NTSB. FAA. Rapports et AD

In a final airworthiness directive (AD) to be published Friday, the FAA has rebuffed efforts by both the Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA) and the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to acclerate a mandated hardware fix with a 2011 deadline for [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] operators with [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] turbofan engines.
The action stems from the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] at Heathrow Airport last year in which accumulated ice in the engine's fuel-oil heat-exchanger (FOHE) is suspected of blocking fuel flow to both engines. The same phenomena likely caused a similar in-flight incident with one engine of a Delta Air Lines 777 in November of 2008.
An interim AD issued in March of this year called on operators to follow certain operational guidelines designed to prevent ice from forming, including in-flight and ground measures.
European regulators in July [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] by equipping aircraft with a redesigned Rolls-Royce FOHE, a device that is supposed to cool the engine oil while at the same time pre-heating the incoming fuel to prevent any water present from freezing. EASA gives operators 6,000 flight hours from July or until 1 January 2011 to make the fix, whichever occurs first.
The FAA final AD to be issued Friday gives operators the same lead time, with the clock starting in early January.
However, ALPA and NTSB have expressed concerns over potential safety issues during the compliance period.
In comments to the proposed rulemaking, issued in July, ALPA requested that the compliance time be set as soon as six months after the January effective date for the AD as interim procedures call for "an immediate idle descent to melt the blockage" in the case of an engine rollback.
Union concerns include the potential for traffic conflicts during such descents in remote areas with no radar separation.
"This engine rollback is very insidious to the crew and creates the potential for a pilot to be faced with an immediate descent without adequate time to compensate for traffic, weather, or terrain," ALPA states.
Fearing similar incidents, NTSB had called on the FAA to mandate that at least one engine on each affected aircraft be modified with the redesigned FOHE by the end of December this year.
"The NTSB believes that the January 1, 2011 compliance date for installation of the new FOHE is not consistent with the risk associated with the original FOHE design."
The FAA rebuffed both requests however, telling the organizations that the interim operational procedures would "assure continued safe operation until hardware modifications become available

Rejecting safety warnings from crash investigators and pilots, federal aviation regulators have decided to allow more than 130 [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] Co. 777 jetliners to continue flying long-distance international trips through early 2011 with suspect parts that have caused engines in extremely rare instances to ice up and basically shut down in midair.
The Federal Aviation Administration's move, announced last week, caps months of debate in the international aviation community about the potential hazards of ice plugging up certain internal piping parts and restricting fuel flow to engines built by [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] PLC, particularly during extended, high-altitude flights crossing polar regions. Citing the possibility of engine shutdowns or emergency descents, critics wanted at least some of the suspect parts replaced by the end of this year, and in any event no later than mid-2010.
One reason for the later regulatory deadline is the limited availability of replacement parts, according to industry officials. The FAA rejected recommendations by the National Transportation Safety Board to order affected Boeing 777 operators to swiftly replace parts on at least one of the two engines on each aircraft. But maintenance officials at [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] Corp.'s American Airlines unit, a major Boeing 777 operator, recently said they still are pushing to complete such a partial replacement effort as quickly as possible.
Boeing officials have said the fixes so far are adequate to assure safety, but the company continues to study the technical issues and consult with regulators to determine future steps.
In releasing the long-awaited safety directive, the FAA determined that interim operational safeguards it previously imposed provide an adequate safety margin to put off permanent hardware fixes until January 2011. Ice-induced shutdowns covered by the latest FAA regulation are extremely rare, with only three events recorded over millions of flights. But when the problem suddenly crops up—as it did on a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] PLC jet that crashed short of a runway while approaching London's Heathrow Airport in January 2008—the result can be catastrophic. The plane was substantially damaged, and 13 people aboard sustained serious or minor injuries. A [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] Inc. jet suffered a brief, single-engine thrust reduction in November 2008, while cruising at 39,000 feet from Shanghai to Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport.
The FAA's action came just a few days after the agency ordered stepped-up inspections of another type of widely-used Rolls-Royce engine. The agency said it acted "to prevent internal oil fires" that can cause certain parts of the engines to break off, perhaps shoot outside their protective covering at high speed and end up damaging the airplane.
Less than nine months ago, the safety board was concerned enough about the phenomenon of ice buildup inside Rolls-Royce engines to issue urgent recommendations for redesign of the suspect parts.
As an interim step, the FAA has mandated that pilots take certain precautionary moves to prevent ice from building up inside sections of the engine-fuel tubing and restricting fuel flow to the engines. After long periods of cruise and before starting descents, pilots must temporarily increase the thrust settings on certain Rolls-Royce engines. The maneuver is designed to prevent a sheet of ice from building up on the surfaces of the oil cooler and potentially starving engines of adequate fuel. The oil cooler is a heat exchanger that warms up fuel while cooling engine oil.
In urging more-aggressive action to deal with the complex problem, the safety board told the FAA that the extended phase-in of the new part wasn't consistent with the risk stemming from the original design.
Rolls-Royce has indicated it is cooperating with Boeing and European jet maker Airbus, which also uses its engines, to analyze the icing phenomenon.
Representatives of the Air Line Pilots Association, the largest pilot union in North America, separately urged faster action on the grounds that Boeing 777 planes often operate "over oceanic and geographically remote areas where radar surveillance may not exist and communications with the air-traffic control [systems] is encumbered by language limits [and] poor radio reception," according to the FAA regulation. Under such circumstances, the pilot group told the FAA, crews could be faced with an immediate descent without adequate time to compensate for traffic, weather or terrain.

