NTSB. FAA. Rapports et AD

FAA tells airlines to fix cockpit window heaters

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FILE - In this file image released by the NTSB, heat from electrical arcing in the windshield heater of this American Airlines Boeing 757 shattered the windshield, spraying the flight's first officer with glass while the plane was over the Atlantic Ocean en route to Philadelphia from San Juan, Puerto Rico, on Jan. 30, 2008. Airlines will have to inspect the cockpit window heaters on 1,212 Boeing airliners and perhaps replace the windows under a safety order the Federal Aviation Administration said Friday July 9, 2010 it plans to issue next week. (AP Photo/NTSB, FILE)

WASHINGTON -- Airlines will have to inspect the cockpit window heaters on 1,212 Boeing airliners and perhaps replace the windows under a safety order the Federal Aviation Administration said Friday it plans to issue next week.
The window heaters have been tied to dozens of incidents involving in-flight fires, smoke, open streams of electricity known as electrical arcing, and shattered windshields in Boeing planes. In many cases, pilots have made emergency landings.
The source of the problem was identified in 2004 as a simple loose screw that chafes power wires where they connect to heating wires in the windows.
The most recent incident was an emergency landing by a United Airlines Boeing 757 at Dulles International Airport in Virginia on May 16. A fire broke out near the captain's side of the window during the New York-to-Los Angeles flight. Pilots used a fire extinguisher to put out the flames, but they had to send for a second extinguisher after the fire reignited. The fire also shattered part of the window. Afterward, passengers said smoke had drifted from the cockpit into the cabin, and fire trucks, ambulances and other rescue equipment was waiting for the plane when it landed.
NTSB has been prodding FAA since 2004 to order airlines to replace cockpit windows on Boeing models in which incidents have occurred with a new window design that uses pins instead of screws. NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman told The Associated Press last month that she was concerned the problem would lead to an accident.
The safety order, which FAA said will be published in the Federal Register on Tuesday, applies to some Boeing 757, 767 and 777 models. NTSB had urged that 747 planes also be included. FAA said it is considering a separate order for 747s, but didn't indicate when that might be.
The order also doesn't go as far as NTSB has recommended. Instead of requiring that all windows be replaced, the order tells airlines that beginning on Aug. 17 they must inspect planes within 500 flight hours and, if evidence of damage is found, replace the windows. The order gives airlines a choice of installing windows of a similar design or the new design. Carriers that choose old design replacements must continue to inspect windows at regular intervals.
NTSB had urged that only the new designs be used for replacements.
FAA said it was aware of 11 cases of fires in the planes over the past 20 years. However, Boeing has said it is aware of 29 incidents involving fire or smoke over the past eight years.
A review by AP of NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System - a confidential database to which pilots, flight attendants, airline mechanics and others voluntarily report safety concerns - and NTSB records found a dozen incidents since 2002 of arcing and shattered windows in addition to a similar number of incidents involving fire or smoke. The review included 747s as well as the other models.
FAA spokesman Les Dorr told AP last month that one reason the safety order was delayed was that the agency had received new information indicating that both the upper window terminals that connect wires to the heaters were a source of arcing. Previously, he said, the agency was aware of incidents involving only the lower two terminals.
FAA said it is considering issuing another safety order addressing the upper two terminals in 757 planes only.
American, Continental, Delta and United airlines told FAA in 2008 that they were opposed to the safety fix, which they said didn't address the root cause of the problem.

FAA Orders Inspections for Boeing 767 Pylons

July 21 – The FAA is ordering U.S. operators of 138 Boeing 767 airplanes to reduce the initial pylon inspection time mandated in a September 22, 2005 Airworthiness Directive from 10,000 to 8,000 total flights. This inspection must be done within 400 flights after the most recent inspection required by the 2005 directive, or within 90 days, whichever occurs later.
The FAA is also reducing the interval for repetitive inspections for cracking of the pylon midspar structural fittings and an adjacent structure from 1,500 to every 400 flights thereafter. There is also an option for replacing the fittings instead of conducting the inspections.
Since the 2005 Airworthiness Directive (AD), the FAA has received two reports of cracking of the midspar structural fitting on Boeing 767 pylons. The pylon attaches the engine to the wing. Undetected cracking could lead to fracture of the structural components, damage to the pylon, and separation of the engine from the wing.
The Immediately Adopted AD affects 138 U.S.-registered airplanes out of 314 worldwide. The total cost to U.S. operators is approximately $46,920. The AD affects only those 767 models that have the original pylon design. Boeing has improved the design of the 767 pylon and those aircraft with the improved pylon designs are not included in this AD.
The AD is on display today at [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

