NTSB. FAA. Rapports et AD

FAA expands inspections of Boeing 737s

Airlines must inspect Boeing [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] airliners for problems that can cause severe elevator vibration and possible loss of structural integrity and aircraft control, under a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] issued Wednesday.
The directive applies to all U.S. 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900 and -900ER jets and is set to take effect Sept. 9. It adopts actions Boeing called for in a revised service bulletin last month.
The directive stems from two incidents in March and April, where Next-Generation 737s experienced vibrations, spokeswoman Julie O'Donnell said. "Both of those airplanes diverted and landed safely. There were no injuries."
After the incidents, Boeing issued a service bulletin and the FAA put out a directive requiring inspections (one-time in some cases, repetitive in others) of the inboard and outboard aft attach lugs of the left and right elevator tab control mechanisms and replacement of mechanisms with discrepancies, such as loose bearings. It allowed airlines to stop doing repetitive inspections if they replaced the mechanism with a new Boeing-built one.
The new order requires modified repetitive inspections of all the specified model airplanes, regardless of whether the mechanism has been replaced.
While there weren't any other incidents after the first two, Boeing analysis led to calling for the wider inspections, O'Donnell said. The problem is that layers of aluminum weren't clamped together sufficiently, resulting in wear of the tab control mechanism, she said.
The stepped-up inspections will allow the 737s to fly safely while Boeing works on two permanent solutions, O'Donnell said, noting that Boeing also has put out flight-crew procedures for vibration incidents.
The FAA said it is imposing the directive without the usual opportunity for comment and with less than the typical 30-day notice because the issue is an unsafe condition that requires immediate attention.
There are about 1,000 affected 737s in the U.S. and 3,200 worldwide. Foreign aviation authorities will likely follow the FAA's lead in calling for the expanded inspections

SUMMARY:

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes.

This AD requires replacement of the power control relays in the P91 and P92 power distribution panels for the fuel boost and override pumps with new, improved relays having a ground fault interrupter (GFI) feature, or installation and maintenance of universal fault interrupters (UFIs) using a certain supplemental type certificate. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent pump housing burn-through due to electrical arcing, which could create a potential ignition source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

DATES: This AD is effective September 22, 2010.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of September 22, 2010.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to certain Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on March 11, 2008 (73 FR 12910).
That NPRM proposed to require replacement of the power control relays in the P91 and P92 power distribution panels for the fuel boost and override pumps with new, improved relays having a ground fault interrupter (GFI) feature. That NPRM also proposed to require a revision to the Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate AWL No. 28-AWL- 20.

Actions Since NPRM Was Issued

To avoid including redundant requirements in this AD, we have removed the proposed requirement to revise the AWL section of certain maintenance documents to include new repetitive operational checks of the ground fault interrupter (GFI) for all alternating current fuel tank boost pumps to ensure continued functionality of the GFI circuit. This AWL revision is already required by AD 2008-10-10 R1, Amendment 39-16164 (75 FR 1529, January 12, 2010), for certain Model 737-600, - 700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes with an original standard airworthiness certificate or original export certificate issued before March 31, 2006. Airplanes with a certificate issued on or after March 31, 2006, must already be compliant with the AWL because those limitations were applicable as part of the airworthiness certification of those airplanes.
We have removed the AWL revision requirement from this AD (specified in paragraph (g) of the NPRM), the related requirement to obtain FAA approval for any alternative inspections or inspection intervals (specified in paragraph (h) of the NPRM), and Note 1 of the NPRM.
We have re-identified subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

Boeing has issued Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009, to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201. (The NPRM referred to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, dated February 19, 2007.) We have revised paragraphs (c) and (f) of this AD to reference Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009, and have added new paragraph (g) of this AD to provide credit (with certain provisions) for Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, dated February 19, 2007. Revision 1 corrects the wiring configuration group for some airplanes, adds and corrects some figures and references and adds a resistance check between the GFI relay's mounting flange and a point on the panel cross member of the P91 and P92 panels. Revision 1 also adds a resistance measurement for airplanes that have accomplished the actions specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, dated February 19, 2007.

