Qantas : QF : QFA

Qantas will set up a new low-cost carrier (LCC) in Hong Kong through a joint venture with China Eastern Airlines.

The alliance will be done through the Australian carrier's low-cost arm, Jetstar. Jetstar Hong Kong will service shortroutes in Asia including greater China, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia.

The carrier is targeted to launch in 2013 with a fleet of three Airbus A320s, subject to regulatory approval. The two carriers also aim to grow Jetstar Hong Kong's fleet to 18 by 2005.

Both carriers will pump a total of $198 million into this joint venture, each holding an equal percentage share. The maximum exposure for each carrier is $99 million over a three-year period.

Jetstar's CEO Bruce Buchanan believes the new carrier, the first LCC to be based in Hong Kong, will trigger new travel demand and also capitalise on the "enormous potential" of the greater China market where the penetration rate of LCCs is less than 5%.

"We know from our experience with Jetstar in Australia and in the setup of Jetstar Japan, the benefits of both a premium and a low-cost airline operating in the same market. This will also apply to Jetstar Hong Kong, which will leverage on the local knowledge and scale of China Eastern Airlines with the successful low-cost model of Jetstar," says Qantas' CEO Alan Joyce.

Jetstar Hong Kong will tap on the Jetstar group's resources including brand and commercial management, safety, aircraft maintenance and IT systems with China Eastern Airlines' leading position in the Chinese aviation market, says Ma Xulun, vice-chairman and president of China Eastern Airlines.

The new carrier also signals Qantas' move to expand its Asian business. The carrier last year announced a five-year plan to tackle challenges in its international business and to focus more on Asia because of strong growth in the region.

Part of the plan was to set up a premium carrier in Asia, but Qantas announced earlier this month that it has ceased discussions with Malaysia Airlines because both parties were unable to reach mutually agreeable commercial terms.***

The Qantas (QF) Airbus A380 that has been stranded in Singapore since the uncontained engine failure Nov. 4, 2010 will return to service in May ([Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]).

QF CEO Alan Joyce told ATW in Berlin last week that repair costs will be around AUD150 million ($156.9 million). “It is probably the biggest repair [that has been] done on an aircraft, as well asthe biggest insurance claim on an aircraft,” Joyce said.

In response to an ATW question, Joyce said the incident did not taint the image of the aircraft or QF. In fact, Joyce said QF reconfigured the Boeing 747 interior “with the same product we have on the A380s, because the reaction (on the A380 product) is still superb,” he said.

Joyce said the load factor on the A380 grew 3% and yield is 3% higher compared to a 747 flying on a different day. He said that QF has the lowest seat count of the A380 compared to every airline. “We have 450 seats; if we go to 485 seats, that gives us several tens of millions of dollars extra next year,” Joyce said.

Jetstar Hong Kong, a new budget joint venture (JV) of equal partnership between Qantas and China Eastern Airlines, is stirring up a storm – and not quite in a tea-cup considering the market potential of 450 million passengers by 2015. The carrier is expected to commence operations in mid-2013.

Repairs have been completed on a Qantas Airways Airbus A380 that experienced an uncontained engine failure over Singapore in November 2010.

The aircraft, registration VH-OQA, will be flown back to Australia from Singapore on 21 April, the Australian flag carrier said in a statement.

This comes after 18 months of extensive repairs on the aircraft, which suffered significant damage to its airframe. The incident occurred minutes after take off on flight QF32 from Singapore to Sydney on the morning of 4 November while the aircraft was flying over the Indonesian island of Batam.

The aircraft rolled off the Airbus assembly plant in September 2008 and entered into service that same month.

Australian investigators have finished collecting data for an investigation into the uncontained failure of the Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine. The data is being analysed and a final investigation report is expected in the third quarter of 2012.

So far, the investigations identified a defect in an oil feed tube as the cause behind an oil fire, which led to the engine failure. The defect caused a section of the oil tube to thin out and crack, leading to an internal engine oil fire that weakened the intermediate pressure turbine disc. This was then separated from the turbine shaft, puncturing the engine case and wing structure.

In January, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) said that both Rolls-Royce and Airbus had taken several measures to improve their processes.

The engine-maker conducted several "major internal investigations" looking into the manufacture of oil pipes with reduced wall thickness, the management of concessions of manufactured components, and the failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) of previous component failures. In its FMECA procedures, Rolls-Royce has revised it to include numerical justifications for any assumptions made.

Rolls-Royce also revised its procedures to include feature checks and risk assessment during the design and manufacture of new structures, and introduced a revised procedure to provide training to better manage the application of retrospective manufacturing concessions.

Airbus is working with airports and firefighting agencies to develop an agreed safe method for these agencies to externally shut down the manufacturer's engines when the need arises. The agreed procedure will then be incorporated into Airbus's rescue and firefighting chart and distributed to those involved.

In its report, the ATSB said that together with the UK's Air Accidents Investigation Branch and Rolls-Royce, it is still looking into "the circumstances and missed opportunities with the potential to have detected the reduced wall thickness and offset counter bore of the oil feed pipe" before, during and after the manufacturing of the IP turbine module case.

The ATSB added that checks on the airframe and systems damage has been completed and did not reveal any significant or critical safety issues.

18 mois pour se remettre de l'"Incident" ...... dixit FlightGlobal !
Alors il faut des victimes pour qualifier d'"Accident" ce type de catastrophe ?

