Boeing KC-46A

Maintenant que la messe est dite (au moins pour le premier tour), ouvrons un poste sur cet appareil qui ne manquera pas de faire couler beaucoup d'encre.

Messieurs d'Aviationweek... tirez les premiers...

KC-46A : Ce que nous ignorons

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KC-46A: What We Don't Know

It is nearly a decade after USAF negotiated a defunct lease of 100 tankers with Boeing, a year after the most recent RFP for KC-X went out, just over two weeks since Boeing's KC-46A contract award and one week after rival EADS said it wouldn't protest the loss.
But, despite all of the mental and financial capital that went into selecting the KC-46A, there are some very basic details that remain unaddressed for the taxpayer.

First and foremost is cost. For what was perhaps the most controversial contractor selection in recent history at the Pentagon, its official "blue top" announcement on Feb. 24 was scant in detail.

The Boeing Co. of Seattle, Washington, was awarded a fixed price incentive firm contract valued at over $3.5 billion for the KC-X Engineering and Manufacturing Development which will deliver 18 aircraft by 2017. Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC/WKK), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity (FA8625-11-C600).

Neither the U.S. Air Force nor Boeing have stated what exactly "over $3.5 billion" means for the KC-46A development contract. The Pentagon has been touting the fixed-price approach as a savvy move to save money. But, one item we don't know is the price of the deal.

Secondly, follwing Boeing's win, Jean Chamberlain, the company's tanker VP, acknowledged that first flight is in 2015, and delivery of the first 18 aircraft would take place by the end of 2017. Chamberlain acknowledged on the company's Feb. 24 telecon post-win that this is "concurrent development" meaning flight test and developmental activities are taking place as the first aircraft are being built. That characterization is certainly accurate. But, another item we don't know about the KC-46A contract is why the Air Force and Boeing opted to take this approach and what the likelihood is it will deliver on time.
Thanks to the three-time restructured F-35 development program, the term "concurrent development" has become a bit of a dirty word among some in Pentagon circles. F-35 development was built on concurrent development and promised low prices. Those didn't materialize, problems have been found in development and production is slipping. So, while a COTS modified tanker and a design-to-spec JSF are very different, the challenges of concurrent development and production remain the same -- risk of delays and possible retrofits.

Underlying the question of what we don't know about the rationale to approve concurrent development and production is what we don't know about configuration. The greater aerospace community can't have a dialogue about the risk or lack thereof to this concurrent approach if the Air Force and Boeing don't release details about the exact configuration. There are a few things we do know: Somehow Boeing is putting a digital 787 cockpit into an analog 767 aircraft and there is a modified KC-10 boom to meet the gallon-per-minute offload requirement. But, we don't know what the design entails in terms of risk reduction on the platform or on the mission systems.

Finally, we don’t even know officially that work has begun on this contract. Neither USAF nor Boeing will confirm.
When the Pentagon set about issuing this RFP in February 2010, it was clear that the paramount concern was designing a competition that would be "protest proof" -- in essence, one that could withstand a protest. The Air Force's ability to buy a tanker wasn’t the only thing on the line. The credibility of its acquisition corps, and its ability to move forward with other major procurements was also at stake. Against that goal, the KC-X procurement has been successful; it was – in the strictest since – protest proof. EADS announced a week ago that wasn’t even going to try for a protest. So, we will never know if the process would have withstood the scrutiny of an audit, but the bottom line is that the Air Force’s acquisition corps has not been subjected to the cloud that comes with a protest on a major program.

Some could argue that Air Force acquisition has been handed – or earned – some clout. It is up to the Air Force, now, not to squander this clout. From the moment EADS announced it was not going to protest, the Air Force entered a traditional customer/contractor relationship with Boeing as its KC-46A supplier. With that comes the responsibility of informing the public and the airmen that will use the KC-46A of what they are getting and how they plan on getting these new aircraft on the ramp.

Perhaps there is an effort to sidestep any public discussion about these topics. Perhaps the Air Force is still in “hunker down,” defensive posture lingering after the protest was anticipated, as one serviceman suggested. Perhaps the Air Force was simply unprepared for the prospect of a protest-less competition.
There is any number of reasons why the Air Force isn’t talking about the particulars. But, if KC-X is any model for the future – or even a successful anomaly of a procurement – the service has got to step up, own the decision and explain it to the public at large.

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Le Pentagone donne les premiers détails sur le KC-46A

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Pentagon Gives First Peek Into KC-46A Details

The Pentagon is quite confident Boeing can execute the notional plan for its long-fought, $4.4 billion KC-46A tanker development contract, but the company is working to iron out a detailed schedule of work by the end of the summer.

Risk in Boeing’s winning KC-X proposal “wasn’t low. It is probably closer to the moderate side, but it is manageable,” says Shay Assad, director of procurement and acquisition policy at the Pentagon, in an exclusive interview with Aviation Week.

An integrated baseline review (IBR), which will outline the entire program’s master plan, is expected six months from contract award, which was Feb. 24. The IBR will sort out how that risk is managed and all major milestones, including flight testing.

The company signed up to a fixed-price incentive deal to design the KC-135 refueler replacements. Solid execution on the contract could exonerate Boeing for poor performance delivering 767-based tankers for Japan and Italy, and for losing its first KC-X attempt to a Northrop Grumman/EADS team in 2008.

Perhaps more importantly, though, progress on the KC-46A contract will be a reflection of the Air Force’s ability to manage a major program after a decade of sordid procurement foul-ups, including the repeated restarts of the KC-X duel. “The Air Force and the department basically put its very best people on this source selection,” Assad says.

The proposed price for Boeing’s 767-based KC-46A program — $21.4 billion — beat that from EADS by about 10%, according to EADS Chairman Ralph Crosby. Boeing’s price, including inflation and in today’s dollars, is about $31.5 billion, EADS officials say. The Air Force plans to buy 179 tankers, four of which will be used for testing.

Pentagon and Boeing officials will not release the target per-unit price of the aircraft in early lots, though the numbers have been negotiated. Until the roughly five-year development program is complete and the Air Force exercises an option for production, the figure is proprietary, Assad says.

However, based on the aforementioned figures, it averages to about $154.9 million for the 175 production aircraft.
The fixed-price arrangement is designed to limit the government’s financial exposure to delays or a cost overrun, and Pentagon acquisition czar Ashton Carter says he plans to use more of these fixed-price contracts to insulate the government from the seemingly rampant cost overages that have taken place in recent years. On the KC-46A, the government agrees to pay 60% of any cost overrun up to 125% of the negotiated target cost (which does not include the company’s profit, included in the target price). If the overrun reaches the 125% ceiling, then profit begins to erode.

“If they overrun their target, they will lose a portion of their profit until it actually goes to zero. And, at that point, the contract effectively is at ceiling,” Assad says. “Once they hit ceiling, they start to lose money.”
By contrast, the fixed-price contract for low-rate, initial production of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which is not commercially derived, is 50/50, with the ceiling at 120%.

Another financial protection for the Pentagon built into the KC-46A tanker deal is the requirement that each lot’s renegotiation produce a target price lower than the previous lot. “Every price is downward-negotiable,” Assad says.

Preliminary design review is expected around mid-2012, with critical design review to follow about one year later, he adds. The first 18 aircraft, including the four developmental aircraft, must be delivered in 2017.

