramatique, mais chacun totalement déconnecté ("totally unrelated to" ) de l'autre (verdict officiel que l'Agité de service / "Dead-horse Flogger" devrait apprendre à respecter, au lieu de couvrir des pages et des pages d'avis contraires, alignés n'importe comment, dans sa bave interminable).
  

• atténuer le danger généré par le "shrapnel" ('chauffé à blanc instantanément) que le fracassement, en raison de la violence de l'énergie (thermocinétique ? Demander à Monsisur Fû, par exemple), lors d'un incident de la soudaineté et de la puissance de celui qui a eu lieu dans un 'incendie d'huile' (en milieu clos, de dimension plutôt réduite), .... pour...
  
• réduire ou mitiger le potentiel des dégâts collatéraux ("collateral damage"), capables de compromettre la sécurité et l'intégrité de l'airframe.
  

Quelqu'un pourrait nous le prédire ?

Rupture de l'arbre IP suite à la sur-vitesse, causée par la surpression due à la combustion de l'huile !
C'est l'arbre qui à lâché, la partition du disc et les dégâts causés en sont la conséquence, le disc n'est pas la cause directe, ça on l'a toujours dit !

Airlines can stop Trent 900 checks: EASA

Operators of Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines will no longer be required to carry out repeated inspections of certain engine parts that were mandated by Europe's safety regulator after last November's uncontained engine failure on a Qantas Airways A380.
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has cancelled the most recent airworthiness directive it issued on 21 December 2010, which listed the requirements for operators to inspect the high pressure / intermediate pressure (HP/IP) structure of Trent 900s.

An uncontained failure of a Trent 900 on a Qantas A380 on 4 November had prompted the EASA to issue the airworthiness directives, which called on operators to carry out repeated inspections of their engines' low pressure turbine case drain, HP/IP structure air buffer cavity and oil service tubes to check for abnormal oil leakage.

Investigations into the Qantas incident have showed that the engine failure was a result of thinning in an oil feed tube, which led to an oil leak and fire. The thinning was introduced during the manufacturing process.

"Since the last airworthiness directive issued on 21 December, the EASA says "the latest progress of the ongoing investigation, further assessment of manufacturing data and additional stress analysis continue to support the above failure scenario".

"In addition, all HP/IP structures containing an oil feed tube with a wall section below a certain threshold, and therefore having a potential risk of fracture, have been removed from service," it adds.
Inspections so far have not identified other engines that are at risk to "develop a failure scenario similar to the uncontained engine failure event", says the EASA.
The safety regulator adds that the inspections are "intrusive" and "introduce some risk from possible maintenance errors".

"The root cause of the incident having been addressed through other adequate measures, it is considered prudent to cancel these inspections," says the EASA.

emergency landing at Changi airport on November 4. The damaged engine of the Qantas A380 passenger plane QF32 after it made an emergency landing at Changi airport on November 4. Photo: Reuters

After months of saying little in the wake of the engine explosion on Qantas Airbus QF32 last November, Rolls-Royce faced questions at its stand at the Avalon air show.

Meanwhile, Qantas A380 engines have experience two similar oil problems in recent weeks, with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigating the latest incident where a jet experienced a partial power loss on February 24.

Qantas said both leaks last month affected different parts of the engine than those involved in the November explosion.

The airline has raised the issue with Rolls-Royce and is awaiting feedback, it said .....

Mais, nous répétons, ... nous, .... que l'ATSB a bien raison d'ouvrir une enquête séparée !

The engine maker is working with Qantas, David Mair, a spokesman for London-based Rolls-Royce, said by phone.

Rolls-Royce Australia Services' chief executive Andrew Dudgeon spoke to Fairfax Media for the first time, defending how the British company handled the fallout from the November 4 mid-air engine explosion on a Qantas A380 carrying 469 people over Batam Island.
Mr Dudgeon, who is the company's local executive engaged in negotiations with Qantas over compensation, said reports that Rolls-Royce already knew it had a problem with the Trent 900 engine were incorrect.
"It's a fallacy to say we knew there was a problem with the engine," Mr Dudgeon said at the company's exhibitors' stand at the airshow. "There was no known problem with the A380 engine."

But when pressed about the details of the two subsequent modifications made to the original engine design certified by the European Aviation Safety Agency, and when or whether those modifications were sent for re-certification to assure their safety, Mr Dudgeon said these were engineering details he did not know.

Modifications were "continually" introduced as new ways of doing things were devised and were retrofitted back into engines, he said..