Bon, quand je casse une aile de ma voiture, je remplis un constat d'accident !
Un aspect sémantique qui m'échappe (Où mon English ...)

Bien, RR se focalise sur la qualité des tuyaux, c'est bien, surtout avec les fuites d'huile multiples qui ont survenu l'année dernière !

Moins bavards les RR sur les rectifications pouvant toucher à la conception (Rigidité, Boites à roulements, Splines etc)

Réactions ?

Paddy a écrit:Réactions ?

Paddy a écrit:Cher Sevrien,

Je ne suis pas motoriste mais permettez-moi de considérer qu’à l’ère de l’internet généralisé (du WEB 2.0 si vous préférez) il y a bien eu une explosion non contenue d’un T900 sous l’aile d’un A380 de la Qantas en 2010.

Vous aviez à l’époque pointé du doigt, certainement avec raison, quelques négligences dans les ateliers d’entretien de la compagnie australienne.

Paddy a écrit:Si Qantas avait totalement été reconnue juridiquement responsable, pourquoi la maison Rolls Royce PLC aurait-elle accepté une compensation financière ou dédommagement ou tout autre terme à votre convenance, au bénéfice de la compagnie australienne ?

• où nous ne parlons pas d'un "accident" (il s'agit d'un incident) et, ...
  
• où il y a du témoignage ou des 'débuts de preuve' prima facie' ("prima facie evidence", en anglais) de ladite négligence contributive, et .....
  
• étant donné que, dans l'absence de "fundamental flaw in design" du moteur (ce qui a été détermineé officiellement comme étant le cas) , tous les principaux ingrédients sont réunis pôur pouvoir faire jouer les assurances, ... les Assureurs et leurs experts aideraient à "faire la part des choses".
  

Paddy a écrit:Le dernier AD de l’EASA est-il un excès de précaution (principe de précaution extrême) ou une nouvelle alerte réclamant des inspections poussées qui dans un cas comme dans l’autre vont encore coûter un "paquet" aux exploitants de Trent 900 ?

• le(s) principal / principaux responsabl(s) trouve(nt) et recommande(nt) les solutions définitives (pour éliminer ou neutraliser la "root cause", .... surtout quand elle est découverte & définie)
  
• ou les 'mesures conservatoires' (ou "fixes", ....quand, sans que la cause racine ait pu être définie, des solutions susceptibles d'empêcher les risques de se concrétiser, en attendant de trouver avec certitude la cause racine et la solution définitive de celle-ci), .....
  
• sont effectivement mises en application sur une base tentative, par les responsables, et prévues avec un échelonnement dans le temps, pragmatique, et selon un échéancier et des modalités (avec ou sans la participation active des clients / exploitants, sur le plan technique), .....
  
• dans le cadre d'une approbation donnée par les Autorités concernées, .. qui, ensuite (quasiment immédiatement après ladite approbation ) publient l'AD avec les détails appropriés.
  

Paddy a écrit:Comme écrit au-dessus, à l’époque du WEB 2.0 (terme un peu débile à mon goût) disons de l’information instantanée, est-il toujours de mise de s’abstenir de communiquer de façon régulière sur de tels sujets ?

Paddy a écrit:En effet, je reçois au moins une fois par semaine, des alertes mail de cette même maison, sur le « shareholding », « total voting rights »… etc

Paddy a écrit:Les communiqués techniques sont rarissimes et ce manque de communication laisse la porte grande ouverte à pas mal de dérives en tous genres.

Paddy a écrit:Quant au pseudo Beochien, personnellement ce qu’il écrit et ce qu'il pense m’indiffèrent totalement, d’où ma question : pourquoi attendre des « réactions » à ses écrits d’avia ou d’aeroweb ?

J’ai beaucoup de mal à vous suivre sur ce dernier point.

Bonne journée.

Là, bien que nous soyons sur le 'www', je décide de chausser mes bottes franco-françaises, pour rester droit dans lesdites bottes, sur les terres françaises, et contrer les coqs qui chantent mal, tels que le pseudo Beochien.

SEVRIEN a écrit:Bonjour.

Juste pour info'.
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Lien et Extrait :
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Update 19 January 2012

The investigation team is being led by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). With the assistance of accredited representatives from the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA), the Air Accidents Investigation Branch of the United Kingdom (UK AAIB), the Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Singapore (AAIB Singapore), the National Transportation Safety Committee of Indonesia (NTSC), and advisors to those investigation bodies including Rolls-Royce, Airbus, SAFRAN Sagem, Honeywell (USA and UK), Aerolec UK and Singapore Aero Engine Services Private Limited, the data gathering phase of the investigation is complete and the team has commenced analysing that data.
During the period July to August 2011, accredited representatives from the BEA and UK AAIB and advisors from Airbus met with ATSB investigators in Canberra, Australia to ratify relevant A380 technical data in respect of the structural and systems damage sustained by the aircraft as a result of the uncontained engine failure. The examination of relevant Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine data and a number of engine manufacturing processes is nearing completion.
The ATSB has met with Rolls-Royce and Qantas Airways to update those parties on the progress of the investigation. In accordance with international protocol and ATSB policy and procedures, those and other relevant stakeholders will be involved in the development of the investigation findings and final report.

Le préambule d'usage.