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Lu sur Air et Cosmos N° 2261 du 15 avril 2011

Le brevet qui fâche Boeing

Le brevet qui fâche Boeing

Alors que Boeing lance le développement du KC-46A, retenu pour être le futur ravitailleur de l'US Air Force au détriment du KC-30 d'Airbus, un brevet déposé par trois ingénieurs d'Aérospatiale en 1996 pourrait gripper le mécanisme. En effet, ce brevet US Patent 5499784, déposé le 19 mars 1996 aux Etats Unis et valable jusqu'en 2014, semblerait protéger certains éléments techniques et principes opératoires utilisés par Boeing . Héritier d'Aérospatiale, Airbus a donc cet héritahe a faire valoir.

Un lien vers le brevet cité précédemment.

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Selon EADS les caractéristiques dévoilées par Boeing du KC-767 lui ouvrent la porte pour le KC-Y

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EADS: Boeing’s “dumbed-down” KC-767 increases KC-Y prospects

EADS North America's top executive says recent disclosures by Boeing show the KC-767 was "dumbed-down" to win the US Air Force KC-X contract, potentially opening the door for KC-45 sales in the future.
Sean O'Keefe, EADS NA chief executive, declined in an interview to admonish Boeing for his competitor's recent acknowledgement that marketing materials advertising a KC-767 with fuel-saving winglets throughout the competition were false.
"I'm not going to pass judgement on anybody's marketing strategy or any competitor's veracity," O'Keefe said. "I wouldn't do that."
But the absence of winglets from the production configuration of the KC-767, which has been redesignated the KC-46A by the US Air Force, offer a clue about Boeing's winning strategy, O'Keefe says.
"You can do this by extension," O'Keefe says. "The only room for margin between the capacity of what you could do today [with the KC-767] and what [Boeing] is offering is to dumb-down the capabilities. As long as you don't go below the capabilities you're able to produce today, you're compliant. As every unfolding chapter is telling us, this is precisely how [Boeing] unfolded their strategy."
O'Keefe does not fault Boeing for removing the winglets or "dumbing-down" the KC-767 configuration to win the contract.
"[The Boeing KC-46A] really is going to be a KC-135 replacement," O'Keefe says. "There's no reason to be shocked by that. That's what [the air force] said they wanted and that's what they got delivered."
But EADS perceives an opportunity for a larger tanker in the USAF inventory.
"That now opens up the opportunity to say, 'What about [the requirement for delivering maximum] fuel at range and all these other things," O'Keefe says.
"That's a requirement that may or may not drive [the launch] of KC-Y, but it's certainly is a higher prospect today than it might have been before," O'Keefe says, adding, "and particularly as each chapter unfolds we start seeing more and more what the KC-46A is going to look like. My goodness, it looks more like a KC-135 than anything else -- again, just like the air force asked for. There is nothing under-handed about that at all. That's precisely what they said they wanted."
Boeing did not respond directly to O'Keefe's comments about dumbing-down the KC-767 proposal, but provided a statement calling the KC-46A "the most advanced tanker ever built" and featuring "amazing multi-role capabilities".

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Merci, Jeannot.

Jeannot a écrit:Selon EADS les caractéristiques dévoilées par Boeing du KC-767 lui ouvrent la porte pour le KC-Y
EADS: Boeing’s “dumbed-down” KC-767 increases KC-Y prospects

North America's top executive says recent disclosures byBoeing show the KC-767 was "dumbed-down" to win the US Air Force KC-X contract, potentially opening the door for KC-45 sales in the future.

Il y en aura, de toutes les façons !

Sean O'Keefe, EADS NA chief executive, declined in an interview to admonish Boeing for his competitor's recent acknowledgement that marketing materials advertising a KC-767 with fuel-saving winglets throughout the competition were false. "I'm not going to pass judgement on anybody's marketing strategy or any competitor's veracity," O'Keefe said. "I wouldn't do that."But the absence of winglets from the production configuration of the KC-767, which has been redesignated the KC-46A by the US Air Force, offer a clue about Boeing's winning strategy, O'Keefe says.

Il connaît bien 'la culture' de Boeing et de son pays, dans ce domaine.

"You can do this by extension," O'Keefe says. "The only room for margin between the capacity of what you could do today [with the KC-767] and what [Boeing] is offering is to
dumb-down the capabilities. As long as you don't go below the capabilities you're able to produce today, you're compliant. As every unfolding chapter is telling us, this is precisely how [Boeing] unfolded their strategy."

Chose impossible à prouver, mais Boeing aurait été conseillé par l'USAF, 'via' des tiers agissant en tant que "go-between" (entre l'USAF et Boeing) , ce qui est, bien entendu, contraire aux règles des appels d'offres internationaux.

O'Keefe does not fault Boeing for removing the winglets or "dumbing-down" the KC-767 configuration to win the contract.

Il est élégant.

"[The Boeing KC-46A] really is going to be a [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] replacement," O'Keefe says. "There's no reason to be shocked by that. That's what [the air force] said they wanted and that's what they got delivered."

C'est une manière de voir la question.

But EADS perceives an opportunity for a larger tanker in the [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] inventory.
"That now opens up the opportunity to say, 'What about [the requirement for delivering maximum] fuel at range and all these other things," O'Keefe says.
"That's a requirement that may or may not drive [the launch] of KC-Y, but it's certainly is a higher prospect today than it might have been before," O'Keefe says, adding, "and particularly as each chapter unfolds we start seeing more and more what the KC-46A is going to look like.

Oui ! On dirait, "more of the same, configured differently" / 'encore la même chose, habillée différemment' !

My goodness, it looks more like a KC-135 than anything else -- again, just like the air force asked for. There is nothing under-handed about that at all. That's precisely what they said they wanted."
Boeing did not respond directly to O'Keefe's comments about dumbing-down the KC-767 proposal, but provided a statement calling the KC-46A "the most advanced tanker ever built" and featuring "amazing multi-role capabilities".

Voilà Boeing !

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On verra ! Un retour en piste, pour l'offre d'EADS Airbus, n'est ni d'actualité, ni pour demain ou juste après demain.

Boeing prévoit un dépassement de 300 millon de $ sur le contrat des ravitailleurs.

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Boeing projects $300 million overrun on tanker contract

Boeing Co. is projected to exceed its cost ceiling by as much as $300 million on the initial contract to develop and build U.S. Air Force aerial refueling tankers, Bloomberg News reported today.

Air Force officials this month briefed congressional defense committees and Pentagon officials on the projected 6 percent increase on what’s now a $4.9 billion engineering, manufacturing and development contract that includes four tanker aircraft. The contract calls for 14 more tankers to be delivered by September 30, 2017.
Boeing in February beat out the European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Co., ending an almost 10-year process for deciding who would build the new tankers. EADS, which had proposed to build its tankers at a $600 million assembly plant in Mobile, did not protest the decision.

EADS North America Chairman Ralph D. Crosby in March said “what determined the outcome here was price,” calling Boeing’s bid “an extremely low-ball offer.”

The $300 million projection was obtained by Bloomberg from government officials who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to comment publicly.