The Federal Aviation Administration has taken fire on runway safety and pilot fatigue issues this week.
First, National Transportation Safety Board Chairwoman Deborah Hersman kicked off the FAA's 2009 International [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] Tuesday by noting that the FAA has fully implemented none of the six runway safety recommendations that the board issued in July 2000.
"It has taken over nine years to achieve partial acceptance of recommendations made in an area, runway safety, that is viewed as critical by both the FAA and the NTSB – and some of the FAA's recent responses to the NTSB on those July 2000 recommendations have asked for more time for further analysis," Hersman said in [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]. "We really need to do better than that."
Hersman noted that the NTSB's top-priority requests of the FAA and industry include:

• Giving immediate warnings of probable collisions or incursions directly to cockpit flight crews;
  
• Requiring specific air traffic control clearance for each runway crossing;
  
• Installing cockpit moving map displays or automatic systems to alert pilots of attempted takeoffs from taxiways or wrong runways;
  
• Requiring landing distance assessment with an adequate safety margin.
  

"When we investigate accidents and reiterate recommendations we made previously, everyone in the aviation community is accountable, because that subsequent accident was preventable," she said.
The Oct. 19 landing of a Delta Airlines Boeing 767 on a taxiway in Atlanta didn't count as an incursion, because the taxiway was parallel to the runway, and hasn't brought much of a backlash, because nobody got hurt, Hersman said.
"Obviously, a heavy jet unexpectedly traveling across the wrong part of the world's busiest airport at 150 knots represents a serious hazard, and with only a slight change in circumstances this incident could have become a catastrophic accident," she said. "There is no need to wait for an actual accident; this event is entirely sufficient to show we have room for improvement, and I expect that once the circumstances are fully understood, appropriate corrective actions will follow to prevent similar future events at Atlanta and other airports."
See NTSB animations of two near-miss runway incidents [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien].
Asked about Hersman's criticisms, FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown said the agency "takes every NTSB recommendation seriously and agrees with the safety intent of most of the board's recommendations."
The FAA has successfully implemented more than 80 percent of the board's more-than 4,000 recommendations on varous issues, Brown said.
"A lot of the board's recommendations deal with very challenging problems," she said. "In some cases meeting their recommendations involves rule making, in some cases changes to the law; in some cases it requires us to develop technology that isn't fully mature or doesn't exist yet."
The lack of existing technology was a major hurdle to implementing runway surveillance systems the board recommended in 2000, Brown said. "We had to essentially invent the technology before we could deploy it."
The FAA has since developed the technology, accelerated implementation by about a year and paid airlines to install cockpit systems as part of a pilot project to review several different types of systems, she said. "Before we deploy it into the aviation system we have to test it."
Hersman noted that major runway incursions have recently dropped by more than 50 percent, but said the recession-driven decline in air traffic might be contributing to that. Brown noted that overall traffic has dropped by just 10 to 13 percent in the same period, and credited the FAA's 2007 runway safety call to action for the reduction in incursions.
Steps since then include airlines developing simulator training for taxiing, large airports improving paint markings before they were required to and smaller airports improving markings even though they were not subject to the requirement, Brown said.
Although not the focus on her talk, Hersman noted that another of the board's priorities is addressing pilot and controller fatigue. And FAA officials faced questions about that -- particularly pilot fatigue -- from senators Tuesday.
"Addressing pilot fatigue is an issue for which it has taken far too long to achieve meaningful reform," Senate Transportation Committee Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV, D-W.V., said in [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]. "This has always been a critical issue, yet it has languished on the National Transportation Safety Board's Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements since the list was first published nearly two decades ago."
The issue has taken on new urgency because of industry changes in recent years, Rockefeller said.
"Pilots are pushed to aggressively perform as many take-off and landings as they can each day, while new aircraft can fly incredibly long routes halfway around the globe," he said. "Stories of pilots anonymously admitting to nodding off, or even a case last year where both pilots fell asleep while flying a commercial aircraft on a short flight, highlight the need to confront this issue directly and immediately."
One impetus for the urgency is February's crash of a regional Colgan Air flight in Buffalo, killing 50 people. The pilots, who both died in the crash, had traveled from Seattle and Tampa, Fla., to Newark, N.J., before the flight.
"You've got people whose work station is on the East Coast, flying from all over the country just to go to work," Sen. Byron L. Dorgan, D-N.D., who heads the committee's aviation panel, said at the hearing, according to an L.A. Times [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]. "I'm not suggesting that people shouldn't commute. I am suggesting that if you're going to have this kind of substantial commuting, you better understand that you're going to have some problems."
The financial crisis in the airline industry has pushed pilots to fly longer without adequate rest, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] John Prater, president of the Airline Pilots Association International, which represents 53,000 pilots at 36 U.S. and Canadian airlines.
"We receive daily reports of scheduling that causes pilots to be virtual 'zombies,'" he said. "The domestic flight and duty rules were last amended in 1985 with the promise that the FAA would revisit these rules in two years. Twenty-five years later we are still waiting to review them."
But Margaret Gilligan, the FAA's associate administrator for aviation safety, noted that, in addition to proscribed limits: "Pilots also have a regulatory responsibility to not fly when they are not fit, including being fatigued."
Prater said the U.S. is not meeting an International Civil Aviation Organization requirement to base flight limitations on science.
Prater and William Voss, president and chief executive of the nonprofit Flight Safety Foundation, called for using comprehensive fatigue risk management systems that take in prevention factors, such as scheduling, accommodations, training; mitigation, such as trip planning and rest facilities; and intervention, including guidelines for tired pilots, timely caffeine intake and controlled rest on the flight deck.
"Canada is one of many countries that have determined that safety is best served by allowing – and regulating – controlled napping in the cockpit. This is a position that Flight Safety Foundation heartily endorses and calls on the FAA to do the same," Voss said in his [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]. "The idea of controlled rest in the United States is, unfortunately, colored by well-publicized episodes of uncontrolled rest."
It's good that the FAA is participating in the International Civil Aviation Organization's efforts to replace flight and duty time limits with fatigue risk management systems, Voss said. He urged the FAA to follow Canada's lead in expanding fatigue rules to cover maintenance crews as well.
Voss also asserted that different types of flying need different rules.
"An eight-hour work day means two different things for the ultra-long range operator and the regional operator," he said. "Multiple take offs and landings over that time period can lead to a higher level of fatigue due to the higher work load activities."
Basil Barimo, the Air Transport Association of America's vice president for operations and safety, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] new rest rules, including allowing "controlled cockpit napping." But the industry representative also said rules much recognize differences between domestic and international passenger flights, domestic and international cargo operations, and on-demand charter operations.
"Nothing in fatigue and sleep research justifies a one-size-fits-all approach," he said.
Prater disagreed, saying there should be "one level of safety in flight time limitation regulations.
"Scheduled passenger, all-cargo and charter air carrier operations are no different when it comes to the actual operation of the aircraft," he said. "All three types of operations use the same aircraft, the same airspace, and the same airports in the same cities. As such, there is no rational basis for cargo or charter pilots to have different or more liberal fatigue rules than scheduled passenger operations."
Barimo also said rules should distinguish between flying and time spent in administrative duties or activities such as checking e-mail or using the telephone, and called for a transition period of at least two years to allow airlines to implement new rules.
Gilligan noted that the FAA proposed a new rule on flight time and rest limits in 1995, but withdrew it because most of the more than 2,000 comments from the aviation community and the public were negative, and "there was no clear consensus on what the final rule should say." She said the agency has been trying off and on to come up with a new rule ever since.
The latest effort started in June, when the FAA set up a new committee with 18 labor, industry and government representatives to develop recommendations. The FAA asked the committee to come up with a new approach that incorporated science, international standards and fatigue risk management systems.
The committee delivered its final report on Sept. 10 and the FAA is now drafting a proposed rule, Gilligan said.
"I will readily acknowledge that this effort has been difficult, and has taken us longer than we wanted or expected," she said. "The events of the last 15 years evidence the complexity of the issue and the strong concerns of the parties involved, and those are clear in the current rulemaking as well. At the same time, our focused effort since June demonstrates the high priority that (FAA) Administrator (Randy) Babbitt and I, along with the rest of the FAA team, place on overcoming these challenges and updating these regulations to enhance safety. I am confident we will get there."