In conjunction with the UK AAIB and Rolls-Royce, the ATSB is continuing its examination of the circumstances and missed opportunities with the potential to have detected the reduced wall thickness and offset counter bore of the oil feed pipe prior to, during and after the manufacture of the module 51 assemblies. The ATSB has also reviewed the quality audits undertaken, and quality assurance system affecting the module 51 design and manufacturing process, and their effectiveness in detecting deficiencies in that process.

Oui. Mais rien de nouveau ici. Maintenant, il y a une 'trappe de visite de stroboscopie' (c'est une image), qui facilitera cette tâche.

Il sera intéressant de voir si les Autorités appuient le problème de la non prise en compte par Qantas, et l'absence chez Qantas d'actions d'inspections impératives, dans le sillage des "Service Bulletins" émis par RR. SIA & lufthansa ont effectué les inspections. Pas de problème significatif chez ces deux compagnies. Problèmes ches Qantas, hélas.

In the interim, Rolls-Royce has conducted a number of major internal investigations into its processes including the:
manufacture of oil pipes with reduced wall thickness
management of retrospective concessions of manufactured components
failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) of previous component failures.

As a result of those investigations, Rolls-Royce has:
revised procedures for new structures that include feature verification and risk assessment during the design and manufacture process
introduced a revised, standalone procedure with appropriate supporting training to better manage the application of retrospective manufacturing concessions
revised its FMECA procedures to provide 'best practice' numerical justification for any assumptions made.
The investigation will monitor the progress of those initiatives.

Tout ceci correspond à la neutralisation & / ou à l'élimination du / des défaut(s) dans le "process" de fabrication ("manufacturing process flaw" ). C'est inhérent à une "Inspection" AD ou "Process Adjustment AD"
, ... et n'a rien à voir avec un "Re-design AD".

C'est la confirmation de ce que savaient tous les professionnels et observateurs avertis : "No conception or design flaw in RR Trent 900 engine" ('pas de défaut de conception ou de "design" dans le moteur RR Trent 900').

Cela n'empêchera peut-être pas le porte-drapeau des *** d'écrire ses âneries habituelles sur les sujets qu'il ne maîtrise pas ! C'est le problème de la prétendue 'liberté d'expression sur le WWW'; ./.. où les ignares et les frustrés peuvent s'exprimer, endisant, plus ou moins, qu'ils croient savoir mieux et plus que les ingénieurs experts en Enquêtes sur Incidents et Accidents d'Avions !

Aircraft response to the disc failure

The examination of airframe and systems damage that resulted from the engine disc burst has been completed. That examination did not reveal any significant or critical safety issues.
The continuing repair of the aircraft in Singapore has allowed the examination of relevant removed/replaced aircraft components at the ATSB's technical facilities in Canberra. Those components have included a number of wiring looms, elements of the aircraft's airframe and a number of sub-components.

Airbus proactive safety action

As part of its ongoing examination of this event, Airbus has commenced working with a number of airport and rescue and firefighting agencies to develop an agreed safe means for those agencies to externally shut down engines on Airbus aircraft - as became necessary in this case. Any agreed procedures will be incorporated in the Airbus Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Chart and be made available to airports and fire crews on line in document and poster form.
Ongoing investigation activities

Normal.

The investigation is continuing and has progressed to the analysis of the large amount of complex factual information that has been gathered during the investigation. The drafting of the investigation report has commenced and will include extensive liaison with domestic and international stakeholders. In accordance with international protocol, that will include a 60-day consultation period for international parties to the investigation.

The final report is anticipated for public release in the third quarter of 2012.

The information contained in this web update is released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 and is derived from the initial investigation of the occurrence. Readers are cautioned that new evidence will become available as the investigation progresses that will enhance the ATSB's understanding of the accident as outlined in this web update. As such, no analysis or findings are included in this update.

J'avoue ne pas avoir 'lu' le blog de Ben SANDILANDS à ce sujet. Aucun véritable intérêt !

Beochien a écrit: .....
Définition d'un Incident aviation selon l'OACI !
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Definition d'un Accident selon la même source !
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Accident (ICAO Definition)

Tags: ICAO, International

Accident- An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which (a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of: being in the aircraft; or direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft; or direct exposure to jet blast (except when the injuries are from natural causes, self inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers or crew); or (b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft and would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component (except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin); or (c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible. (ICAO Annex 13)

___________

• "Whilst these are not necessarily legally binding,..... ", ..... ou ...
  
• 
  
• "Judicial decisions : The definitions that are the subject of this Bulletin have not been the subject of any binding judicial precedents from higher courts......... ; however, the definitions have been considered in two District Court decisions. While neither interpretation is binding precedent, ..... " (Sevrien : et ici, il s'agit d'un Tribunal compétent en la manière d'interpréter certaines définitions formulée par l'ICAO) !
  
• 
  
• "While recommendations are not binding, ........
  

Note 1.-- The difference between an accident and a serious incident lies only in the result.

OBJECTIVE OF THE INVESTIGATION
3.1 The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.

Incident. An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.

Definition

An incident is defined as:

• An occurrence, other than an [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien], associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.
  

Note.— The types of incidents which are of main interest to the International Civil Aviation Organization for accident prevention studies are listed in the Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (Doc 9156).