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009, refers to Honeywell Service Bulletins 1151932-24-61 and 1151934-24-62, both Revision 5, both dated May 25, 2009, as additional sources of guidance for accomplishing a resistance check between the GFI relay's mounting flange and a point on the panel cross member of the P91 and P92 panels.

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009, refers to Honeywell Service Bulletin 1151932-24-61, Revision 5, dated May 25, 2009, as an additional source of guidance for replacing the power control relays in the P91 power distribution panel. Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009, also refers to Honeywell Service Bulletin 1151934-24-62, Revision 5, dated May 25, 2009, as an additional source of guidance for replacing the power control relays in the P92 power distribution panels.

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009, references an incorrect date for Revision 5 of Honeywell Service Bulletins 1151932-24-61 and 1151934-24-62. Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1201, Revision 1, dated May 28, 2009, states January 22, 2009, for Revision 5 of Honeywell Service Bulletins 1151932-24-61 and 1151934-24-62. The correct date for Revision 5 of Honeywell Service Bulletins 1151932-24-61 and 1151934-24-62 is May 25, 2009.

FAA seeks to fine ATS $1 million for lapsed Southwest inspections

The US Federal Aviation Administration proposes to fine Everett, Washington-based Aviation Technical Services (ATS) $1.1 million for making improper repairs on 44 Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-300s.

ATS allegedly failed to accomplish work required under an airworthiness directive that mandated five repetitive inspections and a one-time inspection to find and repair fatigue cracks in the fuselage skin of the aircraft, said FAA. Those inspections were also required under the Southwest continuous airworthiness maintenance programme.

FAA also stated after the inspections ATS failed to install fasteners in all the rivet holes within the time specified for the task. The aircraft involved returned to service between 1 December 2006 and 18 September 2009.

The agency emphasised the Southwest 737-300 that suffered a fuselage crown failure in April of this year was not one of the 44 aircraft subject to the civil penalty.

FAA's latest proposed fine against ATS follows a previous penalty levied against the maintenance services provider in November 2010. At that time the agency fined ATS $530,250 after it determined ATS deviated from required procedures on fuselage skin crack inspections on 14 737s operated by Southwest.

Operators of an estimated 616 US-registered aircraft powered by Rolls-Royce AE3007 engines will be required to perform initial and recurring compressor checks on the turbofans to prevent possible uncontained engine failures under an airworthiness directive (AD) to be issued by the US FAA on 2 November.

Along with a variety of business jets and military aircraft, the AE3007 powers the Embraer ERJ-135/140/145 twinjet family.

The AD, set to become effective on 17 November, will require an eddy current inspection of the outer circumference on the hub wheels of the sixth through 13th stages of the 14-stage compressor in search of cracks. The FAA said it received "reports of low-cycle fatigue cracks" on the parts during shop visits.

The problem, flagged up by Rolls-Royce in June through an alert service bulletin, has been found on wheels having both chrome-carbide coated knife edge seals as well as those without the coating.

"These cracks can deteriorate the integrity of the compressor wheel by lengthening into the outer circumference of the wheel," said the FAA in an advance copy of the final rule. "This condition, if not corrected, could result in uncontained failure of the 6th-13th stage compressor wheel, leading to damage to the airplane."

Along with an initial inspection, the timing of which is function of the number of engine cycles since new and the knife edge seal coating, engines must receive a follow-up inspection every 5,000 cycles. Wheels found to be damaged must be replaced.

Highest time engines, those with more than 18,185 cycles and using chrome-carbide coated knife edge seals must be inspected with 15 cycles.

The FAA estimates that the inspections and potential wheel change outs will cost US operators more than $36 million.

The FAA in 2009 issued an emergency AD requiring inspections on the two-stage high pressure turbines for the AE3007 based on reports of cracks being found.

737 Cracks Prompt More Frequent Checks

The FAA has issued an airworthiness directive (AD) requiring earlier and more frequent fuselage inspections of a specific area on some Boeing 737-300, -400 and -500 series aircraft after a report of two similarly situated cracks that went through the frame and fail-safe chord.