The [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] has finalised an airworthiness directive that requires [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] CRJ700/900 operators to update aircraft flight manuals for cold weather operations related to frost, snow, slush and ice and the wings and leading edges of the aircraft.
First proposed in May, the directive applies to 336 aircraft on the US registry. Operators will have two weeks from 8 January, the effective date of the AD, to update the flight manuals with cold weather procedures developed by Transport Canada.
The FAA notes that frost, snow, slush or ice on the wing leading edges and upper wing surfaces "may change the stall speeds, stall characteristics and the protection provided by the stall protection system, which could result in reduced controllability of the aircraft".

The Federal Aviation Administration Wednesday proposed a $2.9 million fine against American Eagle
Airlines for operating more than 1,000 flights using airplanes that had improper repairs on landing gear doors.

"Safety is our No. 1 priority at the Department of Transportation," Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood said in a news release. "And airlines must know that if safety is compromised, they will be subject to stiff fines."

From February to May 2008, American Eagle conducted at least 1,178 flights with passengers using four
Bombardier jets with main landing gear doors that had not been repaired in accordance with an Airworthiness Directive that became effective in August 2006, the FAA said.

"Following airworthiness directives is not optional," FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt said. "The FAA does not hesitate to levy fines if maintenance standards are violated."

Airworthiness Directive 2006-14-05 required operators of certain Bombardier jets to remove damaged left
and right main landing gear inboard doors and replace them with new or repaired ones.

But American Eagle, after finding damage on four aircraft, repaired the doors while they remained on the planes, the FAA said.

The FAA said inspectors found American Eagle operated at least 961 flights while it was unaware of the situation and another 217 flights after the problem was discovered.

American Eagle subsequently removed the landing gear doors on each of the affected aircraft and repaired them in accordance with the airworthiness directive. The airline has 30 days to respond to the proposed fine.