The Air Force said that Boeing is responsible for all costs over the $4.9 billion ceiling price. Pentagon officials “will now tightly control program execution to make certain Boeing delivers on what it promised,” said Lt. Col. Jack Miller, an Air Force spokesman.
Boeing spokesman Bill Barksdale confirmed the company projects it will exceed the $4.9 billion ceiling and is prepared to absorb the extra costs. He declined to comment on the $300 million estimate or specify when the company concluded it would exceed the ceiling.
“We are not there yet. It’s a projection,” he told Bloomberg.

Holding Boeing accountable

U.S. Rep. Jo Bonner, R-Mobile, told the Press-Register that lawmakers are keeping close watch on the tanker contract.
“I remain convinced that Boeing bought the tanker contract and I am certainly not surprised that costs are already growing,” Bonner said. “I and others in Congress remain committed to holding Boeing accountable to the terms of their fixed price contract agreement.”
Pentagon officials told the House Armed Services Committee this year that the competition resulted in at least a 20 percent per-aircraft savings.

After the contract was awarded, Boeing revealed “that it proposed a ceiling price that is less than its actual projected cost to execute the contract,” according to an Air Force statement. “There is no legal barrier that prohibits pursuing a below-cost proposal strategy and Boeing’s met all rules.”

The contract would allow the government to save 60 cents and Boeing 40 cents of every dollar below the target cost.
Disclosure of the projected overrun comes as congressional defense committees crafting the fiscal 2012 defense budget have included provisions for close scrutiny of the overall $35 billion program. A House Armed Services Committee provision requires an annual audit by the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

“We look to the Air Force to execute the tanker program within the terms of the contract as it was awarded, and to the benefit of both the warfighter and the taxpayer,” said Guy Hicks, a spokesman for EADS.

Protecting the taxpayer

The projected overrun “highlights the importance” of fixed-price contracts “to protect the government and taxpayer,” Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said.

Outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates has pushed these contract types so that companies assume more risk for rising weapons costs. Barksdale said Chicago-based Boeing offered “an aggressive and responsible bid” that came with a risk the company might exceed the ceiling.

“We decided to accept the risk,” he said. “We completely understand our contractual requirement to pay above the ceiling and we are prepared to do that.
“We are comfortable with how we bid. We had to be competitive.”

The projected overrun “doesn’t impact the schedule,” Barksdale said. “It’s just the way we bid and we are going to press ahead.”
Boeing will manufacture basic 767-model aircraft in Everett, Washington, and convert them into tankers in Wichita, Kansas, during the first stage of a three-part Air Force program stretching decades to replace its tanker fleet.

The Pratt & Whitney unit of United Technologies Corp. will provide the engines. Boeing says winning the contract will create and sustain 50,000 jobs among 800 suppliers in 40 states.

The Air Force’s large tanker fleet consists mostly of 415 KC-135R aircraft that first entered service in 1956. The last was delivered in 1964.

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Nul doute que Boeing va essayer de reporter cela sur le contribuable...
Il serait aussi intéressant de comparer ce dépassement avec la différence entre les deux propositions (Boeing -EADS)

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Merci, Jeannot !

Jeannot a écrit:Un lien vers le brevet cité précédemment.

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L'ironie des choses !

Boeing devra prendre à sa charge le depassement ...

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Boeing Liable For KC-46 Overage

The U.S. Air Force is expecting to pay the largest amount allowable under the KC-46A contract with Boeing to develop a KC-135 refueler replacement, with Boeing picking up the rest of the tab.
Two months after Boeing won the contract over rival EADS, which proposed an Airbus A330-based design, the Air Force got news that it would need to pay an additional $500 million to develop the 767-based tanker and deliver the first 18 aircraft.

The target cost agreed upon in February for the fixed-price, incentive-fee development was $4.4 billion, according to Air Force officials. However, “Boeing revealed, post-contract award on 25 April 2011, that during source selection it proposed a ceiling price for the [engineering and manufacturing development] contract that is less than its actual projected cost to execute the contract,” says Lt. Col. Jack Miller, an Air Force spokesman, in a statement. “Boeing is liable for all cost above the $4.9 billion contract ceiling.”
Bloomberg broke the news last week that Boeing may have to pay $300 million over the contract ceiling (totaling $5.2 billion) to develop the KC-46A. The company chose a strategy of submitting a low bid – risking a deficit in development — to make up for the loss in projected sales.

The Air Force intends to buy 179 KC-46A tankers, and there are international opportunities. “We expect to make money on the KC-46 tanker program,” says Bill Barksdale, a Boeing spokesman, in a statement. “The KC-46 contract opens additional opportunities, including potential U.S. and international tanker sales and related services for decades to come.” Boeing has not yet been awarded a KC-46 production contract.

Barksdale and Miller both decline to identify the projected amount of the KC-46A development estimate at completion for the development program. Barksdale also declines to say how many of the tankers must be produced for the company to break even. Barksdale says the Boeing KC-46 bid was “aggressive but responsible.” He declined to say when the company realized its actual development cost would exceed the contract ceiling.

Boeing’s next earnings call with investors is July 27, and this may be when the company discusses how it will take a charge or charges for the projected overrun. So far, Boeing’s stock price has not indicated concern from investors.

“It is one program. It is a bit of a surprise, clearly, but in the broader context of everything else going on with the company and the stock, it doesn’t have the weight or bearing” to influence its price, says Byron Callan of Capital Alpha Partners.

One Air Force official says that if Boeing’s out-of-pocket cost is $300 million, “it may be the best $300 million Boeing spends all year” because it maintained the company’s grip on a decades-old refueler business in the U.S. and kept Airbus from establishing a stateside facility to build A330s.

Barksdale notes that the company is on schedule with the KC-46A development work. Few details about the schedule have been released, though, except for the requirement to deliver the first 18 aircraft in the final production configuration by the fourth quarter of fiscal 2017.

Boeing’s low-ball strategy does not violate acquisition law or regulations, Miller says. “There is no legal barrier that prohibits an offer or from pursuing a below-cost proposal strategy,” he says.

Boeing’s bid price was 10% below that of EADS’s, according to company officials after their loss. If the $300 million projected cost to Boeing is true, this would put the price about 4% below that of its rival.

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Merci EADS...

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Selon l'USAF Boeing pourrair perdre 400 million de $ de plus sur ce contrat

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Boeing May Lose $400 Million More on Tanker, Air Force Says

Boeing Co. (BA) may be required to absorb more than $700 million and the Air Force another $600 million in overruns if projections of cost increases on the KC-46 tanker program materialize, according to newly released U.S. Air Force figures.

Boeing’s $700 million cost is a combination of a previously reported $300 million and another $432 million the Air Force disclosed today, putting Boeing’s profit from the tanker contract in jeopardy if the contract exceeds its $4.9 billion ceiling.

The Air Force and Boeing split 60/40 any dollar increase between a target cost of $3.9 billion to the contract ceiling -- a $600 million share for the service and $400 million for Boeing.

“It’s a part of the contract,” Air Force acquisition head David Van Buren said in an interview today. “That’s the geometry of the contract.”