A serious incident is defined as:

---- An incident (Sevrien : soit, "an occurrence than an accident" : on ne saurait être plus clair ! ) involving circumstances indicating that an [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] nearly occurred. (Sevrien : 'qui a failli avoir lieu, mais qui n'a pas eu lieu').
Note 1.— The difference between an accident and a serious incident lies only in the result.

Note 2.— Examples of serious incidents can be found in Attachment C of Annex 13 and in the Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (Doc 9156).

(ICAO Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation)

While recommendations are not binding, standards automatically become binding on all member states, except for those who find it impracticable to comply and file a difference under Article 38 of the Chicago Convention.

Beochien a écrit:Noter que le fait qu'un accident où incident affecte un avion, ne dépend pas de la marque des moteurs, pour sa définition

Beochien a écrit:La structure du A380 QF 32 ayant été sévèrement affectée, c'est le moins que l'on puisse dire ... [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image] , c'était donc bien un ACCIDENT !

Beochien a écrit:(Et trés sévère, c'est moi qui le dit)

Beochien a écrit:Paradoxalement une "Contained Failure" de moteur, suivi d'un IFSD, est un incident, même avec peut être qq éclats mineurs ayant fait des trous dans la queue, surtout si ils sont faciles à réparer, et n'ont pas affecté de structures !
(Je pensais aux GE 90-115, à l'époque ils sautaient dans tous les coins de la planète ! [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir cette image] ).......

JPRS

100 AccidentAn occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which:

(a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of: - being in the aircraft, or - direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft, or - direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or

(b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: -
adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage eis limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or

(c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.

200 Serious incident
An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred.

N.B. Examples of serious incidents can be found in Attachment D of ICAO Annex 13 and in the ICAO Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (ICAO Doc 9156).

300 Incident
An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation. N.B. The type of incidents which are of main interest to the International Civil Aviation Organization for accident prevention studies are listed in the ICAO Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (ICAO Doc 9156) and ICAO Annex 13
301 Major incident
Eurocontrol: An incident associated with the operation of an aircraft, which safety of aircraft may have been compromised, having led to a near collision between aircraft with ground or obstacles (i.e. safety margins not respected which is not the result of an ATC instruction)

302 Significant incidentEurocontrol: An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident, a serious or major incident could have occurred, if the risk had not been managed within safety margins, or if another aircraft had been in the vicinity.

Eurocontrol: An incident which has no safety significance. N.B. This appears to be a contradiction with the ICAO
definition of an incident: An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which
affects or could affect the safety of operation

Occurrence without safety
effect500 Not determined
The class of the occurrence has not been determined
Not determined

CFM International's next-generation turbofan will power the 78 Airbus A320neos ordered last October by Qantas Airways, the General Electric-Snecma joint venture announced today.

The $2 billion engine order, valued at list prices, brings the overall number of orders and commitments for the CFM Leap-series to more than 3,500 engines, the company says.

Qantas wants to take delivery starting in 2016 of the 78 A320neos, which have been assigned to the carrier's low-fare subsidiary Jetstar.

Alan Joyce, Qantas chief executive, cited the Leap engine's "performance, fuel efficiency and maintenance programme" as reasons for the selection.

Pratt & Whitney had offered the PW1100G geared turbofan series to Qantas.

The Leap-1A powers the A320neo. The Leap-1B and Leap-1C models are designed for the Boeing 737 Max and Comac C919, respectively.

Qantas also has ordered 32 A320s for delivery before the 'neo' model is ready in 2016.

SEVRIEN a écrit:Additif.
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Bien entendu, Qantas est embêté. En rason de la préférence manifesté concrètement, en faveur des IAE V2500 sur les A320 déjà commandés, il n'est pas convaincu par le GTF de P&W. Chose compréhensible !

Qantas est (ou un 'serait', fortement teinté par le positif / l'affirmatif, pourrait être utilisé) plus favorablement impressionné par le LeapX (et sa 'crédibilité') que par le GTF. Et compte tenu de son expérience avec le CFM-56, sur les B737 du Groupe Qantas (malgré quelques 'irritations'), et, surtout, depuis l'arrivée de la version CFM56-7B-E, Qantas voit d'un oeil favorable le LeapX de CFMI !

Aussi, compt tenu des incidents de sécurité qui ont émaillé les années 2009, 2010 et 2011 (du 'jamais vu' chez Qantas), la Cie. utilise le délai, avant de se prononcer sur un choix de motorisation, pour :
[/color]

• mettre la pression sur les motoristes, dans le but d'obtenir les meilleurs conditions possibles (soit un 'package', contenant un volet 'prix' compétitif) ;
  
• mais, aussi, de faire une évaluation approfondie.
  

Les observateurs professionnels pencheraient plutôt pour une décision de prudence, chez Qantas, .... ce qui militerait en faveur du LeapX. 'Prudence' sur le plan financier / économique, que sur le plan de l'entretien du point de vue technique.

L'absence de recul sur le GTF ne séduit guère. Et les Australiens se méfient des beaux parleurs et du "marketing hype" . Ils n'aiment pas les affaires d'infractions de brevetés, non plus.

Mais tout est possible.

A voir ! A suivre de près !

SINGAPORE – Repairs to the Airbus A380 owned by Qantas (QAN.AU) that suffered engine damage over Singapore in November 2010 cost A$139 million and were completed within the planned budget and timeframe, executives of the Australian carrier and the manufacturer said Friday.