L'aviation civile américaine ordonne l'inspection de Boeing 767 aux Etats-Unis, après la découverte de fissures

L'administration fédérale de l'aviation civile (FAA) a annoncé mercredi avoir ordonné des inspections sur 138 avions de type Boeing 767 aux Etats-Unis, en raison de possibles fissures sur les pylônes soutenant les réacteurs.
Ces inspections ont été décidées après la découverte de telles fissures, appelées "criques", sur deux avions du même type de la compagnie aérienne American Airlines. Les pylônes raccordent les réacteurs aux ailes. L'ordre de la FAA concerne 138 Boeing 767 immatriculés aux Etats-Unis, sur une flotte totale de 314 appareils dans ce pays.
Le Boeing 767 est un biréacteur long courrier, qui a fait son premier vol en septembre 1981.
L'appareil -décliné en quatre versions passagers, un modèle cargo et une citerne volante- peut transporter de 200 à 300 passagers sur des distances de 10.400 à 12.200km. Au total 973 exemplaires de cet avion sont exploités par 92 compagnies dans le monde, selon les chiffres de Boeing.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has warned operators of CFM International [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-5 and CFM56-7 engines to be aware of premature wear that may precipitate engine failure.

The bureau wishes to "draw the attention of all operators of CFM56-7 and CFM56-5 engines and their variants to the safety issues identified by this investigation," says the ATSB in its safety advisory notice.
"In particular, operators should be aware of the potential for premature wear within the compressor variable stator vane bushings and shroud to develop to levels where it may precipitate the failure of the engine while in service, and within a time-frame that is less than the minimum threshold for the initial inspection for the problem."

"Operators are encouraged to review their procedures to ensure an appropriate awareness of the issues among maintenance personnel," it adds.
The CFM56 is found on [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] A320s and [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] 737s.
The ATSB launched its investigation after a 20 August 2009 incident in which a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]-800, local registration VH-VOC, had to return to Launceston Airport because a compressor surge and damage to the left engine.

"The compressor surge and damage to the left engine was the result of advanced variable stator vane bushing/shroud wear, which caused a seal retainer to dislodge from the inner shroud segment and move into the compressor gas path," says the ATSB.

"The liberated seal segments then progressed downstream, causing significant damage to the remaining stages, resulting in loss of compressor efficiency," it says.

The ATSB says the engine manufacturer has responded by issuing a number of service bulletins to operators highlighting the need for on-wing borescope inspection to look for inner shroud and j-hook wear.
It also introduced new part numbers that appear to eliminate the cause Of the compressor surge, says the bureau.
As a consequence, the ATSB considers that the safety action, taken by CFM International, adequately addresses this safety issue, it adds.

FAA proposes fine against Continental

The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aims to levy a $230,000 fine against Continental Airlines for operating a single Boeing 767 that was not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.
Specifically FAA alleges Continental operated the aircraft on 22 revenue flights after replacing the nose landing gear wheel and tire assembly, but failed to install the required axle washer despite warnings in the maintenance manual that not installing the washer could lead to failure of the wheel bearing.
FAA explains agency inspectors discovered the violation during a records check and notes three identical earlier violations.
Continental has 30 days to respond to the proposed penalty

The US Federal Aviation Administration is proposing to extend the fix to prevent leading-edge flaps from retracting during take-off on Rolls-Royce RB211-powered [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] 747s, to the other versions of the aircraft.

Both a R-R directive......

.....and FAA's latest notice of proposed rulemaking are designed to prevent the repeat of an 11 May 2009 incident in which a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] came close to stalling after the leading edge flaps retracted on rotation due to a faulty signal from the thrust reverser control system.
"The design for the thrust reverser signal to the flap control unit for the R-R RB211 series is the same as the General Electric CF6-80C2 series and Pratt & Whitney [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] series," says the FAA.

Specifically, the thrust reverser uses a position sensor to indicate that a thrust reverser sleeve is unstowed. The sensor's signal is also used as an input for the flap control unit.
"Aerodynamic forces can cause the thrust reverser sleeve to flex, which can be enough movement to cause the sensor to indicate that the sleeve is not fully stowed even though the sleeve has not moved from the stowed position," the FAA says.

Explaining the rationale for the immediate adoption of the thrust reverser signal fix directive for the RB211, the FAA says the position sensor that directs signals to the flap control unit is sensitive to smaller sleeve movements, and that there were similar service experiences of small sleeve movements that triggered the same "amber alert" of the BA aircraft. But those incidents were only single-engine occurrences.
In the BA incident the first thrust reverser deployment signal was received before take-off decision speed, and the second signal, which triggered the retraction, happened several seconds later after the pilots committed to take-off.
After examining in-service experience, the FAA reasons the GE and P&W engines are less sensitive to small thrust reverser sleeve movements. "In this case the risk is reduced and allows for less aggressive compliance time," the agency says.