“If they come in” over $3.9 billion, the Air Force pays its share until the $4.9 billion ceiling is reached, Air Force KC-46 program manager Major General-select Christopher Bogdon said. “If they get to $4.9 billion, they get zero profit,” Bogdon said.
“We made an aggressive yet responsible bid to win the contract. This is a win for the Air Force and a win for the taxpayer in that they will receive the best tanker at the best price,” said Conrad Chun, a Boeing spokesman.

Boeing Shares

Chicago-based Boeing declined $1.72, or 2.3 percent, to $73.35 at 4:15 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange Composite trading.
“Based on the present estimate to complete that Boeing has given to us, they will spend up to the ceiling price, so yes, we would share the difference between target cost and up to the ceiling. But anything over $4.9 billion is completely the responsibility of Boeing,” Pentagon director of pricing Shay Assad said in an interview.

“That wasn’t a surprise to us because we evaluated the contracts and we have properly budgeted for it,” Assad said.
The Pentagon evaluated the Boeing bid with the understanding it was “possible” the ceiling would be breached, Assad said.
Now, Boeing has told the Pentagon it expects to exceed the ceiling, Assad said.

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Un autre Dream Contract ?

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Comment Boeing va-t-il tirer partie du contrat des ravitailleurs ?

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How will Boeing profit from tanker contract?

Just whenever you think there’s nothing more to write about the air force aerial tanker, more news pops up.
The news that [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] on the initial KC-46A tanker contract, and [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] (will there be still more to come?), isn’t particularly surprising.This is on top of the $600m the USAF (read that “taxpayers” agreed to absorb of the first $1bn in excess program costs.

In fact, when the first loss projection was announced, Wall Street aerospace analysts noted the news but shrugged it off as falling under the “what did you expect?” category. We didn’t even both to write about it, except in passing.
Having coincidentally been in Washington (DC) when EADS held its post-contract award press conference, we attended and listened to EADS Chairman Ralph Crosby explain to reporters in obvious bafflement that Boeing must have bid the contract at a loss.
EADS, having been the target of so much political campaigning that illegal subsidies to Airbus would all but guarantee EADS would bid a money-losing contract to win the deal, was around 10% higher than Boeing’s bid. Crosby was clearly dumbfounded at the Boeing price.

In fact, we later learned that an Airbus official had urged EADS to be even more aggressive in its bid pricing–but that even the price urged by the Airbus official (which we were unable to learn) still would not have been low enough to beat Boeing’s bid.
Still, with taxpayers now set to get clipped at least another $600m, we can’t help but wonder about the hypocritical politicians so concerned about taxpayer subsidies (which is all this will amount to) that will now be going into Boeing’s tanker. (This is obviously rhetorical sarcasm.)

Having said that, low-ball, loss-leader bids are not at all unusual in aerospace.
Boeing’s tanker spokesman Bill Barksdale declined comment on this specific news to various media but is quoted as saying the program overall will be profitable. How, you might ask?

Within 10 days of winning the contract, we’re told Boeing went to the USAF with a series of proposed change orders, where, it is assumed, Boeing would make money. We’re told USAF rejected these change orders. It was after that Boeing officials said they would be just the tanker awarded, nothing more, nothing less.

The follow-on groups of airplanes might be priced better, of course, than the first 18 or the first four. More likely, Boeing is counting on the maintenance and parts support as the foundation for profit. In commercial deals, it’s rare but not unknown for the airframe and engine OEMs to lose money on the initial deal only to make it up in maintenance, repair and overhaul contracts. Boeing’s Commercial Aviation Services division posted $1bn in profits in 2009 and did similar numbers in 2010.

Boeing has a long history of obtaining DOD contracts to maintain tankers. In fact, we always felt this was a key attribute Boeing failed to exploit in its PR and political campaign during the tanker competition, and one that EADS could not remotely match in experience.
Then there is selling the USAF parts for the KC-46A. Part sales has always been a DOD scandal, with contractors routinely over-charging (sometimes by massive amounts) price vs cost.

[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] is replete with examples of Boeing massively over-charging DOD for spare parts.
Whether Boeing will ever make money on the baseline tanker contract is obviously up for question; company officials and aerospace analysts said the program would be a “small margin” one, but really didn’t define what this means or where the margin would come from.

But MRO was always part of the baseline assumption, in our view. This is where we believe the real profit is likely to come from.

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Le Sénateur John McCain refuse les surcouts de Boeing sur ce projet

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Boeing Tanker Costs 'Completely Unacceptable,' McCain Says

Boeing Co.'s projected cost growth on its aerial tanker contract, which may force it to absorb $700 million and U.S. taxpayers $600 million, is "completely unacceptable," Senator John McCain told the Pentagon in a letter today.

Under the terms of the $4.9 billion fixed-price contract ceiling that calls for a sharing of cost increases, the Air Force and Boeing split 60/40 any increase between the target cost of $3.9 billion to the contract ceiling -- a $600 million share for the service and $400 million for Boeing.

Boeing also faces absorbing another $300 million because it is projected to exceed the $4.9 billion ceiling by that amount, McCain wrote.

"This is gravely wrong and creates an incentive, particularly on very large programs, for contractors to low-ball a contract knowing that the taxpayers will subsidize at least some of the overruns that will be needed to actually complete the work," wrote McCain today to Pentagon weapons buyer Ashton Carter.

Boeing in February won the competition to replace the Air Force tanker fleet over European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co. EADS North America Chairman Ralph D. Crosby in March said "what determined the outcome here was price," calling Boeing's bid "an extremely low-ball offer." EADS didn't contest the award.

10-Year Effort

McCain is the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee. He's also the most persistent congressional critic and watchdog of the nearly 10-year-old Air Force effort to buy new tankers, which he said in the letter are needed.

McCain released in September 2003 hundreds of internal Boeing e-mails on what was then a deal to lease and buy Boeing tankers. The documents triggered hearings and official reviews that eventually killed the proposal.

McCain wrote today, "I can assure you that Congress and taxpayers will find a $600 million subsidy of a low-ball bid by Boeing is something they feel they should not have to pay."

"Boeing fully understood that up to 60 percent of any cost overrun up to $1 billion over the target cost" of $3.9 billion "would be borne by the taxpayer," McCain wrote.

"On a program that you found to be low-to-moderate risk, the extent of exposure to the taxpayer here appears excessive," McCain wrote.

Defense Department spokeswoman Cheryl Irwin had no immediatecomment on the letter.

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Si mes souvenirs sont bons, le Sénateur John McCain était plutot favorable au projet EADS.
Cependant il n'a pas tout à fait tord ! Non ?

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Voici la lettre de 3 pages envoyées par le Sénateur Mc Cain à Ashton Carter sur le dépassement bugdétaire du futor ravitailleur de Boeing. CQFD

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CQFD

L'USAF et Boeing ont terminé leur première défiintion du KC-46A

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USAF, Boeing Complete Key KC-46A Review

he U.S. Air Force has completed an interim baseline review (IBR) for the KC-46A aerial refueler, clearing the first major schedule milestone for the program.

The review lasted weeks and concluded Aug. 24, according to Jennifer Cassidy, an Air Force spokeswoman. “IBRs are intended to provide a mutual understanding of risks inherent in contractors’ performance plans and underlying management control systems,” she says. An IBR is a formal review conducted directly by the government in cooperation with the contractor team. These reviews also outline what resources are needed to achieve program goals.