“We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking in the fuselage frames and frame reinforcements, which could reduce the structural capability of the frames to sustain limit loads and result in cracking in the fuselage skin and subsequent rapid depressurization of the airplane,” the FAA says in AD 2011-23-05, issued on Nov. 1.

The directive affects 605 U.S.-registered aircraft and is effective as of Nov. 16, the FAA says.

The new AD supersedes AD 2009-02-06 RI, which requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the 1.05-inch nominal diameter wire penetration hole in the frame and in the frame reinforcement, between stringers S-20 and S-21, on both the left and right sides of the airplanes. The 2009 directive resulted from reports of cracking in the frame, or the frame and frame reinforcement, common to the penetration hole intended for wire routing, and followed a December 2007 Boeing Alert Service Bulletin on the same issue.

Since that 2009 directive, the FAA says, it has received a report of four adjacent cracked frames in the forward cargo compartment between S-20L and S-21L on a 737-300. Two of the cracks went completely through the frame and fail-safe chord.

The cracks were discovered when the aircraft had accumulated 44,535 flight cycles and 44,876 flight hours—before the compliance time required by the earlier directive. That discovery led Boeing in September to revise its service bulletin to shorten the compliance time for the initial inspection to 30,000 cycles and to reduce the repetitive interval from 14,000 cycles to 4,500.

The directive adopts the initial inspection revision. It also requires reinspections within 4,500 flight cycles, with a grace period of 90 days. Airlines have up to 90 days to inspect aircraft that already have accumulated more than 40,000 cycles.

Reports of eight in-flight and four on-ground unintended shutdowns of General Electric CF6-80C2B wide-body turbofan engines have prompted the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to mandate a change out of the engine's electronic control unit (ECU).

A proposed airworthiness directive, to be published on 14 November (Sevrien : 2011) , will affect 697 CF6 engines.....

.....flying on US-registered widebody aircraft.

The directive supersedes a 2007 AD requiring a software upgrade (8.2.Q1) on the same ECU to increase the engine's margin to flameout after several incidents where engines had flamed out due to exposure to ice crystals and ice shedding into the engine.

With the new software in place, problems continued.

Devrions-nous dire, comme Alan JOYCE de Qantas, quand il y a eu l'incident regrettable du RR Trent 900 sur l'A380 de Qantas, ..... 'Le logiciel n'a pu rien faire ; il doit y avoir un défaut fondamental ("fundamental flaw") dans les conception et "design" du moteur' ? :lol: :roll:

FAA said it received two reports of "ice crystal condition flameouts", which prompted GE to develop another software upgrade (8.2.R) for the ECU. The new software included "improved inclement weather capability, and enhanced fuel metering valve fault handling logic to reduce the risk of [in-flight shut down] caused by intermittent fuel metering valve feedback signals", said the FAA.

Since that time however, there have been 12 additional engine shutdowns, eight in flight and four on the ground, with engines using upgraded ECU software and other upgrades.

The problem was found to be caused by ignition system induced noise that created dual-channel faults in the ECU computer.

In response, the proposed AD mandates replacing the ECUs with a new unit developed by GE to "eliminate the potential for dual-channel [computer] faults due to ignition system noise".

If finalised as written, the AD will give operators between six months (or 450 engine flight cycles) and 60 months (or 4,500 engine flight cycles) to change out the ECUs, depending on ECU part number.

Jeannot a écrit:Certes Sevrien mais ne vaudrait-il pas faire du P2F, et réellement le faire, au lieu de laisser le champ libre à la concurrence ?

Jeannot a écrit:AD pour les GE CF34

FAA Adopts New AD for GE CF34-10E Series Engines

The FAA announced today that it has adopted a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF34-10E turbofan engines. The AD seeks to remedy reported heavy wear found on the seating surface of the center vent duct support ring, and also on the inside diameter of the fan drive shaft at the mating location. Read the full text of the document here at the U.S. Government Printing Office web site.

If untreated, this wear on the center vent duct support ring and/or the inside diameter of the fan drive shaft could cause a fan drive shaft failure, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft. This AD will affect 71 engines installed in aircraft that are registered in the United States.