Operators of the affected aircraft have 36 months from the proposed rule's effective date to comply with the changes to thrust control system wiring for the flap control unit in both types of engines outlined in Boeing service bulletins released in January.

• (a) données historiques (factuelles),
  
• (b) informations, disponibles pour tous dans le domaine public,
  
• (c) éléments pertinents au contexte de cet incident (avec les sources, bien sûr, comme d'habitude) allégué être enraciné dans le Compresseur Haute Pression / "High Pressure Compressor" (HCP), notamment pour vous indiquer pourquoi,
  
• ---- sur la base de faits objectifs, et craintes réelles, présentés par les Autorités américaines (FAA),
  
• ---- que je ne refoule pas -- surtout pas -- il est raisonnable de dire....
  
• ---- qu'il semblerait qu'il y ait une forte possibilité que.....
  
• ---- cette affaire relève surtout d'une question d'entretien-moteur,
  
• ---- et non pas d'une question fondamentale de moteur (conception, design, fabrication & ou réalisation de moteur "pur jus").
  

• Sauf erreur ou omission de ma part, en ce qui concerne les moteurs IAE V2500, il n'y a absolument aucun historique, ayant nécessité un AD des Autorités américaines (FAA) ou autres, d'un incident de 'criques' / "cracks" d'un disque de HPC ;
  
• il y a eu des AD, concernant les "cracks" de "Vortex Reducer", notamment sur la tout première version, soit la "-A1" du moteur IAE V2500 (IAE V2500-A1), "standard" qui a cédé la place au standard "-A5" (IAE V2500-A5) ;
  
• ce standard "-A5" avait reçu de grandes améliorations, par rapport audit "-A1", ... y compris celle d'un nouveau "Vortex Reducer" (appelons-le le VR-A5-01, pour la circonstance) .
  
• l'amélioration fut indéniable ; mais, même dans ce cas, il y a eu un besoin d'améliorer encore, et, disons que c'est le standard qu'on peut appeler, toujours pour la circonstance, "VR-A5-02" qui est en place aujourd'hui ;
  
• il y a même eu un AD tout récent (en 2010, ... mois d'avril), .... mais toujours pas pour "crack" d'un disque de HPC, et toujours déclenché par la découverte d'un "crack" sur "Vortex Reducer", ... et vraisemblablement celui qu'on pourrait appeler le "standard VR-A5-01" (point important, auquel nous reviendrons).
  

• l'AD ne concerne que le "Vortex Reducer".
  
• Les VR sont des "time-limited life parts" / 'pièces à durée de vie limité par le temps'. Ces VR doivent être inspectés fréquemment, et, s'il y a le moindre signe précurseur d'une faiblesse, doivent être remplacés immédiatement.
  
• Positionné entre deux disques de HPC, tout VR affaibli peut se détériorer rapidement, d'une manière "non gérée", et non gérable, et, s'il se brise, peut causer une détérioration à l'un ou à l'autre des deux disques sains en question, ou aux deux ensemble, événement capable d'engendrer un incident qui pourrait consister en un "uncontained failure".
  
• Voilà le risque réel d'un danger réel, à potentiel grave.
  
• Et le VR (en mars / avril, 2010, ... date récente, donc) ne coûte que : US$ 80 (quatre vingts US$).
  

• En outre, en fouillant dans l'historique des 3 compagnies (en Inde) que sont, ou qu'ont été, Deccan, Kingfisher et Indigo, surtout en se référant aux acquisitions et aux dates des acquisitions, il est certain, que pour les avions liés aux 2 compagnies, Deccan et Indigo, et à leur commandes des précédentes 'fournées', il s'agirait, au mieux, des VR-A5-01.
  
• Et il est un fait que, pour les moteurs des avions concernés de Deccan et d'Indigo (ceux de Deccan étant sous Kingfisher, maintenant), il est certain qu'il n'y a pas d'accord "style IAE", du type "TotalCare".
  
• Sous les accords du genre "TotalCare" ou "Power by the Hour", les techniciens d'IAE, ou de CFMI, aussi, auraient changé systématiquement, de façon routinière, à chaque visite appropriée programmée, les VR, ... chose qui ne surait absolument pas être garantie, quand il n'y pas d'entretien contractuel "d'aftermarket".
  