The company won the work Feb. 24 under a fixed-price contract. Because of the contract’s aggressive schedule for deliveries by 2017 and the fixed-price development, many in industry are closely watching progress. The IBR was conducted in accordance with the program schedule, which called for the review to be complete within seven months of contract award.

Cassidy says the IBR was “successful,” but service procurement officials declined to provide detail on the outcome of the review. Boeing deferred questions on the IBR to the Air Force.

A critical design review is slated for 31 months after contract award, or September 2013, and the first 18 KC-46As are due for delivery in 2017.

Boeing is expected to exceed its contract ceiling of $4.9 billion; the company is liable for any costs beyond that ceiling (Aerospace DAILY, July 28). The Air Force plans to buy 179 KC-46As to begin replacing the aging KC-135 fleet.

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D'autres nuages s'amoncèlent sur le KC-46A !

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Top weapons tester says KC-46A schedule is unworkable

US Air Force's plan for testing and evaluating the Boeing KC-46A tanker is "not executable" and could overrun the schedule by at least eight months, the US military's top weapons tester said in a new report.

Michael Gilmore, director of the office of test and evaluation for the Department of Defense, sharply criticized the USAF's ability to certify the KC-46A for military operations by the end of Fiscal 2017.

USAF and Boeing officials were not immediately available to comment on Gilmore's report.

Gilmore rejects the USAF's apparent planning assumption that the KC-46A schedule can be more aggressive than most military aircraft programmes.

The USAF assumption is flawed even though the KC-46A is based on the 767-2C, a new derivative of the certified commercial airliner, Gilmore said.

Gilmore cited the US Navy's experience with the Boeing P-8A Poseidon, a submarine-hunting variant of the commercial 737-800 fuselage. Like other fixed-wing military transports, each aircraft in the P-8A test fleet averages fewer than 30 flight hours per month, Gilmore said. The USAF schedule however, schedule requires each KC-46A to average 42h per month during flight-testing.

The KC-46A also built in an "optimistic" re-fly rate of 15%, meaning the number of tests that have to be repeated due to unexpected results, Gilmore said. The P-8A refly rate is averaging 45%, he noted.

The USAF also allocated 750h to the operational test programme, but Gilmore estimates the minimum necessary to complete the schedule is 1,250h of flight tests.

If the KC-46A flight test programme achieves no worse than the P-8A's average, the schedule could be delayed a minimum of eight months, Gilmore wrote.

The USAF selected Boeing's proposal last year over an EADS North America bid. Boeing is expected to build 179 KC-46As to begin replacing the USAF's aging fleet of KC-135 tankers.

The KC-46A integrates a new refueling boom, wing-mounted refueling pods and a new cockpit system.

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Une petite compilation trouvée sur Reuters

Dépassement de couts par dépassement de délais

En tout cas hors de ce qui doit apparaitre comme admissible contractuellement ( + 400 mio USD)

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27 mars (Reuters) - Andrea Shalal-Esa, Wilfrid Exbrayat pour le service français, édité par Jean Décotte

Le nouveau tanker KC-46 conçu par Boeing connait déjà un dépassement de budget de 900 millions de
dollars et s'expose à un risque sérieux de non respect des délais, lit-on dans un rapport du Government Accountability Office (GAO), un organisme du Congrès.

Le GAO constate que l'Air Force a encadré le risque de surcoût de ce programme de près de 52 milliards de dollars en concluant un contrat à prix fixe mais observe aussi que desdépassements des délais restent très possibles.

Un risque que l'Air Force elle-même juge "modéré".

"Même avec ces gardes-fou, il est important d'observer qu'après un an de développement, les estimations de coût du
fournisseur et de l'Air Force dépassent le montant du contrat de développement et que des risques importants de dépassement des délais ont été identifiés", lit-on dans ce rapport annuel publié lundi.

Le programme dépasse le budget de 4,4 milliards de dollars du contrat initial de développement de 900 millions de dollars,
soit de 400 millions le plafond fixé pour ce contrat.

Suivant les termes du contrat, l'Etat doit couvrir 60% des dépassements jusqu'au plafond, charge à Boeing d'assumer leur charge au-delà du plafond, à moins que Washington ne renégocie le contrat.

Boeing avait remporté ce marché mouvementé en février 2011, face à EADS, et après moult péripéties. L'US Air Force
doit remplacer sa flotte de tankers (avions de ravitaillement en vol) KC-135, dont l'âge moyen est maintenant de 49 ans.

Boeing propose une version modifiée de son avion de ligne 767 pour ce faire.

Le GAO observe que le programme tanker n'est pas aussi délicat qu'un programme développant un tout nouvel armement,
comme le F-35 Joint Strike Fighter construit par Lockheed Martin et que le Pentagone a restructuré par trois fois ces
dernières années.

Mais il note des risques au niveau de trois technologies critiques qui n'ont pas été testées dans un environnement réel et s'inquiète aussi du poids de l'appareil, déjà proche de ses limites.

Le GAO estime également qu'une nouvelle complication est née du fait de la décision de Boeing de fermer son site de Wichita (Kansas) où les 767 devaient être "militarisés".

La fermeture de Wichita par Boeing ajoute un peu de stress au projet KC-46A

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Boeing Wichita Closure Adds RiskTo KC-46A

Boeing’s decision to close its Wichita facility by the end of next year may be good for the company’s books, but a senior U.S. Air Force official says it adds risk to its ability to execute the KC-46A aerial refueling contract.

The Wichita facility was “well-suited” for militarizing the 767-2C aircraft, including adding the refueling equipment, owing to decades of experience, says Maj. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, the USAF’s KC-46A program executive officer. Now, however, that work is being set up between Boeing’s Puget Sound and Everett facilities, both in Washington.

This move, announced nearly a year after the company won the contract over an EADS A330-based tanker entry, will introduce risk in three key areas, Bogdan says. They include the transfer of refueling boom assembly work, shifting oversight of the FAA supplemental type certification (STC) and moving the military modification and finishing center.

“Without a doubt, closing Wichita is a change to the plan, and any change on a program like this is going to introduce some uncertainty and some risk,” Bogdan tells Aviation Week. “We are adding some oversight.”

The government has asked for details on how Boeing plans to ensure the STC will be addressed, Bogdan says. Also, “Boeing owes us [a] more detailed report on the Wichita move [and] progressively more details on their plans for integrating the boom and other aspects of the schedule,” says Air Force Secretary Michael Donley.

“The fact that they chose to close Wichita was not part of the original plan. And so—quite frankly—we’re going to hold them accountable to make sure that risks don’t manifest themselves,” Bogdan says. “We are involved in the oversight of that move . . . under the same cost structure, under the same schedule, with the same requirements,” he says.

Boeing opted to close the facility by the end of 2013 due to a lack of “sustainable business on the horizon,” company officials say. Additionally, “this action will ensure that Boeing is competitive in the aircraft maintenance, modification and support business and will place the company in a stronger position to win new business,” says company spokesman Jerry Drelling.

The move, however, does not necessarily bode ill for the KC-46A program.

“If Boeing can make this transfer from Wichita . . . without introducing any risk in cost or schedule . . . the program will be less risky because they are going to build the boom in the same place where they build all of the other military [tanker] stuff,” Bogdan says. “The consolidation of all of those elements in one place is really a good thing . . . The problem is that they have got to make the transition now while they are designing the airplane.”