FAA mandates Airbus collision avoidance modification

The US FAA has finalised an airworthiness directive (AD) that will require operators of more than 500 [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] family aircraft to update critical avionics software related to the aircraft's traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS).
The estimated costs of the upgrade, which takes four hours to complete, is roughly $15,000 per aircraft.
FAA's decision to adopt the new rule is the result of two near mid-air collisions that occurred between A320 family aircraft, incidents that prompted the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to issue an airworthiness directive on the TCAS alerting function in November 2008.
Investigators concluded that human factors issues related to the incidents, which involved resolution advisories issued by TCAS, included a lack of visibility of "relevant information" on the primary flight display regarding the flight control inputs necessary to avoid a collision.
"This condition, if not corrected, could result in erroneous interpretation of TCAS resolution advisories, leading to an increased risk of mid-air collision," says the FAA. The FAA rule is identical to the original directive issued by EASA.
FAA first proposed to mandate the software upgrade in July 2009, calling for changing out the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] electronic instrument system software with a new version that "consists of a change in the needle colour and thickness and an increase in the width of the TCAS green band".
The rule requires operators to change out the software, per a January 2008 Airbus mandatory service bulletin, within five years

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an emergency airworthiness directive Friday requiring that airlines inspect about 600 Boeing 737s to check a mechanism that controls the flap on the horizontal tails of the jets.
Some of the jets must be inspected within 12 days, and the rest within 30 days. FAA spokesman Allen Kenitzer said about half the affected airplanes are operating in the U.S.
He said the directive stems from an in-flight incident on March 2, when a Ryanair 737-800 en route from Eindhoven in the Netherlands to Madrid, Spain, with 146 passengers aboard experienced "severe vibration" in flight.
The flight crew diverted the airplane, which landed safely and uneventfully in Brussels, Belgium.
An inspection afterward found "extensive damage" to the left elevator, which is a movable flap on the horizontal tail that controls the pitch of the airplane, up or down.
The FAA airworthiness directive described the damage as "failure of the aft attach lugs on the left elevator tab control mechanism."
"Severe vibration in this attach point is suspected of allowing rapid wear of the joint and resulted in failure of the attach lugs," the FAA report said. "This condition, if not corrected, could result in a loss of aircraft control and structural integrity."
During the required inspection of affected planes, mechanics are instructed to look for damage to the attachment points of the elevator-control mechanism. If they find these lugs damaged, the plane must be grounded until the mechanism is replaced.
The Ryanair jet that experienced the vibration in March was a relatively new airplane.
It was delivered from Boeing's Renton plant in April 2008 and had completed 4,233 flight cycles. Kenitzer, the FAA spokesman, said the elevator tab on the jet's horizontal tail was the latest design, one mandated by a previous FAA directive in 2003 that was intended "to prevent severe vibration of the elevator and elevator tab assembly."
That earlier directive required a retrofit redesign involving 88 hours of work at a cost of more than $5,000 per jet. The FAA said then it was necessary to prevent "severe damage to the horizontal stabilizer followed by possible loss of the elevator tab and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane."
However, Boeing spokeswoman Sandy Angers said the problem that has now come to light with the elevator tab attachment lugs "is a separate issue.
Boeing issued a service bulletin earlier Friday recommending that airlines inspect the mounting lugs on all its newer-generation 737s, more than 3,000 of which are flying.
However, the emergency FAA directive mandating the inspections applies only to about 600 of those jets considered more at risk and that must be inspected within a month. Whether a jet must be checked within 12 days or within 30 days depends upon its age, its total accumulated flight cycles and if it is approved to fly extended flights"

FAA calls for fix to Boeing 777

Airlines must install new software on Boeing 777s to keep the jets from potentially going off the end of runways.
The Federal Aviation Administration directive, which the agency has not yet posted to its Web site, comes after incidents involving the jet's autopilot.
"Boeing had received operator reports of flight crews inadvertently engaging the autopilot while on the ground," Boeing spokeswoman Sandy Angers explained Tuesday. "When the flight crew inadvertently engages the autopilot during the lower-speed phase of takeoff, the control column forces will be higher than normal when the pilot attempts to initiate takeoff rotation. This can result in a high-speed rejected takeoff, and increases the possibility of a runway overrun."
Angers noted that the 777 fleet has notched more than 4.8 million flights over its 15-year history, with just nine reported instances of a rejected takeoff because of inadvertent engagement of the autopilot and no runway overruns or injuries associated with the events.
Boeing supports the FAA's rule, which "essentially mandates the service bulletin Boeing issued to operators on Jan. 22, 2010," Angers said. The service bulletin advised airlines to install new software that prevents flight crews from inadvertently engaging the autopilot before takeoff.
The fix ultimately could affect more than 800 777s worldwide, The Wall Street Journal [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] Tuesday.

NTSB issues urgent recommendations for CF6 engines

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued four urgent safety recommendations to the FAA following uncontained engine failures in four recent incidents.
The first recommendation covers a blade borescope inspection every 15 flight cycles for the GE [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-45 and -50 high pressure turbine rotor until a redesigned disk can be installed.
CF6-45 and -50 model engines power [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-15/30s, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-200s/300s and the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] A300B.
The recommendations apply to the low pressure turbine (LPT) stage three (S3) rotor disk, which the NTSB says "can fail unexpectedly when excited by high-pressure (HP) rotor unbalance".
The second recommendation covers a re-design of the disk to withstand unbalanced vibration forces from the high pressure rotor.
The remaining two recommendations to the FAA would require operators to perform a fluorescent penetrant inspection on the LPT S3 during every shop visit, and install the newly designed disk "at the next maintenance opportunity".
The four recommendations come after four recent incidents involving CF6-45 and -50 powered aircraft. On 4 July 2008 a Saudi Arabian Airlines [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] 747-300 experienced an engine failure on climb out from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
The next incident occurred 26 March 2009 when an Arrow Cargo [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] DC-10F in Manaus, Brazil experienced a loss of oil pressure in one engine, prompting an in-flight shut down.
Following that shut down, on 17 December 2009 the crew of a Jett8 Cargo Boeing 747-200F heard a muffled explosion and immediately applied left rudder and lost pressure in one engine. The aircraft landed at Changi Airport, Singapore.
The final incident that led NTSB to issue the urgent recommendations occurred 10 April 2010 when an ACT Cargo Airbus A300B4 experienced an engine failure on takeoff roll from Manama, Bahrain, prompting a rejected takeoff and an activation of the aircraft's fire suppression system.
"Engine cases are not designed to contain failed turbine disks," says NTSB. "Instead, the risk of an uncontained disk failure is mitigated by designating disks as safety-critical parts, defined as the parts of an engine whose failure is likely to present a direct hazard to the aircraft.