The "Nancy Bird-Walton" will fly out of Singapore on Saturday and recommence commercial flights on April 28, Alan Milne, head of Qantas' integrated operations center told reporters in Singapore.

The repairs were covered by insurance, he said.

• en Australie, ..... si,
  
• quand on tente de régler une affaire à l'amiable / par négociation, sans avoir déposé une plainte formelle au préalable, selon les formes et critères de substance obligatoire (il faut qu'il y ait matière à procès) auprès du Tribunal approprié,
  
• on aboutit à l'échec des dites négociations,
  
• la partie qui s'estime lésée ne peut avoir aucun recours ultérieurement à une action en justice, selon les normes des procès et ou procédures prévues à cette fin.
  

Et l'absence fut conseillée à RR par ses avocats, comme tout le monde se sait / savait, sauf Ben SANDILANDS (VO et version française, ultérieurement), paraît-il !
Sauf, bien entendu : ignorance feinte et mauvaise foi, ce qui n'est pas exclu, chez les versions originale ou française !

Combien de revenus ont été perdus pour la période 'hors service' ?

L'incident est, donc, clos, et tout avait été prévu largement dans les comptes de RR, pour la partie le concernant ('perte d'exploitation' / "Consequential Loss" ou "Business Interruption Loss", et d'autres éléments négociés à l'amiable, ... ce qui a évité la cristallisation de procès / procédures 'hostiles', au-delà des procédures 'pro-forma' qu'on trouve dans le système australien de justice.

• tout ait dû être pris en compte, par des experts indépendants fort compétents, et les parties prenantes et leurs Conseillers,
  
• de manière précise, et satisfaisante et équitable, aux yeux de tous,
  
• y compris à l'égard de la partie de la négligence contributive de Qantas, réputée reconnue, .... mais dont les éléments, qui restent confidentiels, pour le besoin de la cause, dans chaque "settlement out of court" / 'règlement à l'amiable', ..... et ne seront pas diffusés dans le principe -- sauf implicitement -- ou dans le détail.
  

SEVRIEN a écrit:Bonsoir / bonjour , chers tous.

RAPPEL.

• Concernant la précision excellente du "Reporting" de RR, dans la publication de la provision, faite dans les comptes de 2010, pour "full & final settlement out of Court", au bénéfice de QANTAS, pour régler la responsabilité financière "nette" revenant à RR, pour le regrettable incident du RR Trent 900 sur l'A380 de QANTAS, en novembre, 2010.
  
• RR a provisionné le montant maximal "provisionnable", en conformté avec la responsabilité de RR sous la loi en vigueur et l'application des principes juridiques d'usage, et qui a été déterminé strictement selon les principes et règles comptables des IAS, standards internationalement acceptés, et adoptés en Australie, comme dans la plupart des autres pays de la planère, en dehors des USA.
  
• Bien entendu, les chiffres, ainsi que l'application rigoureuse (dans leurs calculs et détermination finale) de tous les principes, règles et procédures en question ont été audités & validés.
  
• 
  
• Il n'y avait aucune place pour le moindre désaccord de qui que ce soit, et surtout pas des avis subjectifs infondés des illettrés (sur les plans juridique et financier) que sont les "Usual Subjects", et, notamment, les Agités bien connus, qui n'ont pas pu s'empêcher d'écrire, dans toute la splendeur de leur ignardise, que le montant était, à leur avis, et à leurs yeux (? ) insuffisant !
  

Lien :
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Rolls-Royce and Qantas settle over engine explosion
Wed, 22/06/2011 - 11:12
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[Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] (RR.) and Qantas have reached a settlement over the Airbus A380 engine explosion last year.

Qantas said the out-of-court commercial settlement would add AU$95 million (£62 million) to its 2011 pre-tax profit of around AU$550 million and the airline has called off legal action against Rolls-Royce.

Comme nous l'avions prévu !

The settlement is in connection with a Qantas A380 plane that had to make an emergency landing after one of its Trent-900 engines exploded shortly after take-off from Singapore on 4 November last year. The problem caused Qantas to ground all six of its Airbus planes temporarily.

Bien entendu, la situation d'incidents chez QANTAS était déjà quelque peu 'chaotique', pour dire le moins !

Qantas chief executive Alan Joyce said the settlement marked the end of legal proceedings the airline brought against Rolls-Royce in December.

Nous rappelons à nos Forumistes et lecteurs que cet aspect d'intenter un procès 'suspendu' en Australie, est une procédure obligée par la loi, pour permettre à la plaignante de lancer un procès définitif contre la partie adverse, au cas où les négociations 'à l'amiable' n'aboutiraient pas à un accord acceptable pour la plaignante !

"Qantas looks forward to a continued strong relationship with Rolls-Royce on the basis of the settlement announced today," the airline said in a statement.

Et cela veut dire exactement ce que cela dit ! L'accord est 'acté', et ne doit pas être une fiction !

However, Rolls-Royce provided a lower figure and said the final deal did not change its guidance on the cost of the incident.
"The agreement is entirely consistent with the financial guidance given with our full-year results; that total costs to Rolls-Royce as a result of the incident were £56 million in the 2010 financial year, with some small additional costs in 2011," it said in a statement.