Refueling boom assembly work that was shifted to Puget Sound is slated for completion by October 2012, Drelling says. The finishing center move is scheduled to wrap up by the end of 2013. “Any risk associated with the move would be mitigated by early next summer, at the latest,” Drelling says.

Timely certification and flight testing are key risky areas in the program, as noted by both Bogdan and a recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The auditors note that 50 testing and certification flight hours for each of four development aircraft are required per month. But, Bogdan notes, commercial certification is often a “high-intensity, rapid” operation, including six-day-a-week schedules at Boeing. Military-type certifications, however, are laborious, highly bureaucratic and not under the sole control of the contractor’s team. “Can they transfer some efficiency to military testing” from the commercial work, Bogdan asks. Slow testing as a result of procedures at Edwards AFB, Calif., has caused delays in other programs, such as the Global Hawk unmanned aircraft, and could impact the KC-46A fielding dates.

Boeing officials say the flight-test schedule “will rely heavily” on use of its flight-test facilities. “By operating primarily from contractor facilities, we are confident we will be able to conduct flight test of the aircraft at closer to historical Boeing Commercial flight-test rates,” Drelling says, adding that the schedule has five months of management reserve built in.

The fiscal risk to the government, however, is negligible owing to protection from a fixed-price, incentive-fee contract. Financial risk would only be introduced if the government and Boeing opted to change requirements or reopen negotiations.

The real problem is that development snags could prolong deliveries, forcing the Air Force to keep aging and maintenance-hungry K-135s in service longer than planned. This is especially true should problems arise late in development or while production is under way, the GAO auditors say.

The development contract requires that 18 combat-ready aircraft be delivered in fiscal 2017 at a cost target of $4.4 billion. However, owing to a government estimate of $5.3 billion at completion of the work, the Air Force is anticipating paying the total amount allowable on the contract, which is $4.9 billion (the Air Force and Boeing share cost overruns 60/40, respectively, up to the ceiling). Any additional overage—estimated by USAF as $400 million—is Boeing’s responsibility.

Thus far, the government has paid $558 million in seven progress payments. Bogdan says the government withholds 20% of Boeing’s billing requests, which is payable at completion of development. Additionally, USAF is withholding another 9% from each payment as a loss ratio since Boeing is expected to burn through the government money in advance of completing development.

Boeing officials decline to discuss the specifics of their independent cost estimates for program completion, but GAO auditors report that the company estimates its overrun to be about $187 million less than the Air Force’s estimate. “We remain on target with our initial estimate of the cost of developing the KC-46 tanker. Initial cost productions are just that, projections,” Drelling says. “Should we be able to reduce the costs of the program—and Boeing has both the opportunity and incentive to do so—it will benefit both [USAF and us].” Boeing officials have not outlined how they plan to reduce the cost of the overrun.

The Air Force estimates the development and procurement cost of all 179 KC-46As as $51.7 billion.

Bogdan and GAO auditors are watchful of the concurrent KC-46A development and production phases. Concurrency refers to the risk associated with producing aircraft before discovering all possible defects in a design through testing.

Bogdan also notes that the government has leverage over Boeing in that its production decision is event-driven. “If the test program doesn’t go well or is delayed, we are not going to make a production decision and that is at great risk to Boeing for two reasons: One, it is a fixed-price contract so as long as EMD [engineering and manufacturing development] continues, they are going to have to pay anything above $4.9 billion. Two, the longer we wait to get into production, the longer Boeing waits to make money on this program,” he says.

The KC-46A contract also contains a deficiency clause that is “the most airtight I have ever seen,” Bogdan says. The language was drawn in part from lessons gleaned from the F-35 experience. Lockheed Martin’s F-35 development program is fraught with concurrency anomalies, exposing the government to hundreds of millions—and potentially billions—of dollars of liability in the form of retrofits. The KC-46A contract stipulates that if any deficiencies are found in the six years of development, Boeing is required to design a fix, gain Air Force approval for it, retrofit it into delivered aircraft and insert it into the production line at no cost to the government.

Bogdan says Boeing has set aside three system-integration laboratories specifically for KC-46A work. Additionally, Fedex has ordered 27 767 freighters that Bogdan suggests will provide some risk-reduction work leading into the build of the first 767-2C (the baseline for the tanker). The freighter will have a cargo door and structurally enhanced floors, tail, wings and empennage—as will the 767-2C. The 2C, however, will include such tanker-specific equipment as specialized wiring and plumbing, a refueling receptacle and boom equipment.

The GAO auditors note that the “aircraft weight forecast is near the aircraft’s weight limit,” a potential concern. The design now has about 2,000 lb. of margin after having grown 600 lb., Bogdan says. However, if Boeing exceeds the 2,000-lb. limit, the aircraft still has margin to meet the performance requirement for range and offload. The risk, he says, would largely be to Boeing’s ability to meet a contractual requirement, not its ability to meet the performance standards.

During a requirements review, the Air Force and Boeing had an “absolute meeting of the minds” on what the “secondary requirements,” which are design elements derived from the key performance parameters, would be for the KC-46A design, says David Van Buren, the outgoing Air Force senior acquisition executive. In the past, a misunderstanding on these “derived” requirements has driven the cost of programs up. In the case of the KC-46A, however, USAF is working aggressively to control requirements in order to avoid reopening the contract for negotiation.

A KC-46A preliminary design review is expected to be completed at the end of the month.

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L'USAF : Boeing doit livrer le KC-46 ou ...

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Boeing must deliver on KC-46, USAF

Boeing must perform on the new KC-46 tanker programme, the US Air Force is warning the company as the aircraft enters its preliminary design review (PDR). Otherwise the service could walk away.

"We could buy more KC-46s or - make no mistake about it - if Boeing doesn't perform, we'll just start another competition," says Maj Gen Christopher Bogdan, the USAF's KC-46 programme executive officer.


The KC-46 effort is the first phase of a three-step programme to replace a geriatric fleet of 416 Boeing KC-135 tankers that have been flying since the Eisenhower administration.

The USAF wants a total of 179 KC-46 tankers eventually, but initially Boeing is obligated to deliver the first batch of 18 combat-ready KC-46As by August 2017.

The first production aircraft deliveries are expected in early 2016, Bogdan says.

"If they don't give us the 18 airplanes by August of 2017, I have the option to withhold payments [and] I have the option not to approve any of the further production options," Bogdan says.

With a production rate of 15 aircraft per year, Boeing will be building the KC-46 until 2028. But the contract has a mechanism to vary production rates. For example, in years three, four and five, the USAF has the option of buying between nine and 18 jets and would still get good prices, Bogdan says. "We got a really, really good deal," he adds.

However, 179 aircraft will only cover the replacement of 33% of the KC-135 fleet. If Boeing fails to deliver on the contract or the USAF is not happy with the aircraft, the service has the option to start the follow-on KC-Y and KC-Z tenders early, Bogdan says.

But pressuring Boeing to perform is not the only reason for the relatively small order: technology is likely to have evolved by 2028, when the last production KC-46 from this buy rolls off the production line.