This AD goes into effect on Feb 27, 2012 and requires CF34-10E operators to inspect the center vent duct support ring and fan drive shaft for wear. The discovery of wear on either item would require removing all center vent duct support assemblies and/or any fan drive shaft on the engine. The specific inspection criteria for the center vent duct assembly and the fan drive shaft and removal requirements are outlined in section (f) of the document.

Operators must comply with this AD on each CF34-10E engine before it accumulates 11,500 total in-service cycles. The FAA estimates that compliance with the AD will be about $520,760 to U.S. operators (not per engine, as previously stated), which includes labor and material costs. The administration estimates that a replacement center vent duct support assembly costs $3,080, and estimates that two fan drive shafts at the price of $126,900 each will also need to be replaced if wear is found. It takes about eight work hours per engine to reform visual inspections and a replacement of the center vent duct support assembly, and the average labor rate is a about $85 per work hour.

Jeannot a écrit:Sans commentaire...

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The decision to proceed with a gradual inspection of all 68 A380s in service will refocus attention on flaws recently identified in flagship jets at both Airbus and Boeing. Both aircraft makers maintain that their newest jets remain safe to fly after problems were caught at an early stage.

"This is an extension of a process already underway," said one of the sources, who asked not to be named. "An effective repair has been identified."

Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co., declined to comment on the decision to broaden wing inspections. A spokesman for the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) was not immediately available to comment.

EASA last month ordered checks on a third of the A380 fleet following the discovery of a cracked component inside the aircraft's wings.

Il n'y a pas lieu, non plus d'entrer dans le jeu du blâme, procédé qui relève de l'ignorance la plus crasse qui soit !

The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on 23 March will propose that operators of 954 Pratt & Whitney PW4000-series turbofan engines on US-registered widebody aircraft retire the engines' first stage high pressure turbine (HPT) hubs prematurely, costing an estimated $23 million in "lost life value" for the fleet.

The action stems from the PW2000 "field event" that led Pratt & Whitney to re-evaluate the low-cycle fatigue analysis of the Boeing 757 engine, as well as for other "similar" engine designs including the PW4000, says the FAA in the proposed airworthiness directive (AD).

"Pratt & Whitney's updated analysis indicated that the original grain size requirement specified on the HPT stage 1 front hub design drawing was too large, and may not be sufficient to meet published life limits," says the FAA. "Although we have not received any reports of cracks, parts with the larger grain size may initiate a crack prior to the published life limits."

If cracks were to develop, the FAA says the hub could fail, leading to an uncontained engine failure and "damage to the aircraft".

The affected parts, which have an as-delivered lifetime of either 15,000 cycles since new (CSN) or 20,000 CSN, must now be retired at 13,700 or 18,000 CSN, respectively, assuming the AD is approved as proposed.

The FAA says there are 605 PW4000 engines on the US registry that use a 20,000 CSN life limit for the part, and 349 engines with a 15,000 CSN limit.

The European Aviation Safety Agency issued an emergency airworthiness directive on 17 May relating to Eurocopter EC135 helicopters after a crack was detected on the lower hub-shaft flange of a main rotor hub shaft. The cause of the cracking has not been determined yet.

This, says EASA, could lead to further crack propagation "possibly resulting in main rotor hub failure and consequent loss of the helicopter". The agency had issued a previous directive on EC135 helicopter drive system cracking, but since then "further cracks have been detected on the lower hub shaft flange of two other helicopters during accomplishment of the pre-flight checks".

It adds: "It has been determined that the identification of deformed safety pins may not be sufficient to detect the cracks on the (main rotor hub) shaft."

EASA requires, for EC135 and EC635 series helicopters, repetitive pre-flight visual inspections of the main rotor blades attachment area in the upper and lower hub-shaft flanges, as well as repetitive visual inspection on the upper and lower hub-shaft flanges and the blade bolt area.

Initial inspections must be carried out within three days of the directive. After that, the flight time between any two pre-flight inspections must not exceed 6h.

Once initial inspections have been carried out, the accumulation by a main rotor hub of 400h since since its first installation on a helicopter should trigger further a further checking regime, and if cracks are found the hub should be replaced.