Et nous répétons que RR n'avait pas le droit de comptabiliser des provisions pour ces 'bricoles" de quelques GB£ 4 à 5 millions !

Reuters reported that sources close to the deal said the main difference between the figures is that Rolls-Royce likely accounted for some parts and services at cost while Qantas accounted them at market or list prices.

Bien sûr.

Réactions ?

SEVRIEN a écrit:Suite (Rolls Royce).
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Revenues rose 4 per cent, led by after-market sales – or servicing the engines – while pre-tax profits rose 21 per cent year on year to £1.16bn, boosted by foreign-exchange rates and the acquisition with [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien].

Rolls-Royce underscored further growth prospects with a 5 per cent rise in its order book, to £62bn and Mr Rishton said the company was as confident today as it was two years ago that its revenues would double within a decade.

On se souvient bien des âneries totalement pessimistes et fausses, racontées par Leeham News (Scott HAMILTON lui-même) est les Adeptes de la Discutaille au Coin du Comptoir du Café de lla Gare !

It expects its civil aviation and energy divisions to lead the way this year, helped by demand from emerging markets.

“In the markets in which we operate we still see growth and opportunities within developed parts of the world as well as the emerging parts of the world,” Mr Rishton said, adding that new orders were fuelling growth in countries such as China, India, Brazil and Russia. In mature markets, such as Europe, the need to [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien] engines because of high fuel prices was buoying demand, he said.

Oui ! Et RR y est bien présent, ... très solide, .....et avec efficacité !

Roughly half of the company’s engine order book comes from the developing regions of Asia and the Middle East, serving as a “pretty good proxy” for the company’s split between new capacity orders and replacement orders.

Rolls-Royce is one of the UK’s most respected and influential engineering companies and Mr Rishton was not shy about suggesting that the UK government look to its long commitment to engineering as a guide to rebalancing the economy.

Il donne le démenti aux bobards que certains continuent à raconter, même de nos jours, comme des généralisations, ciblant bêtement les Financiers, .... et sa remarque est particulièrement astucieuse et bien orientée !

He said the UK was merely at the start of a long process, one that needed to include improving the image of engineers.

Bien dit !

“We make heroes both positive and negative out of investment bankers,” Mr Rishton said. “We raise their profile, we make films about them. Kids talk about it the same way they talk about celebrities. Many people think an engineer is someone who repairs your car at a garage,” he added.

La réflexion est bonne (et non pas un dénigrement du garagiste) !

The company raised the dividend by 9 per cent to 17.5p, paid out from earnings per share that were 25 per cent higher at 48.5p.

Shares fell slightly in early trading, to £7.75 after [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien].

They had stumbled last month when analysts raised concerns about slackening demand from both civil and military aircraft makers. But the company pointed on Thursday to a 7 per cent rise in its civil aerospace order book – which represents more than 80 per cent of the group total – including an exclusive deal to build the engine for Airbus’s A350-1000 aircraft.

The defence order book fell by 7 per cent, to £6bn, but the division’s bottom line was shored up by a £60m payment from the Ministry of Defence for cancelling contracts following [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien].

Il faut toujours gratter plus loin que le vernis.

Aussi, l'ajustement final de l'impact de l'incident du RR Trent 900 sur l'A380 de Qantas n'a même pas fait une ride sur la surface de l'eau.

Ceux qui ont tant exagéré ces impacts dans leurs dramatisations, reposant sur toute la splendeur de leur ignorance, .. devraient faire la pause, et réfléchir (oui ; cela sera dur pour eux ! ).

Mr Rishton said continued investment across the group’s divisions meant cash flows would stay steady in 2012 even as revenues and profits looked set to rise.

Analysts at Investec called the full-year results “solid”, “with the prospect of continued long-term growth underpinned by the order book, growing after-market sales and contribution from Tognum”.

Conclusion bien plus sensée (reposant sur les faits), que les âneries diffusées par Scott HAMILTON, et certains autres du même tonneau !

1. C'est un point de vue qui aura le mérite d'exister. Certes, point de vue infondé, et idiot, .... mais qui aura, le cas échéant, le mérite d'exister.
   
2. Il est idiot tout simplement parce qu'il est clair que l'avion est totalement en mesure de réaliser ses missions, à tous points de vue. Autrement, il n'aurait pas été réparé, et n'aurait jamais obtenu la réactivation de sa certification d'origine.
   
3. Les petites traces des 'blessures' n'enlèvent pas le moindre brin de 'l'ensemble sécuritaire' de l'appareil en question, et n'enlèvent rien, ... rien ... à ses performances !
   

C'est normal ; il ne faut surtout pas les en empêcher ; mieux vaut laisser sortir les idiots des lambris ; leurs ignorance et bêtises n'empêcheront jamais la vérité sous le point no. 3 ci-dessus de prévaloir et d'être confirmée !

Qantas and the real lessons of QF32 and the rebuilt A380

Amid the extensive, and accurate, reporting of the return to flight of the first Qantas A380, Nancy-Bird Walton, that was severely damaged by an engine disintegration operating QF32 on 4 November 2010, there is one sharp lesson for all airlines when it comes to maintenance and ‘care’.

And that isn’t the one that managements and unions argue about, which is outsourcing.

It is the lesson that says ‘keep in control and keep informed.’