CHANGING LANDSCAPE

Moreover, the threats the USA will be facing by then might be very different and there new requirements may have to be incorporated. While it is not part of the current requirements, the KC-46 cannot refuel unmanned aerial vehicles. In the future that would almost certainly be a requirement, Bogdan says.

"We wanted to have the opportunity later on down the road to incorporate any of that in a new design," he adds.

Keeping open the prospect of two additional contests also provides an incentive for Boeing and competitor EADS to keep investing in and developing new technologies for a future tanker design.

As such, the USAF strategy is to maintain a level of ambiguity about its plans for follow-on competitions.

"If it were up to me today, I would tell you that I want to keep it vague as to what we do for KC-Y," Bogdan says.


The threat of walking away from the contract is not the only stick the USAF has in its arsenal as it prods Boeing into maintaining discipline on the KC-46. The contract is structured so that the USAF's liability is strictly limited.

Boeing has to pay for every penny the KC-46 project goes over the contract-ceiling price for the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase.

Although the KC-46 programme is a $4.4 billion fixed-price incentive development contract, it limits the government's liability for costs over $4.9 billion.

The tanker's estimated development costs are currently around $900 million higher than the February 2011 contract award value, but the USAF is liable for only about $500 million of this total. The remaining $400 million is Boeing's responsibility.

"It's no surprise to us that the programme has hit the ceiling because we already planned for that and we already budgeted for that," Bogdan says. "The only surprise is that Boeing told us that so soon, quite frankly."

The KC-46 contract has another unusual feature. Unlike for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme, US taxpayers are protected from concurrency costs.

Boeing is obligated to incorporate any modifications that may arise as a result of problems found during flight-testing or operational testing into the production line at its own cost. But it also must retrofit those modifications to any previously delivered jets without any additional cost to the USAF.

"In other programmes, once the airplane is delivered, if there is a problem with it, then it's the air force's issue to get it fixed," Bogdan says. "Not so on this contract."

By contrast, on the F-35 programme the US Department of Defense was forced to slow down production of the fighter because of the enormous cost of retrofitting early model aircraft rolling out of the factory.

However, the KC-46 tanker programme cannot take sole credit for developing a more favourable contract vehicle for the new aircraft - the DoD has learned over the years from previous efforts.

"We took a lot of good ideas from a lot of people," Bogdan says. "We just kind put it together in a way that all fits."

Analyst Richard Aboulafia of the Teal Group in Fairfax, Virginia, says the USAF had a decade to work out the details of the KC-46 programme. As such, he is not surprised that it is being well executed.

Contracts such as the KC-46 effort are part of a broader move by the DoD to shift more of the risk to contractors. "To a certain extent this is the future," he says.

But this type of fixed-price contract does not work for a new clean-sheet developmental effort. "There is all sorts of mayhem that can be produced by an all-new clean-sheet-of-paper design," Aboulafia says. "Especially for a combat aircraft where you have three services weighing in."

Bogdan agrees: "I wouldn't tell you that every programme could be like this, because we're using a commercial derivative airplane."

Meanwhile the KC-46 has entered its PDR phase, which is split into two phases.

"The first step has already occurred," Bogdan says. "That's where we jointly with Boeing reviewed the entrance criteria to kinda start the PDR review."

ATTENTION TO DETAIL

That review started in the week of 18 March and Bogdan says he spent three days at Boeing's facilities reviewing 89 criteria for the PDR. Those criteria range from manufacturing plans to the minutiae of the integrated designs for the aircraft's fuel system. "We went through one by one to make sure Boeing met the criteria for the government to say: 'Yeah, that's good enough to move on to PDR.'"

What is unique in the case of the KC-46 is that the USAF jointly reviewed those requirements with Boeing. That afforded Bogdan the opportunity to hear from both Boeing and USAF experts at the same time and gave him a broader understanding of the PDR details, he says.

"As far as I can tell right now in my assessment of that, Boeing met all 89 of those criteria," Bogdan says.


The next step will take place during the last week of April. There are eight exit criteria for the programme to move out of the PDR stage.

"The most stringent of those is [that] all the sub-systems on the airplane have to go through their own individual mini-PDRs and then they have to be rolled up into a big, integrated 'here is the preliminary design of the airplane'," Bogdan says.

Assuming Boeing meets the USAF's requirements, the service will clear the company to start detailed design of the new tanker. That process of detailed design, integration and assembling manufacturing drawings should take roughly 13 months.

The next step after that would be the critical design review (CDR) that is currently scheduled for July 2013.

"Once you get to CDR, you should have significant drawings completed so they can start building the first test articles," Bogdan says.

Boeing will build four test aircraft for the KC-46 programme at its factory in Everett, Washington. The first two aircraft are new versions of the venerable 767 called the 767-2C. The new model will have a cockpit derived from Boeing's state-of-the-art 787 airliners, a fully stressed cargo floor and a cargo door. The entire aircraft has a "beefed-up structure", Bogdan says.

"Those will undergo FAA [US Federal Aviation Administration] testing," he says. That will include an "amended type-certification testing and supplemental type-certification testing."

Boeing is contracted to deliver an aircraft with a FAA type-certificate. There are two parts to this requirement: firstly, the baseline 767-2C must first get its amended type-certificate (ATC), as all new variants of existing civilian aircraft must. Secondly, the jet must also get a supplemental type certificate (STC) for all of its various military modifications.

TESTING TIMES

The USAF could simply issue a military type-certificate, but then the service could not use the testing already done by civilian users. This would make operating the plane more expensive.

Boeing, in partnership with the FAA, is efficient at testing new civilian aircraft, but testing military aircraft is a far more complex endeavor - which might cause delays.

The first flight of the 767-2C is expected in the summer of 2014.

The next two aircraft will be built as 767-2C aircraft but will immediately begin modifications to turn them into true KC-46 tanker flight-test articles at another plant in Everett. The aircraft is being designed to offload 212,000lb of fuel and double as a cargo transport. The aircraft is also being designed with a 40-year lifespan.

Earlier Boeing plans to install military hardware in Kansas were shelved when the company decided to shut down its Wichita facilities.

If all goes according to plan, the first KC-46 will fly in January 2015.


"We'll have four airplanes in the test programme," Bogdan says. "Two of them initially focused on FAA testing and two of them initially focused on military testing."

But there are several potential problem areas as the KC-46 navigates though development and tests. Of these, software development and integration is one area Bogdan is particularly worried about. Indeed software development and testing has bedevilled many prominent programmes including the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and the F-35.

"I've never been on any aircraft programme - and I've been in acquisitions for 25 years - where software shouldn't be a major focus and doesn't cause some kind of disruptions," Bogdan says. "I made that an emphasis item from the very first day on this programme."

On the KC-46, the USAF and Boeing have to integrate military and civilian software, which can be challenging. However, Boeing has taken some steps to mitigate potential problems, including setting up three dedicated software integration labs (SILs).

"That's really good because other programmes I've been on have sometimes had to share time in a software integration lab with other programmes," Bogdan says.

Moreover, one of those labs will be a full-up hardware and software-integrated pilot-the-loop rig, which will allow the KC-46 programme to do much more realistic testing on the ground. "You don't want to find problems necessarily on the test airplanes," Bogdan says. "You'd rather figure them out in the SIL."