This warning about Eurocopter drive train cracking comes in the wake of a successful controlled ditching on 10 May of a Bond Helicopters Eurocopter EC225 (G-REDW). The crew ditched the helicopter off Aberdeen when gearbox oil pressure dropped because of a failure in the oil pump drive.

Use of flotation devices when the aircraft was set down on the water enabled the helicopter and all on board to be recovered.

An exhaustive inquiry by the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch is still continuing into the sudden catastrophic failure of the epicyclic gearbox module in a Bond Eurocopter AS332L2 Super Puma (G-REDL) in April 2009, in which all 16 people on board died when the rotor completely separated.

Je pense que c'est un sujet a la mode...
A suivre et pas que chez eurocopter je pense

Mais qu'Eurocopter baisse tête & bosse !

" Je pense que c'est un sujet a la mode...
A suivre et pas que chez eurocopter je pense' !

(a) 'Je pense que c'est un sujet à la mode'.

(b) 'A suivre et pas que chez Eurocopter je pense'.

• Encore un "Emergency AD" pour Eurocopter.
  

An emergency airworthiness directive for several Eurocopter types has been issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency after an AS332 Super Puma helicopter suffered brake failure when landing on the helideck of a North Sea offshore oil rig, and "started to roll toward the edge of deck", the agency reported.

There have now been [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] relating to Eurocopter helicopters, but they are unrelated to each other.

• Nous ne mangeons pas le même type de pain que ces scribouillards, "armchair critics" ignares ou autres 'propagandistes' et "chatmen", bourrés de mauvaise foi et de parti-pris, qui essayaient (dans des efforts puériles, stérlies et futiles, à répétition), ....
  
• .... de faire l'amalgame entre l'incident regrettable du RR Trent 900 sur l'A380-800 de Qantas, et l'incident de "inappropriate operating regime" (avéré et confirmé par l'enquête officielle, à laquelle toute la faune précitée, bien entendu, ne participait pas), à la racine de l'incendie explosif qui du RR Trent 1000 ("Package A") sur banc d'essai à Derby,UK)
  

After extending the landing gear on approach to the rig, the crew witnessed a cockpit amber alarm indicating a low level of hydraulic fluid in the left hand side hydraulic system.

The EASA emergency AD said: "After landing, the helicopter started to roll towards the edge of the helideck as the flightcrew was not aware that wheel brake capability was affected and relied only on the effectiveness of the helicopter's ancillary hydraulic accumulator."

This AD requires the insertion of a "rush revision" into the emergency procedures section of each applicable rotorcraft flight manual.

The report continued: "The results of the following investigation showed that this alarm was due to hydraulic fluid leakage, caused by the failure of one hydraulic union connector in the LH hydraulic circuit."

EASA has issued AD 2012-0059-E to address this "potential unsafe condition", which, it says, can affect Eurocopter SA330, AS332 and EC225 helicopters, requiring an immediate rotorcraft flight manual revision to cover any other cause of leakage from the emergency/auxiliary hydraulic circuit that could result in an empty accumulator.

EASA says that this situation could affect other Eurocopter helicopters that are fitted with an emergency accumulator.

This includes the SA365N (as an option) and in basic configuration for the SA365N1, AS365N2, N3 and the EC155. The agency says a "potential leak could, in certain operational conditions, lead to the same consequences".

(a) 'Je pense que c'est un sujet à la mode'.

(b) 'A suivre et pas que chez Eurocopter je pense'.

• de la manière dont "fonctionnent" / sont administrés les AD, notamment aux USA (sous l'autorité de la FAA) ;
  
• du "reporting" et / ou du "reporting system", ... que RR respecte scrupuleusement, même si les motoristes rivaux (ou l'un d'eux en particulier, dont le cas est notoire) ne le font pas avec les mêmes rigueur et assiduité ;
  
• et, surtout, du fait que beaucoup d'AD ne font que réfléchir que les solutions (déjà approuvées / adoptées) soient opérationnellement en place, et efficaces ;
  
• du fait que, si des pièces ont eu besoin d'être 'ajustées' (mais sans "re-design", et surtout, sans "re-design fondamental"), ceci est déjà fait, et elles sont déjà installées là où cela s'avère nécessaire.
  

l'AD (de la FAA), sur les cannelures de l'arbre IP des T900 ... qui se tassent ... trop vite !
Bon, rien de bien nouveau ...
Sauf que ça dure ...
Vivement le passage aux TXWB ... sur les A380 !