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued four urgent safety recommandations to the FAA following uncontained engine failures in four recent incidents.
The first recommendation covers a blade borescope inspection every 15 flight cycles for the GE [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-45 and -50 high pressure turbine rotor until a redesigned disk can be installed.

CF6-45 and -50 model engines power [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-15/30s, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-200s/300s and the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] A300B.
The recommendations apply to the low pressure turbine (LPT) stage three (S3) rotor disk, which the NTSB says "can fail unexpectedly when excited by high-pressure (HP) rotor unbalance".

• occultation, de non-déclaration, ..... & / ou...
  
• déclaration tardive ou incomplète d'un problème-moteur de fond,.....
  
• et d'incidents et de "fixes inadéquats",...... qui ne tiennent pas la distance !
  

The second recommendation covers a re-design of the disk to withstand unbalanced vibration forces from the high pressure rotor.

The remaining two recommendations to the FAA would require operators to perform a fluorescent penetrant inspection on the LPT S3 during every shop visit, and install the newly designed disk "at the next maintenance opportunity".

The four recommendations come after four recent incidents involving CF6-45 and -50 powered aircraft. On 4 July 2008 a Saudi Arabian Airlines [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] 747-300 experienced an engine failure on climb out from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

The next incident occurred 26 March 2009 when an Arrow Cargo [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] DC-10F in Manaus, Brazil experienced a loss of oil pressure in one engine, prompting an in-flight shut down.

Following that shut down, on 17 December 2009 the crew of a Jett8 Cargo Boeing 747-200F heard a muffled explosion and immediately applied left rudder and lost pressure in one engine. The aircraft landed at Changi Airport, Singapore.

The final incident that led NTSB to issue the urgent recommendations occurred 10 April 2010 when an ACT Cargo Airbus A300B4 experienced an engine failure on takeoff roll from Manama, Bahrain, prompting a rejected takeoff and an activation of the aircraft's fire suppression system.
"Engine cases are not designed to contain failed turbine disks," says NTSB. "Instead, the risk of an uncontained disk failure is mitigated by designating disks as safety-critical parts, defined as the parts of an engine whose failure is likely to present a direct hazard to the aircraft.

• sur une grande partie de la planète,
  
• aux USA, ...... ce qui se comprend,
  
• et surtout, pour ce qui est de l'Europe, en France, quasiment seulement en France, ..... ce qui ne se comprend pas (si ce n'est que, n'ayant pas de motoriste national, 'domestique', .... qui couvre toute la gammes de moteurs -- loin s'en faut -- il faille soutenir le "champion" GE, qui y donne du travail à son motoriste sous-traitant -- dans le marché des avions civils, ... s'entend -- faute de mieux, .... mais avec des arguments ridicules,, .... ce qui se comprend encore moins, ...
  

• RR RB211 de "vieille génération" ont été ainsi frappés de mesures draconiennes du NTSB (aucun ! );
  
• de P&W de ja famille PW 4000 de "vieille génération" ont été ainsi frappés de mesures draconiennes du NTSB (aucun ! )
  

• la non-déclaration de certains incidents-moteur,
  
• ou la 'minimisation' de la gravité des incidents déclarés,
  
• et la maximisation des efforts pour éviter la déclaration d'IFSD.
  

SEVRIEN a écrit:
...........................................
Nous sommes en train de regarder la "root cause", / 'la cause racine ou 'd'origine' ', là ou elle naît : dans le moteur, et, notamment, dans l'environnement des disks de turbine et de leurs vibrations, ou celles qu'ils engendrent, ou auxquelles ils sont mêlés ou contribuent !

Et nous sommes en train de regarder un défaut moteur, susceptible même de nuire à, voire de détruire
jusqu'à l'intégrité même de "l'airframe" ! Il suffit de se souvenir de l'incident (au sol), concernant le moteur et l'airframe du B767 d'AA, à l'aéroport de Los Angeles !

Est-ce que les GECL, et autres aveugles du même tonneau, se rendent compte de la gravité de la situation, & du travail, et de son coût, que représente une telle fréquence de "borescopage" ? Tous les 15 cycles de vol ?

Et 'quid' des responsabilités du motoriste ?

CF6-45 and -50 model engines power [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-15/30s, [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-200s/300s and the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] A300B.
The recommendations apply to the low pressure turbine (LPT) stage three (S3) rotor disk, which the NTSB says "can fail unexpectedly when excited by high-pressure (HP) rotor unbalance".