The USAF has also mandated that Boeing use the Department of Defense's "best practice" guidelines for software development and for the metrics with which they benchmark their performance. "We've also made sure that those practices and processes have been slowed down to their sub-tier software suppliers," Bogdan says.

On the manufacturing side, the USAF is hoping that Boeing will be able to leverage production experience on the cargo variant of the 767 - which has many of the same features as the KC-46.

Those features include the cargo door, cargo floor and much of the airframe, Bogdan says. As much as 80% of the KC-46 is derived from civil hardware that is common to Boeing commercial aircraft. "So there is obviously some synergy for Boeing there," he says.

Federal Express has ordered 30 Boeing 767-300F freighters, which will help mature the production line for the service's next-generation tanker.

"The other good thing for our programme is FedEx is going to get delivered their cargo freighter airplanes before ours," Bogdan says. "That means Boeing's going to have to mature the production line for that airplane before our airplane goes down the production line."

That should also help reduce the risk to the USAF flight test programme.

"That's a very good risk reduction for us," he says. "There will be lessons learned from the FAA testing that Boeing's got to do for the model version of the FedEx airplane."

But there are other aspects of the KC-46 development and test effort that might prove to be more difficult.

The KC-46's refuelling boom is a new version of the Boeing KC-10 tanker's boom, but it has been modified with the digital fly-by-wire system found on Italian and Japanese 767 tanker booms.

"We're integrating old software on old hardware," Bogdan says. "That always creates some risk, but I think they're both known quantities."

CINEMATIC EXPERIENCE

Unlike the KC-10 or the older Boeing KC-135 tanker, the boom operator does not refuel aircraft by looking through a physical window. Instead that operator looks at a 3D video-display system similar to modern cinemas - not unlike the movie Avatar.

Last December in Saint Louis, Missouri, Boeing built and test flew the 3D-display and associated optical and infrared cameras on a Hawker-Beechcraft King Air aircraft. USAF and Boeing boom operators proved that the sensors and displays both work by conducting mock aerial-refuelling with Boeing F-15s and F/A-18s.

"Although that's a prototype, and although it's not on the KC-46," Bogdan says, "we know they can integrate the sensors, the screen and all that software."

However, the KC-46 is also required to support the US Navy's hose-and-drogue refuelling system though wing-mounted refuelling pods. Boeing had encountered difficulties with aerodynamic buffeting on the Italian 767-based tanker's pods and has instead picked Cobham to build the KC-46 pods. Cobham had the engineering expertise needed to change the outer mould-line of its pods to tailor them to the requirements of the USAF tanker, Bogdan says.


"They already reshaped the pod," he says. "The buffet problem that they saw on the Italian tanker has been pretty much mitigated."

If there are further problems, Cobham has the ability to reshape the pod again if a problem is discovered in testing - which is not true of the other pod-maker, Bogdan says.

The USAF test programme will run until the end of 2017. The last major event prior to the KC-46 joining the combat air forces is operational testing, which will happen that year.

But recent reports from both the Government Accountability Office and J Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation, say that Boeing and the USAF are underestimating the difficulty of flight-testing the KC-46. Both decry the level of concurrency in flight tests between the FAA certification and the military flight tests.

Bogdan says the two reports are overstating the problem. He says that the risks are mitigated because most of the systems on the KC-46 have flown in one form or another on other aircraft. Moreover, much more of the flight-test programme will be completed before the tanker heads to production than for previous military aircraft.

"We're going to have over 60% of all of our flight-testing completed before we ever give the permission to start production," Bogdan says. "That's an awful lot of testing compared to most other programmes."

In another break from tradition, the KC-46 production start is not based on a specific calendar date. Boeing has to meet certain criteria tied to successful flight-testing. The longer it takes to get the KC-46 into production, the longer it will take for the company to make a profit on the programme.

"It's an event-driven requirement," Bogdan says. "If they don't get that flight-testing done and are successful, I won't give them permission to start production."

Boeing declined to comment for this article when contacted

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Bonsoir !

La pertinence ! La perspective est trouble, et pas du tout rose pour les tankers de l'USAF !

Lien :
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Budget Woes Could Impact USAF’s KC-46, Experts Warn
Jan. 15, 2013 - By AARON MEHTA

"The KC-46 tanker program faces potential budget issues that could force a renegotiation of the U.S. Defense Department’s contract with Boeing, according to budget analysts.

"The program, considered a future cornerstone of the Air Force, is being squeezed by both current funding levels and a potential sequester.

"DoD planned to spend $1.8 billion on the tanker program in fiscal 2013. However, Congress has failed to pass a new budget, leaving programs funded under a continuing resolution that leaves financial support at 2012 levels. For the KC-46 program, that means making do with just $900 million, or half of what the program office had planned for this year.

"That presents a major problem for the aerial tanker program, said Todd Harrison, a budget expert with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

"The KC-46 is particularly vulnerable, Harrison said, because it is still in the development stage, where budgets are slated to ramp up significantly year to year. But there is also concern that spending cuts could force the government to change a contract that is considered very friendly to the Pentagon.

"The KC-46 contract is capped at $4.9 billion, with a floor of $3.9 billion. The Air Force is responsible for 60 percent of those costs and Boeing for 40 percent; anything above $4.9 billion is paid for solely by Boeing. If the Air Force, due to the continuing resolution, cannot meet its funding requirement for fiscal 2013, Boeing could face a choice — paying out of pocket to maintain planned spending levels, or slowing down the tanker’s development.

"The Air Force, in turn, could find itself forced to choose between delaying development, which would drive up per-unit cost, and renegotiating its contract with Boeing — something DoD would desperately like to avoid.

“The USAF will be bending over backwards not to damage this contract, so I rather think the program managers will muddle through,” Rebecca Grant, an analyst with the Iris Research Group, said in an email.

"But in a worst-case renegotiation, “Boeing might have an opening to increase the price, due to overall cost increases in the supply chain or their own share,” she wrote. “Anyway you look at it, delay adds cost. The question is how much.”

"The tanker aircraft program, like the rest of the federal government, is also facing the threat of steep cuts under sequestration. For a growing program already operating at half cost under a continuing resolution, the added hit from automatic budget cuts would be a “disaster,” said Harrison, who warns it could force DoD to renegotiate with Boeing on the program.

"The thought that sequester could force the Pentagon to work out a new deal with Boeing was first raised by a DoD official last September.

“I don’t want to break my contract, and I’m fearful sequestration may force me to do that,” Maj. Gen John Thompson, the KC-46 program executive, said at the Air Force Association conference in National Harbor, Md. “If I have to break my fixed-price contract, then I stand the potential to lose out on some of the great things that we put in this vehicle up front.”

"Boeing directed request for comment on the tanker program to the Air Force.

“The program is not impacted under the current [continuing resolution],” Air Force spokeswoman Ann Stefanek said in an email.

"Both Grant and Harrison are quick to agree that operating under the continuing resolution is not a death sentence for the program. If DoD can work a new budget so that the program reaches that $1.8 trillion figure by the end of fiscal 2013, there should be little impact.

"But the longer the government operates at last year’s funding levels, the greater the risk to the program, Harrison warned.

“There's still room to avoid the most devastating effect on this program, but that window is narrowing,” Harrison said. “But if sequestration happens, all bets are off".

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