• Enfin, on nous informe qu'il est possible, lors d'un entretien 'indélicat', effectué sans le doigté requis, qu'un VR soit endommagé par inadvertence.
  

• DATES: This AD becomes effective April 22, 2010.
  
• 
  
• Conclusion
  
  We have carefully reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD will affect six IAE turbofan engines installed on airplanes of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about one work-hour per engine to perform the actions, and that the average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. No parts are required. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $480.

• Unsafe Condition
  
  (d) This AD results from reports of fractured vortex reducers found at shop visits. We are issuing this AD to inspect for cracks in the vortex reducer. Cracks in the vortex reducer could result in an uncontained failure of the HP compressor stage 3-8 drum and subsequent damage to the airplane.

• Onetime Fluorescent Penetrant Inspection
  
  (f) Fluorescent penetrant inspect the vortex reducer for cracks when the HPC stage 3-8 drum has between 3,000 and 13,500 cycles- since-new (CSN) if all of the following conditions also apply:
  (1) The HPC stage 3-8 drum has ever operated in an engine at the V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2528-D5, V2530-A5, or V2533-A5 thrust ratings,
  (2) The vortex reducer had cycles accumulated on it when mated with the HPC stage 3-8 drum, and
  (3) The HPC stage 3-8 drum had fewer than 3,000 CSN when mated to the vortex reducer.
  (g) If the vortex reducer is cracked, remove both the vortex reducer and the HPC stage 3-8 drum from service.
  (h) After the effective date of this AD, do not return to service any HPC stage 3-8 drum that was removed as specified in paragraph (g) of this AD.

.....(d) This AD results from reports of fractured vortex reducers found at shop visits. We are issuing this AD to inspect for cracks in the vortex reducer. Cracks in the vortex reducer could result in an uncontained failure of the HP compressor stage 3-8 drum and subsequent damage to the airplane.

IAE today celebrated its latest milestone on the V2500 SelectOne™ program when the new engine entered into commercial service with launch customer, IndiGo, after being delivered on time on September 23^rd.
The aircraft, which is leased from Australia’s Allco Finance Group, is being utilized on new round-trip daily services between Jaipur and Ahmedabad, Chennai (via Mumbai) and Guwahati (via Kolkata); between Ahmedabad and Bangalore, Pune and Kolkata, and additional round-trip services between Mumbai and Jaipur.

IAE Executive Vice President – Customer Business, Ian Aitken, said: “Rather than being the end of the road, we view today’s entry into service with IndiGo as the start of a new journey. The airline has backed its engine order with our V2500Select® aftermarket service so we still maintain long-term responsibility for the engines.”

Bruce Ashby, Chief Executive Officer of IndiGo added: “We’re obviously delighted to be the first airline to benefit from the additional advantages that V2500 SelectOne™ offers. We recognized the opportunity for additional savings this new, more fuel-efficient engine could offer us. We are very focused on minimizing operating costs to ensure that our fares remain competitive and we can retain our position as the largest low-fare airline in India.”
IndiGo placed the single largest order for the V2500 in 2005 when it purchased engines for a fleet of 100 A320s, supported by a comprehensive V2500Select® aftermarket agreement. The value of the engine deal alone was $1.7 billion at list prices.

Forumiste Excité a écrit: "Le récente épisode des fissures sur les disk de compresseurs HP des VR2500, dont Indigo a aussi été victime ,......" .....
"J'espère que IAE et RR auront fait le boulot nécessaire (Et les corrections pour l'avenir !)"

• "Où est-il enregistré & 'catalogué officiellement, ... le fait qu'il y ait eu (je cite) 'des fissures sur les disk de compresseurs HP des VR2500' ?
  
• "Ou est-il enregistré & catalogué officiellement que la Cie. IndiGo ait été victime d'un tel problème?"
  
• "Où est l'AD y afférent ?"
  
• "Et si les phrases s'avéraient infondées, .... être une fiction, quelle serait l'action appropriée contre l'auteur, ... et les 'sites de l'Internet' ou Forums qui l'hébergent ? "
  

vonrichthoffen a écrit: L'Inde se trouverait sur une autre planète que Toulouse ou Derby ?
Ca ressemble surtout à des temps de chauffe non respectés, par exemple des temps de taxi relativements courts sur un moteur puis décollage immédiatement derrière, le tout avec des avions à la couenne en terme de payload.