Summary.
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We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce plc (RR) models RB211-Trent 970-84, 970B-84, 972-84, 972B-84, 977-84, 977B-84, and 980-84 turbofan engines. That AD currently requires inspecting the intermediate-pressure (IP) shaft rigid coupling splines for wear resulting in rearward movement of the IP turbine. This AD requires the same inspections, and new inspections based on possible changes in wear rate. This AD was prompted by RR identifying wear beyond engine manual limits on the abutment faces of the splines. RR also determined that an additional IP shaft rigid coupling configuration requires inspection. We are issuing this AD to detect wear on the abutment faces of the splines, which could result in loss of disc integrity, an uncontained failure of the engine, and damage to the airplane.

Actions Since AD Was Issued [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]
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Since we issued AD 2010-16-07 ([Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien], August 13, 2010), RR determined that engines that are moved from one position to another on the same airplane or to a different airplane, may exhibit a change in the rate of IP shaft rigid coupling spline wear. RR also determined that an additional IP shaft rigid coupling configuration requires inspection, because it also exhibits wear.
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Relevant Service Information [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

We reviewed RR RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems Alert Non-Modification Service Bulletin (NMSB) No. RB.211-72-AG329, Revision 4, dated March 23, 2012. That Alert NMSB describes procedures for inspecting and replacing the IP shaft rigid coupling.

We also reviewed RR RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems Alert NMSB No. RB.211-72-AG871, dated March 23, 2012. That Alert NMSB describes procedures for inspecting the IP shaft rigid coupling on engines that have incorporated RR RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems Service Bulletin (SB) No. RB.211-72-G585, Original Issue, or any revision. Service Bulletin No. RB.211-72-G585 is the SB that introduces the additional configuration that this AD adds.

This AD will not have federalism implications under [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.Show citation box

......I certify that this AD:....
(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, .....

(2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),....

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and......

(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

This AD is effective July 17, 2012.

Engines That Have Incorporated RR RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems SB No. RB.211-72-G585, Original Issue, or Any Revision.

(i) Initially borescope-inspect the IP shaft rigid coupling splines before accumulating 400 FCSN or 400 cycles since the last inspection per paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this AD. Use paragraph 3.A.(2) of RR RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems Alert NMSB No. RB.211-72-AG871, dated March 23, 2012, to do the inspection.....

(ii) Repetitively borescope-inspect the IP shaft rigid coupling splines. Use paragraphs 3.A.(2)(e), 3.A.(2)(f), and 3.A.(3) of RR RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems Alert NMSB No. RB.211-72-AG871, dated March 23, 2012, to determine the re-inspection interval and to do the inspections......
(2) In-Shop Inspections [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

(i) At every shop visit after the effective date of this AD, where the IP shaft rigid coupling is exposed, visually inspect and MPI the IP shaft rigid coupling splines......

(ii) At every shop visit after the effective date of this AD, where the IP shaft rigid coupling is not exposed, borescope-inspect using paragraphs 3.A.(2)(a) through 3.A.(2)(f) of RR RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems Alert NMSB No. RB.211-72-AG871, dated March 23, 2012......

(A) If at the time of initial inspection, the average value of length “B” is equal to, or less than, 6.00 mm, repeat the borescope inspection using paragraph (g)(1) or (g)(2) of this AD within 400 flight cycles.......

(B) If at the time of initial inspection the average value of length “B” is greater than 6.00 mm, MPI the IP turbine shaft, and visually inspect and MPI the intermediate turbine shaft and IP rigid coupling......

(3) After Any Shop Inspection [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

After any shop inspection, where the rigid shaft coupling is exposed, perform a borescope inspection per paragraph (g)(1) of this AD within 400 cycles after the in-shop visual inspection and MPI.......

(h) Definition [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

For the purpose of this AD, a shop visit is the induction of an engine into the shop for maintenance involving the separation of pairs of major mating engine flanges, except that the separation of engine flanges solely for the purposes of transportation without subsequent engine maintenance does not constitute an engine shop visit.