But the company had moved swiftly by dedicating 350 of its engineers to find the source of the engine explosion, he said.

"We had the [turbine] disc back at Derby (in the United Kingdom) for analysis within two days.
"We investigated, isolated and fixed the problem," he said. .

• il n'eût pas pu s'agir d'un simple "no-modification AD" ;
  
• les avions ne seraient pas en train de voler / de cotinuer à voler ! Il y aurait eu besoin d'un programme d'essais et de recertification !
  

The problem that caused the uncontained Trent 900 engine explosion on QF32 was unrelated to the oil problem on a Qantas A380 on February 15, en route to London that led to a partial power loss, he said.
"It was only a very small oil leak," he said. "It did not require an engine shutdown."
But Australia's air safety investigators have launched a further inquiry after another Qantas A380 suffered a similar partial power loss on February 24 over decreasing engine oil levels.

Australia's air safety investigators found a fire from leaking oil led to the QF32 engine explosion, traced to a badly manufactured oil stub pipe.
Qantas estimates the cost on its business at $80 million, excluding brand damage, and "at least" $100 million in damage to the aircraft and engine repairs (covered by insurance or Rolls-Royce).
Mr Dudgeon said the company was "close to settlement" with Qantas, but declined to indicate a ballpark compensation figure.

When asked about whether Rolls-Royce was prepared for compensation claims from the insurers for Airbus and Qantas, Mr Dudgeon said he was unaware that such claims might be made.
"I've not heard that at all," he said.

He defended the company remaining publicly tight-lipped about the QF32 engine explosion until the facts were known.

"We report to our customer, Qantas," he said.

The Trent family of engines had flown 38 million hours and the company had not had an uncontained disc failure since 1994, he said.
He branded some media reports about the QF32 incident as "scaremongering" that "doesn't help anyone".
with Bloomberg

En outre, il n'y a eu aucune chasse à la boîte à roulements ("bearing box"). Il y a eu un examen, tout à fait normal et inévitable, en raison d'un problèlme historique sur un RR Trent 700, pendant les années 1990 !

Mais, pour le Trent 900, RR a décidé de son propre chef, d'y apporter rapidement, une modification, assez facile de réalisation, pour la raison suivante :

• atténuer le danger généré par le "shrapnel" ('chauffé à blanc instantanément) que le fracassement, en raison de la violence de l'énergie (thermocinétique ? Demander à Monsieur Fû, par exemple), lors d'un incident de la soudaineté et de la puissance de celui qui a eu lieu dans un 'incendie d'huile' (en milieu clos, de dimension plutôt réduite), .... pour...
  
• réduire ou mitiger le potentiel des dégâts collatéraux ("collateral damage"), capables de compromettre la sécurité et l'intégrité de l'airframe.

• Les pneus de Concorde, développés par Michelin, après la tragédie de de Roissy (Gonesse), destinées à subir une déformation "zéro" (ou infîme) pendant le décollage, ..... et, ....
  
• ayant des caractéristiques qui, dans le cas d'un incident d'éclatement du pneu, quelle qu'en soit la raison, "cracherait" de petits morceaux de caoutchouc "shrapnel", dans l'analogie), de faible poids, libérés avec une vélocité réduite, de façon à écarter tout risque de "blessure" de la "peau" de la voilure de l'avion, et des réservoirs, .... et (grâce à la protection interne de ces derniers par un tapissage de kevlar) de fuite de carburant à débit fortement réduit, à écarter le risque d'incendie violent !
  

• Ces mêmes acteurs ont été très favorables à l'apport de ce type de pneu, à l'atterrisseur principal.
  
• Pourquoi , donc, n'admettent-ils pas les bienfaits visés par le "redesign" du "bearing box", chose qui n'a rien à voir avec un défaut fondamental du moteur, mais, plutôt, d'une mesure d'accompagnement à grand potentiel d'amélioration sur le plan de la sécurité, entre autres.
  