In the considerable heat of events after the serious incident on 4 November 2010, which lead to Qantas undoubtedly correctly grounding its A380 fleet, Qantas CEO Alan Joyce made a number of statements which were repeated in the legal documentation that preceded a settlement of its claims against the engine maker Rolls-Royce.

Those claims were inter alia that Rolls-Royce did not tell Qantas about certain matters related to the upgrading or modification of the Trent 900 series engines fitted to its A380s, leaving it in the dark about certain issues that could affect its performance, and depriving it of relevant knowledge affecting its operations and also depriving it of information which had it possessed would have caused Qantas to seek prompt modification of its engines and been used by Qantas to assess whether or not to change the way it was using the engines.

Those claims were also correct, and acknowledged as correct by Rolls-Royce, in a process that was at times incredibly reluctant and unwilling from the perspective of those in Qantas and in its official guidance to media and investors.

It is reasonable to conclude that the manufacturing defect which directly caused the QF32 disintegration and inflight crisis would most likely have been rectified before the failure occurred in-flight had Qantas known in precise detail what Rolls-Royce was on about in its modifications of the engines.

But all of this leads to another matter.

Whatever the merits of outsourcing anything more complex or costly than regular operational or line maintenance of aircraft or engines, the QF32 incident ought to end forever the accountants dream that out of sight power-by-the-hour arrangements to let someone else, even the engine maker, assume responsibility for ‘total care’, is smart, when in reality it is ‘total stupidity’.

With the benefit of hindsight after what is probably the world’s most expensive repair of an airliner after an in-flight incident that scared the hell out of everyone, outsourcing ‘total care’ without retaining control and knowledge is fraught with brand threatening risks.

The foolish dumbing down of the airline game into ‘virtual airlines’, where everything that used to be integral to an airline’s performance, reputation and brand, gets shunted off to a shed somewhere run by whomever tenders the cheapest price, is a nasty, dangerous piece of work.

And, to be fair to some of the proponents of virtual airlines, that is not what they envisaged either. But the virtuality argument took on a life of its own once it escaped into the wild, and in the process, a great deal of sensible and rational work as to how to successfully run airlines in a world flying into open skies and fiercer competition was lost.

The magic combination of greed and stupidity came into play, especially in much of what passes for supposedly robust financial analysis of airline competition.

QF32 ought to be remembered for being a very loud wake-up call for airlines and air safety regulators world wide. Airlines can’t afford to be inefficient. But they can’t afford to turn into killers either. In the world beyond Qantas we can find too many instances of airlines where no responsibility, no control, and indeed, no clue seems to summarise the parameters of managements that emerge from business school with a near total contempt for technical or specialised knowledge, and a focus on short term gain that is totally at odds with any industry in which skills have to valued, nurtured, recruited, retained and rewarded.

Qantas can, and no doubt will, continue to outsource just about everything that moves in order to save money. But it must not outsource its diligence, its attentions, and its knowledge of precisely what the engine maker, or airframe maker, or systems maker, is up to for a single minute, because their priorities are not the priorities of Qantas.

At the end of the day, whether it ends in a fireball and 469 dead passengers and crew, and a dead brand, or a superb recovery from a ‘tricky situation’, no airline, Qantas included, can outsource its responsibilities.

SEVRIEN a écrit:Bonsoir !

Ben SANDILANDS ( encore lui), qui n'aime pas perdre les débats,..... revient à la charge. Il veut avoir le dernier mot. Mais il ne l'a pas eu, et il ne l'aura pas, ... (ni lui, Ben SANDILANDS en VO, ni la version française, et d'autres du même tonneau).
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Qantas and the real lessons of QF32 and the rebuilt A380

April 22, 2012 – 7:26 am, by [Vous devez être inscrit et connecté pour voir ce lien]

Amid the extensive, and accurate, reporting of the return to flight of the first Qantas A380, Nancy-Bird Walton, that was severely damaged by an engine disintegration operating QF32 on 4 November 2010, there is one sharp lesson for all airlines when it comes to maintenance and ‘care’.

And that isn’t the one that managements and unions argue about, which is outsourcing.

It is the lesson that says ‘keep in control and keep informed.’

Cela n'est pas un tort à mettre à la charge de RR, ou d'un quelconque autre motoriste.

Mais, l'Agité de Service, dans toute la splendeur de son ignardise, de son inconséquence, de sa mauvaise foi, et de son parti-pris, sera, peut-être, capable de continuer à dire que RR devrait donner à AFI le droit d'assurer le MRO des moteurs RR des avions appartenant à des cies. autres qu'AF ! Ils l'ont déjà fait ; il ne s'agit point d'un procès d'intentioin !

Celui signifie quoi ? Lui, et les autres du même tonneau devraient réfléchir, avant d'écrire dans le vide !

Cela signifie que cet Agité de Service et ses 'confrères' favorisent l'outsourcing, dès que cela va à l'encontre du "business model" et du buisiness case" de RR ! Quelle inconséquence ! Quelle inconstance dans la ligne d'argument !

Ils racontent n'importe quoi ! Ben, SANDILANDS, aussi, dans l'unique but d'avoir le dernier mot !

In the considerable heat of events after the serious incident on 4 November 2010, ...

On voit que Ben SANDILANDS a fini par accepter la vérité ! Il s'agit s'un incident sérieux, et bien entendu, non pas d'un accident !