(i) Credit for Previous Actions for Engines That Have Not Incorporated RR RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems SB No. RB.211-72-G585 [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

If you performed inspections and corrective actions that are required by paragraph (f) of this AD using RR RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems Alert NMSB No. RB.211-72-AG329, Original Issue, dated November 26, 2009; Revision 1, dated January 13, 2010; Revision 2, dated July 7, 2010; or Revision 3, dated November 25, 2010, before the effective date of this AD, you have met the requirements of paragraph (f) of this AD.

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

The Manager, Engine Certification Office, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Use the procedures found in [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] to make your request.......

(k) Related Information [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

(1) For more information about this AD, contact Alan Strom, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; phone: 781-238-7143; fax: 781-238-7199; email: [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien].......

(2) Refer to European Aviation Safety Agency AD 2012-0057, dated April 3, 2012, and AD 2012-0057 (corrected), dated April 20, 2012, for related information.........

(3) RB211-Trent 900 Engine Manual, tasks 72-33-21-200-804 and 72-00-00-200-808, pertain to the visual inspections and MPIs required by this AD........

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

(1) You must use the following service information to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) under [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien](a) and [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] of the following service information:

(i) Rolls-Royce plc RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems Alert Non-Modification Service Bulletin No. RB.211-72-AG329, Revision 4, dated March 23, 2012. .......

(ii) Rolls-Royce plc RB211 Trent 900 Series Propulsion Systems Alert Non-Modification Service Bulletin No. RB.211-72-AG871, dated March 23, 2012. ........

(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Rolls-Royce plc, Corporate Communications, P.O. Box 31, Derby, England, DE248BJ, phone: 011-44-1332-242424; fax: 011-44-1332-245418, or email: [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]...........

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 781-238-7125.........

(4) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to: [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]...........

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 5, 2012.

Peter A. White,

Manager, Engine & Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

Pour la petite phrase, tout aussi futile : "Vivement le passage aux TXWB ... sur les A380 !", ..... cela ne mérite pas plus que le "No comment" !

"FAA should have issued GE CF6 directive in 2006: NTSB" !

The US National Transportation Safety Board says an engine fire on an American Airlines Boeing 767-300ER in February would not have occurred had the Federal Aviation Administration issued an airworthiness directive after a similar problem in 2006.

The NTSB [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]is recommending that the FAA issue a new airworthiness directive (AD) forcing operators to correct the potential problem.

American flight 837, departing the John F. Kennedy (JFK) international airport for Port au Prince, Haiti, on 8 February with 201 passengers and 12 crew members, experienced a fire in the right engine while climbing through 9,000ft (2,743m). The pilots declared an emergency and returned to the airport for an overweight, but uneventful landing.

Damage to the General Electric (GE) CF6-80C2 engine, including thermal damage to the interior surface of the right thrust reverser cowl and burns on "numerous" wires and cables, was traced to a fire fuelled by jet fuel that had sprayed from a distorted fuel tube flange. Investigators later determined that the leak had been caused by a bracket and a spray shield that were installed in the reverse order.

The same conclusions were drawn from the aborted mission of a Delta Air Lines Boeing 767-300ER that departed Rio de Janeiro for Atlanta in July 2006. In that case, the left GE CF6-80C2 engine experienced a fire at 3,000ft on climb out resulting in a single-engine, overweight landing in Rio.

Ten years before the Rio failure, GE had issued a service bulletin (SB) that introduced a one-piece spray shield and support bracket, in part to eliminate the potential for installing the two individual parts in the wrong order - the root cause of both the American and Delta failures that would follow.

"The SB was initially issued as a category 7 bulletin, meaning that (GE) recommended operators incorporate the SB at their discretion," says the NTSB.

"However, following the Delta Air Lines engine fire at Rio de Janeiro, (GE) elevated the bulletin to category 3 in March 2007, meaning that (GE) recommended operators accomplish the SB at the engines' next shop visit."

The American 767 went to the shop two years after the SB was issued, but the change was not made, nor was American required to do so.