• nous ne trouvons toujours aucune trace de mention de 'fissures sur les disques du Compresseur HP';
  
• 
  
• il n'est pas impossible que la responsabilité de Kingfisher soit engagée, .... car, à ce jour, nous ne trouvons toujours pas de trace du genre d'accord (tel que celui conclu par IAE & IndiGo) entre IAE & Kingfisher. Si Kingfisher est responsable de son entretien, et que la Cie. n'ait pas fait de manière constante les inspections appropriées, ou exécuté les tâches de 'réparation' appropriées, ou demandé au motoriste de les faire, .... Kingfisher pourrait avoir à faire face lui-même à ses problèmes (car ils pourraient s'avérer être bel et bien les siens, .... à tous points de vue, .....même si je pense-- avis personnel-- que ni RR ni IAE, ensemble ou séparément, ne laisseraient jamais tomber Kingfisher, ou un quelconque client) ;
  
• 
  
• dans cette affaire, l'AD semble réfléchir la conclusion que, aux yeux des Autorités concernées, l'affaire du "vortex reducer" est la "root cause", ... et que le reste n'est que conséquences (à potentiel grave, bien sûr), ... d'où le "fix", comme mesure conservatoire, ... "en aval", .... ce qui offre de très nets avantages en matière de sécurité, et, bien entendu, assure l'apport d'une composante supplémentaire dans la "chaîne qualité" / '"eloignement du risque" !
  
• 
  

The [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]has issued an [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] calling for immediate inspections of[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien], -3B and B1 engines for potential fan disk failure, following the discovery of parts from the shattered engine which broke apart in mid-air while powering a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] on 25 January (2007).

Inspection of the parts, which were recovered from countryside southwest of Denver, Colorado, indicated that the fan disk was caused by a crack which had developed in the bore of the disk itself. Close inspection of the pieces revealed this had been caused by an electrical arc-out defect which left a blemish on the inside of the bore.

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342, and -343 Airplanes, Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, and -313 Airplanes, and Model A340-541 and -642 Airplanes AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
SUMMARY: font=Times New Roman,Times New Roman]We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:


Several reports have recently been received of loose pneumatic quick-disconnect unions on Goodrich pitot probes P/N (part number) 0851HL. These may be the result of mis-torque of the affected unions at equipment manufacturing level. Investigations are still on-going to determine the root cause(s).
This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an air leak, resulting in incorrect total pressure measurement and consequent erroneous Calibrated Airspeed (CAS)/MACH parameters delivered by the Air Data Computer (ADC).

Loss or fluctuation of indicated airspeed could result in misleading information provided to the flightcrew. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective September 22, 2010.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 767-300 series airplanes. This AD requires replacing a wire bundle clamp and installing a tetrafluoroethylene (TFE 2X) sleeve. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing of a wiring bundle, which could result in a high-energy short and, consequently, a possible ignition source in the center auxiliary fuel tank.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. This AD requires inspecting to verify the part number of the low-pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen system installed under the oxygen mask stowage box at flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen mask locations, and replacing the flex-hose with a new non-conductive low- pressure flex-hose if necessary. This AD results from reports of low- pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew oxygen system that burned through due to inadvertent electrical current from a short circuit in an adjacent audio select panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex- hoses used in the flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen systems to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires replacement of the power control relays in the P91 and P92 power distribution panels for the fuel boost and override pumps with new, improved relays having a ground fault interrupter (GFI) feature, or installation and maintenance of universal fault interrupters (UFIs) using a certain supplemental type certificate. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent pump housing burn-through due to electrical arcing, which could create a potential ignition source inside a fuel tank. This condition, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies of the 8 aft-most fastener holes in the horizontal tangs of the midspar fitting of the strut, and corrective actions if necessary. The existing AD also requires repetitive inspections for cracks of the closeout angle that covers the 2 aft-most fasteners in the lower tang of the midspar fitting, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. The existing AD also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This new AD reduces the compliance times for doing the inspections. This AD results from reports of cracks in the midspar fitting tangs. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking in the primary strut structure and reduced structural integrity of the strut, which could result in separation of the strut and engine.

SEVRIEN a écrit:Bonjour / bonsoir, chers tous.

On m'a informé sur 2 AD, concernant les appareils B737 (-300?) et B767-300 (?), émis par la FAA (me semble-t-il), visant des solutions à apporter, pour neutraliser le risque d'explosion des reservoirs des avions en question (risque "d'arcing" ? ).

Mais je ne trouve pas les références / liens. Qui les aurait vus passer ? [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image]

Merci d'avance !

• il s'agirat de B737-NG, et non pas de '-300' ("classic") ;
  
• 
  
• Les 2 AD de la FAA, en effet, concerneraient des défauts électriques, susceptibles de générer des court-circuits dans le réservoir central des 737NG et 767-300 (d'où : risque d'explosion ; rappel du "crash" du B747 de la TWA) !