Aux yeux du NTSB, il s'agit d'un problème qui dure depuis des décennies (il suffit fe regarder les familles d'avions concernées .. ! ), .... de mélangé de:

• occultation, de non-déclaration, ..... & / ou...
  
• déclaration tardive ou incomplète d'un problème-moteur de fond,.....
  
• et d'incidents et de "fixes inadéquats",...... qui ne tiennent pas la distance !
  
  

The second recommendation covers a re-design of the disk to withstand unbalanced vibration forces from the high pressure rotor.

Voir remarque précédente.

The remaining two recommendations to the FAA would require operators to perform a fluorescent penetrant inspection on the LPT S3 during every shop visit, and install the newly designed disk "at the next maintenance opportunity".

Pour le NTSB, cela ne doit plus tarder !

The four recommendations come after four recent incidents involving CF6-45 and -50 powered aircraft. On 4 July 2008 a Saudi Arabian Airlines [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] 747-300 experienced an engine failure on climb out from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

The next incident occurred 26 March 2009 when an Arrow Cargo [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] DC-10F in Manaus, Brazil experienced a loss of oil pressure in one engine, prompting an in-flight shut down.

Following that shut down, on 17 December 2009 the crew of a Jett8 Cargo Boeing 747-200F heard a muffled explosion and immediately applied left rudder and lost pressure in one engine. The aircraft landed at Changi Airport, Singapore.

The final incident that led NTSB to issue the urgent recommendations occurred 10 April 2010 when an ACT Cargo Airbus A300B4 experienced an engine failure on takeoff roll from Manama, Bahrain, prompting a rejected takeoff and an activation of the aircraft's fire suppression system.
"Engine cases are not designed to contain failed turbine disks," says NTSB. "Instead, the risk of an uncontained disk failure is mitigated by designating disks as safety-critical parts, defined as the parts of an engine whose failure is likely to present a direct hazard to the aircraft.

Voilà ! Cela permettra de ré-équilibrer le débat !

Worries Emerge on Boeing Cockpit-Oxygen Systems

A cockpit blaze aboard a United Airlines jet last month revived a long-running debate over the dangers of potential windshield electrical fires on hundreds of Boeing aircraft.
But now, the incident also has focused attention on a related safety issue: Pilot complaints that emergency cockpit-oxygen systems on many of the same planes aren't adequate to cope with such hazards.
Starting nearly three years ago, some pilot union leaders have complained that on certain Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft, the hoses for such oxygen systems aren't long enough to allow pilots to keep the masks on while they retrieve the fire-extinguisher stored at the rear of the cockpit. The hose "may restrict movement to parts of the cockpit where the emergency equipment is stored," according to a safety alert issued by the Air Line Pilots Association in September 2007. But "removing the mask in a toxic, smoke-filled environment puts the pilot at risk."
In the fall of 2008, Federal Aviation Administration lawyers supported some of the union's concerns. An internal agency memo concluded that at least one pilot must be able to reach the cockpit fire extinguisher without removing an oxygen mask.
A spokeswoman for The Federal Aviation Administration said last week that the agency is "looking into the issue" of longer hoses, but it has some concerns about pilots possibly getting distracted or even tangled up if the equipment is modified.
The hose issue was highlighted by the May 16 cockpit fire aboard the United Boeing 757, en route from New York to Los Angeles, which made an emergency diversion to Dulles International Airport near Washington. While cruising at 36,000 feet about 30 minutes into the flight, the captain's lower front windshield began to smoke. The plane landed safely and none of the 112 people aboard sustained injuries.
But investigators have said that flames shot out from the windshield, and the fire was serious enough that the crew eventually had to use two onboard fire extinguishers to put it out.
When one of the pilots attempted to reach the extinguisher stored in cockpit while the aircraft was airborne, according to one person briefed on the details of the incident, his oxygen mask and smoke goggles were ripped off his face due to the length of the hose attachment
Over the weekend, a Boeing Co. spokesman didn't have any comment on the matter.
While government and industry officials consider the design of oxygen hoses, underlying windshield hazards remain in the spotlight.
Fire dangers posed by defective electrical connections used on the windshield heating elements of more than 1,000 Boeing 757, 767 and 777 planes have been well documented. From the beginning of 2001 through April 2008, Boeing reported 29 separate incidents world-wide involving windshield smoke or fire. The manufacturer has issued a series of service bulletins urging airlines to ramp up inspections. The most recent revision, released at the end of March, broadens the portions of windshields subject to regular checks. If certain types of damage are detected, Boeing urges replacement of suspect parts or even entire windshields.
The National Transportation Safety Board continues to criticize FAA officials for moving too slowly to mandate precautionary replacement of suspect parts.
In March 2008, the FAA piggybacked on Boeing's recommended maintenance moves and proposed to mandate stepped-up inspections covering more than 1,200 planes registered in the U.S. Hundreds of additional aircraft would be affected by foreign regulators adopting the U.S. agency's standards.
Prompted by the United emergency landing, the FAA is now accelerating work on a final safety mandate covering windshields. But it's not clear whether the FAA ultimately will expand its previous criteria calling for replacement of parts or windshields that show evidence of heat damage or other electrical defects.
With regulators poised to order greater precautions, a number of carriers are taking voluntary steps to reduce windshield smoke and fire hazards
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] Corp.'s American Airlines, on its own, has replaced 85% of the windshields on its 757 and 767 fleets. A spokesman said Friday that by the spring of 2011, all of them will be replaced with product purchased from a different supplier
Current precautionary inspection intervals vary at other big carriers, though some have been shortened as a result of the United fire.
US Airways had been conducting routine inspecting of Boeing 757 windshields every 1,000 flight hours. Now, according to a spokesman, that has been reduced to 500-hour intervals, which is the timetable proposed by the FAA last year. The spokesman said the airline hasn't found any damage or improperly installed connections between power wires and heating elements.
[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] Inc. initially opted for inspections every 3,000 hours, and a spokesman said Friday that hasn't changed.
A spokeswoman for UAL Corp.'s United Airlines said last week that the carrier complies with all of Boeing's recommendations and "has implemented enhancements to our maintenance program" in the wake of the Dulles incident. But over the weekend, she declined to elaborate.