"The (NTSB) notes that, unlike an AD that mandates the accomplishment of a particular task, manufacturer SBs are only recommendations to take certain actions. Accordingly, American Airlines was under no obligation to comply with (the SB), even after (GE) elevated the SB to category 3."

American later told the NTSB that its fleet of CF6-80C2-powered 767s "have been operating with a mix of two- and one-piece bracket and spray shields over the past 20 years" and that until the 8 February 2012 engine fire, "there was no economic reason to replace the two-piece bracket and spray shield with the one-piece bracket and spray shield and, thus, the operator had not."

The NTSB says the FAA should have issued an AD requiring operators to replace the two parts with the combined part after the Delta engine fire in 2006, in part since the 767-300ER is approved for extended operations (ETOPS), and as such, would have to operate on a single engine for as long as three hours had an engine fire occurred mid-flight rather than at takeoff.

"The NTSB concludes that, if the FAA had issued an AD to require installation of the one-piece bracket and spray shield on CF6-80C2 engines (as recommended (in the SB) following the July 2006 Delta Air Lines engine fire at Rio de Janeiro, the engine fire on American Airlines flight 837 would not have occurred," the agency says.

• réf. / lien : [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]
  

The latest safety directive was prompted by a malfunction of a Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine on a Singapore Airlines flight from Singapore to Hong Kong last month, said an industry official familiar with the details. Nobody was hurt, pilots shut down the engine and the plane returned safely to Singapore.

But investigators now believe some of the engine's turbines seized up due to inadequate lubrication because a part between an oil tube and a cover for some bearings was never installed, .....

During a revenue service flight, a Trent 900 engine experienced a high Intermediate Pressure (IP/N2) vibration fault along with several other fluctuating engine parameters, including Low Pressure (LP/N1) faults. The flight crew decided to throttle back the engine to idle and performed an air turn back. The other engines continued to operate normally and an uneventful landing was made. The results of an initial investigation revealed that the LP system was seized. Removal of the Low Pressure Turbine (LPT) bearing housing end cover revealed that the oil transfer tube assembly had fractured because the spherical seat between the oil transfer tube and the end cover was missing (not installed). This non-conformity caused the fracture of the oil transfer tube, leading to reduced oil flow and subsequent damage to the LP and IP bearings. Rolls-Royce has identified that other Trent 900 engines could potentially be affected...........

• dans le sillage de l'incident du RR Trent 900 sur l'A380 de Qantas, même des moteurs "new build", et théoriquement "guéris" (le processus de fabrication dans la zone incriminée du moteur avait été corrigé, pour éliminer tout risque de ce qui a causé l'incident RR Trent 900-Qantas), devaient être inspectés avant livraison, ....... ce qui signifie que les enquêteurs ne peuvent pas utiliser avec certitude le terme "assembly" ou "re-assembly" du moteur ;
  
• 
  
• pendant la toute première vague d'application des inspections, en conformité avec les instructions et modalités imposées par l'AD, très tôt après l'incident RR Trent 900 -Qantas, il y a eu au moins un cas publié de défaut de remontage d'un moteur (heureusement sans gravité) après inspection.
  

European regulators on Tuesday ordered some carriers to finish the safety checks and complete necessary repairs by the end of the month—an unusually short deadline for most safety directives.

More than 200 Trent 900 enginesare being checked for the missing part, with 30 engines identified as a priority, said the industry official. All of the priority engines currently flying on A380s have been checked, the official said.

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously: .......

Rolls-Royce Alert NMSB RB.211-72-AH051 initial issue dated 03 August 2012. Rolls-Royce NMSB RB.211-72-H056 initial issue dated 03 August 2012 The use of later approved revisions of these documents is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

! Les "Super Tweeters" / "Twits", "Super-Bloggers" et Adeptes de la discutaille au coin du comptoir du Café de la Gare !

Rolls-Royce said the lack of lubrication was traced to a part that was omitted during assembly.

As a precautionary measure, checks to ensure the correct fitting of the component are now well advanced," said company spokesman Bill O'Sullivan. "Measures have been taken to preventa repeat occurrence," Mr. O'Sullivan added.