Jeannot a écrit:China Airlines: problèmes de réacteurs sur les A330

China Airlines: problèmes de réacteurs sur les A330

La compagnie aérienne taïwanaise China Airlines a reconnu que trois de ses Airbus A330-300 avaient connu des problèmes de réacteurs qui avaient forcé à l’annulation de leurs vols.
Les autorités de l’aviation civile ont révélé que trois vols en A330-300 de la compagnie nationale au départ de l’aéroport Taoyuan, près de la capitale Taïpei, avaient dû faire demi-tour après avoir subi une extinction de réacteurs, deux fois en décembre 2010 et une fois en janvier 2011.
La compagnie a examiné les moteurs fautifs, des CF6-80E fournis par General Electric, et constaté une usure anormale des pales de turbines, alors que dans les trois cas les moteurs n’avaient pas atteint les 18 000 heures de vol prévues avant maintenance. China Airlines a remplacé les trois réacteurs défaillants et ordonné une inspection de tous les moteurs ayant plus de 12 000 heures de vol sur les dix-huit A330 que compte sa flotte, tout en déposant un recours contre GE – qui vient d’envoyer son PDG à Taïwan. Jusque là 30 des 36 réacteurs concernés ont été inspectés.
Eva Air, l’autre compagnie taïwanaise, a de son côté signalé que ses propres Airbus A330 n’étaient pas équipés des mêmes réacteurs, et donc que ces incidents ne la concernaient pas. Le CF6-80 équipe en revanche des A330 de compagnies comme Aer Lingus, Air France, Continental Airlines, Finnair, KLM, Philippine Airlines, Qantas, Qatar Airways etc…

Etonnant ! N'est-il pas ?

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Sevrien a écrit: ......GE n'aurait pas fait intervenir les Politiques des USA, et, notamment, John Douglass******, pour faire inverser la décision de motoriser les A330 de China Airlines (Taiwan) avec des RR Trent 772B, conformément aux règles de "Tendering" publiées "au monde entier" sur cette affaire !

RR a gagné, haut la main, en stricte conformité avec lesdites règles publiées. Les documents originaux indiquant la sélection de RR furent transmis au 'Premier Ministre', pour notification, ... non pas pour ratification (pas nécessaire, dans les circonstances), ... et ont été retournés aux Responsables de l'Appel d'Offres (y compris des Ministres), avec le nom de RR barré, et remplacé, de façon manuscrite (main du Ier Ministre, paraît-il) , par "General Electric".

Toute la classe Politique européenne, y inclus, notamment J. CHIRAC, G. SCHRODER, et les "Autorités" de l'UE, a cherché à assurer la 'victoire' de RR!

Pendant des mois, les acteurs européens, (sauf RR, bien entendu), ont chercher à faire adopter le vrai vainqueur d'origine. Rien n'y fit ! C'est GE qui a "gagné" !

..... avec son vieux moulin CF6, bon mais dépassé, et frappé des problèmes que nous connaissons aujourd'hui, GE & ses appuis des Autorités américaines, ont tout fait, y compris enfreindre les règles, pour garder la position de main-mise sur la chasse-gardée qu'est Taiwan, aux yeux des USA ! Bien entendu, selon tous les rapports dans les media, GE avait sollicité cette aide !

Aussi, si la remarque, "Peut être que l'A330 ne les intéresse pas plus que ça ?" ne faisait qu'approcher la vérité, GE ne serait pas en train de chercher à se positionner pour remotoriser les A330 existants, et donner un nouveau moteur aux A330 "new build", en cherchant, comme d'habitude, une exclusivité pour GE dans cette opération !

• ayant été gavé pendant des années, surtout dans les media français, qui traitent de l'aéronautique et de l'aviation, de GE (et /ou de P&W ; mais, surtout de GE), comme s'il n'y avait que lui comme motoriste sur la planète,
  
• ayant été frappé constamment par ce qui a tant agacé Flaubert, .... soit le véhiculage (dans les media) des idées reçues et le gobage qui s'ensuit chez les destinataires de ce véhiculage (d'idées fausses, qui ne résistent pas à l'examen des faits réels), ....
  
• j'ai décidé de me joindre au débat, pour travailler à la remise de l'équilibre là-dedans (bien sûr, ... cela agace certains ; tant mieux )!
  

Mais il y a un paquet (au niveau planétaire) de ces auteurs et 'reporters' qui "sévissent" et méritent largement qu'on y leur enfonce la tête !

[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] isn't the only workhorse equipment targeted for extra scrutiny this week. FAA has issued [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]) detailing improper repairs to GE CF6-80A, CF6-80C2 and CF6-80E1 fuel nozzles.

Reported FAA:

Following a routine maintenance check, an airplane was found with a fault message that required replacing the fuel filter. The subsequent leak check found a leaking fuel nozzle. Testing confirmed that the leak was due to an incomplete weld of the nozzle. Additional fuel nozzles repaired using the same procedure were evaluated and a number of nozzles were identified as having an incomplete weld.