SUMMARY: This AD requires removing from service, nine stage 3 low-pressure turbine (LPT) disks, identified by serial number (S/N).
This AD results from the discovery of a material nonconformity requiring removal of the disk before the certified disk life of certain stage 3 LPT disks. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the stage 3 LPT disk and damage to the airplane.

Jeannot a écrit:Visiblement quelques soucis sur les pylones des 767 d'American. Suffisemment important pour alrter Boeing

Boeing 767 engine pylon cracks raise alarm

Boeing is drafting new guidelines for inspecting the structural integrity of its 767 jetliner after cracks were discovered in the engine pylons of at least two planes operated by American Airlines, The Wall Street Journal reported late Monday. The size of the cracks surprised Boeing officials and there is concern the problems could be more widespread, the newspaper said. Under new guidelines, the manufacturer will likely recommend stepped-up inspections. In one case, cracks in the jet's pylon were so bad that regulators said it could easily have lost an engine, the Journal said. Why the cracks are appearing isn't known. American parent AMR Corp. and the Federal Aviation Administration have inspected the bulk of the operator's 767 fleet and metallurgical tests were pending

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SEVRIEN a écrit:Merci, Jeannot ! C'est une vieille histoire qui revient !

"What goes around come around" ! [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]

Sevrien a écrit:
La bêtise est que vous ne tenez même pas compte du fait que :

-- (i) la FAA prend appui très sérieusement sur la base de données que constitue le « Directory of Ageing Aircraft », compilé par Flight International et d'autres organisations, y compris la FAA elle-même ;

-- (ii) la FAA a déjà émis un AD (en 2000 ? Voilà le sign-posting ! A vous de chercher), qui a fini, dans son application, par reconnaître la différenciation entre moteurs, contrairement à ce que vous avez écrit!

Vous refusez de reconnaître les faits, et ne faites qu'avancer vos opinions, truffées de contradictions inhérentes, qui reçoivent le démenti de la FAA, qui,
-- dans le contexte des moteurs qui « tombaient des ailes des avions » (« became detached from the aircraft’s wing ») ,
-- a déterminé que ce « detachment » fut dû à des vibrations excessives, qui usaient prématurément les « broches de fixation » du combiné « moteur-nacelle » au pylône,
-- et contribuaient à une usure prématurée de l'ensemble « nacelle-broche-pylône ».
.............
Au début, dans cette affaire, la FAA n'a fait aucune différenciation entre les différents moteurs !

C'est Boeing qui a défendu RR, qui a fini par avoir un traitement équitable de souplesse, qui reconnaissait qu’il y avait bel et bien une différenciation entre moteurs. Et ceci a bien était reconnu, par la FAA, dans :

-- (a) la célérité avec laquelle elle a exempté RR des mêmes contraintes que celles imposées à GE & P&W (fréquence de remplacement des broches ne dépassant pas la moitié de celle frappant GE et P&W ; plus question de "one size must fit all" !) ;

--(b) la restauration quasi-immédiate des ETOPS 180 minutes aux avions en question à motorisation RR, alors que GE & P&W ont dû patienter bien plus longtemps, avant de récupérer d'abord ETOPS 90 minutes, avant de passer à 120, et ensuite, à 180 minutes !

Voici les extraits de mes posts (vulgarisés, nécessairement, par rapport aux texte et jargon de la FAA et de son AD ! [b][b][b]

Sevrien a écrit:[/b][/b]
21/09/2006 (dans un post sur l'Airbus A380, .....)
............................

Quand le FAA a paniqué, et donné l'ordre de faire changer les broches de fixation (ensemble moteur, nacelle, pylône, aile ) des avions à moteurs à forte poussée (> 37, 000 à 40,000lbs, paramètre bas.... ),

-- en raison des problèmes dus à l'usure excessive & prématurée par vibrations (cela concernait les GE & P&W -- architecture 'à 2 arbres' --, pas les RR -- architecture à 3 arbres'), pendant des semaines, la BA, entre autres, ramenait les avions au bercail de LHR, selon un système de rotation,

et les ingénieurs de Boeing travaillaient nuit & jour, sur le 'tablier', non pas dans les hangars, pour remplacer toutes les pièces (saines, en fait), par celles qui arrivaient par paquets, tous les jours, jusqu'à ce que toute les flottes BA de B757 / -767 / -747 soient rééquipées et contrôlées, sans que la BA subisse une minute de retard au décollage du fait de ces opérations.

Sevrien a écrit:
14/10/2006 .........
Lorsque P&W & GE sont en train de voir leur 'rétention d'efficacité' chuter vers 98.5% par rapport à leur base 100% (RR -- et je ne roule pour aucun motoriste -- toujours à, par exemple, 99, 96% par rapport à la sienne) et qu'après, ......
-- c'est l'accélération de 'dégradation' vers les 95%-96%,

-- et que RR reste au-dessus des 99%, les P&W & GE sont obligés de faire de la maintenance , y compris des pièces chères, non seulement pour la maintenance 'pur jus', mais , aussi, pour rattraper leur performance en consommation visée.

Indépendamment de l'avantage de l'architecture des 3-arbres de RR, sur celle à 2-arbres des deux autres, ......

.....RR prépare TOUS ses moteurs depuis au moins 2 décennies aux règles et normes ETOPS 180 minutes, 'out of the box'. Résultats de 'non dégradation' époustouflants, bien au-delà de ce que RR avait espéré.

Dans ma note sur le problème des changements des 'broches' (de pylone) sur "big-twins", imposés par la FAA, aux moteurs "big fan" à forte poussée (> 37, 000lbs, sur les B767 et B757, par exemple). Le FAA a reconnu que les RR RB211-535 C / et -E4, et les RB211-524 (toutes les versions) par rapport aux moteurs correspondants de PW & GE :
-- subissaient moins de 'dégradation',

-- causaient moins de vibrations, susceptibles de causer le détachement des moteurs, en vol, en raison de l'usure prématuré des 'broches' qui 'lâchent' (soit 'dégradations' hors moteur, causées par le moteur ! ),

-- et étaient quasi-automatiquement / très rapidement ré-autorisés ETOPS 180 minutes, pour toutes les flottes de toutes les Cies. concernées, ...

-- alors que, s'agissant des moteurs rivaux, il y a eu une longue période de limitation à 120 minutes de 're-proving', et, le comble ....
-- les broches, même renforcées, étaient / sont obligées d'être changées, par ordre FAA, (coût 'caché' d'entretien dont on ne parle pas ! )...après seulement deux-tiers du temps autorisé à ceux sur les mêmes types d'avions motorisés par les RR correspondants !

SEVRIEN a écrit:Oh, oh ! AD touchant CFM-56 !

Lien :
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AD: CFM International

Tue, 22 Jun '10

AD NUMBER: 2010-13-09
MANUFACTURER: CFM International, S.A. CFM56-5, -5B, and -7B Series Turbofan Engines
SUBJECT: Airworthiness Directive 2010-13-09

SUMMARY: This AD requires removing from service, nine stage 3 low-pressure turbine (LPT) disks, identified by serial number (S/N).
This AD results from the discovery of a material nonconformity requiring removal of the disk before the certified disk life of certain stage 3 LPT disks. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the stage 3 LPT disk and damage to the airplane.

Réactions?

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to:

(1) CFM International CFM56-5, -5B, and -7B series turbofan engines with stage 3 low-pressure turbine (LPT) disks part number (P/N) 336-002-006-0, installed with the following serial numbers (S/ Ns), DE255844, DE256388, DE256622, DE256623, DE256625, DE256627, DE256628, DE256631, and DE256637.

(2) CFM International, S.A. has stated that none of these affected disk S/Ns were originally installed on any CFM56-5 turbofan engine, however, that disk P/N is certified for use on CFM56-5 engines.

(3) The -5 and -5B series engines are installed on, but not limited to, Airbus A318, A319, A320, and A321 airplanes, and the -7B series engines are installed on, but not limited to, Boeing 737 series airplanes.

Loose screw causes cockpit fire in some Boeing jets; FAA slow to act

The Federal Aviation Administration has taken its time in ordering airlines to fix a problem in Boeing Co. jets that causes cockpit fires, reports [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien].

A loose screw in the cockpit window heaters has caused a burning smell and, in some cases, flames. The AP reports that the problem has occurred on dozens of flights, terrifying passengers and crew and forcing emergency landings. No fatalities have been reported.

The National Transportation Safety Board is pushing the FAA to order airlines to fix the problem.

"There is no shortage of information. In fact, there's no shortage of incidents," NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman told the AP. "What's the missing is the will to do something about it."

Boeing said there has been 29 incidents since 2002 involving 747, 757, 767 and 777 jets.

The FAA is expected to issue an order to airlines next month.

AD NUMBER: 2010-14-07
MANUFACTURER: The Boeing Company Model 747 Airplanes
SUBJECT: Airworthiness Directive 2010-14-07

The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Model 747 airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections of the body station (BS) 2598 bulkhead, and corrective actions if necessary. That AD also currently requires a terminating modification for certain repetitive inspections and a post- modification inspection of the modified area. This new AD continues to require those actions using revised service information. For certain airplanes, this AD requires new repetitive inspections, an interim modification, and post-interim modification inspections. For certain airplanes, this AD requires replacing any previously repaired aft inner chord and reinstalling the terminating modification. For airplanes that are converted to the Model 747-400 large cargo freighter (LCF) configuration, this new AD reduces the threshold and repeat intervals of certain post-modification inspections. For all airplanes, this new AD also requires certain inspections of the upper aft outer chords and diagonal brace attachment fittings, flanges, and rods to continue after the terminating modification. This AD results from reports of cracked aft inner chords on airplanes after certain requirements of the existing AD were done. The FAA is issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the BS 2598 bulkhead structure, which could result in inability of the structure to carry horizontal stabilizer flight loads, and loss of controllability of the airplane.

FMI: [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]