....which lead to Qantas undoubtedly correctly grounding its A380 fleet,

"Correctly"? Cet avis personnel de Ben SANDILANDS . n'est nullement étayé par les faits. Pourquoi Alan JOYCE aurait-il (eu) raison contre ses homologues de SIA et / ou de Lufthansa ? Eux n'ont pas eu tort d'éviter de faire le même type de "grounding" de Qantas ! Au contraire !

Qantas CEO Alan Joyce made a number of statements which were repeated in the legal documentation that preceded a settlement of its claims against the engine maker Rolls-Royce.

'That preceded' ! Ben SANDILANDS n'a rien compris, ou est délibérément économe avec la vérité.

Les "claims" d'Alan JOYCE furent 'perçus' comme 'infondés', et, nécessairement, éliminés de la documentation à laquelle Ben SANDILANDS fait allusion. Les dires d'Alan JOYCE furent reconnus érronés, ... voire faux.

Ben SANDILANDS omet de dire que ceci fut un préalable sans lequel aucun 'règlement à l'amiable' / "settlement out of court" n'aurait pu être envisagé, approché, ou obtenu. Et, cela est un 'sine qua non' de la loi australienne.

Le texte permettant de choisir la voie du règlement à l'amiable ne saurait contenir (et ced relève de la logique, et du bon sens, voyons) des allégations inflammatoires et infondées, risquant de faire couler "le settlement out of court" avant même que les discussions ne soient ouvertes ! Ben SANDILANDS cherche-t-il à prendre ses lecteurs pour des imbéciles ?

Il n'est pas étonnant qu'il y ait des Australiens qui veulent octroyer à Ben SANDILANDS le prix du plus mauvais journaliste d'Australie !

En outre, ... si l'accord à l'amiable s'avère non obtenable, la partie s'estimant lésée a, certes, le droit d'intenter le procès formel, ... mais seulement dans la limite des termes réfléchis du "settlement out of court" tenté ! Il y a une obligation de cohérence ! Il n'y a pas de Justice à la Carte, dans ce contexte, .... avec un 'poids procès' et un 'poids règlement à l'amiable' ! Bien sûr, Qantas pourrait intenter un 'procès nouveau', ... mais à ses risques et périls !

Those claims were inter alia that Rolls-Royce did not tell Qantas about certain matters related to the upgrading or modification of the Trent 900 series engines fitted to its A380s, leaving it in the dark about certain issues that could affect its performance, and depriving it of relevant knowledge affecting its operations and also depriving it of information which had it possessed would have caused Qantas to seek prompt modification of its engines and been used by Qantas to assess whether or not to change the way it was using the engines.

Faux. Tout cela a été rendu caduc par les seuls faits que :

• dans le métier, il est normal qu'il y ait des modifications qui réfléchissent, ou visent, des améliorations de "process", dans le but d'améliorer la réalisation d'un nouveau produit et de ses performances, par exemple, sur les plans technique et économique, ... sans que ceci entrâine, notamment le moindre besoin de faire recertifier le moteur, partiellement (certaines ses composantes) ou totalement ; c'est ainsi depuis toujours ;
  
• les experts indépendants, y compris les Enquêteurs Indépendants, et les Experts indépendants des assureurs, qui n'allaient jamais faire de telles accusations à l'encontre de RR, ont, certainement pesé assez lourd dans la balance pour faire comprendre à Alan JOYCE et à QANTAS que de telles allégations seraient 'perdues d'avance', et qu'Alan JOYCE et Qantas pourraient même se trouver en position délicaté, sur le plan juridique,...
  
• alors que des discussions constructives auraient bien plus de chances de permettre de trouver des compensations équilibrées et équitables.
  

Those claims were also correct, and acknowledged as correct by Rolls-Royce,

Faux ! C'est le contraire ! RR a ouvertement reconnu (et assumé) la responsabilité d'un défaut de "process" de fabrication ("defect in a manufacturing process"). D'ailleurs, tous les conseillers proches du centre du dossier, y comprs ceux de Qantas, ont fait comprendre à Alan JOYCE & à Qantas que RR n'aurait aucune difficulté à prouver la négligence contributive de Qantas, tandis que, dans un processus de recherche d'un "settlement out of court", ces éléments ne seraient utilisés que pour faire des appréciations techniques et des chiffrages voulus raisonnables et équitables, et non pas comme des arguments et accusations de 'contre-attaque' dans un procès classique.

Comment voudrait-on que Ben SANDILANDS, en sortant son bazooka, à tout bout de champ, puisse comprendre ces subtilités ?

...... in a process that was at times incredibly reluctant and unwilling from the perspective of those in Qantas and in its official guidance to media and investors.

Faux et ridicule ! Du délire ! Voir sous topic "Qantas : QF : QFA", rubrique "Actualités Cies. Aériennes : Cies. asiatiques", notamment les tout récents rappels, à ce sujet, ... qui donnent on ne peut mieux le démenti à cette remarque fausse et infondée, et non étayable ! Ben SANDILANDS en devient risible, et se donne en spectacle ! Quelle tenative médiocre de trouver des arguments !

It is reasonable to conclude that the manufacturing defect which directly caused the QF32 disintegration and inflight crisis would most likely have been rectified before the failure occurred in-flight had Qantas known in precise detail what Rolls-Royce was on about in its modifications of the engines.

Faux, ... ou, du moins, rien n'est moins sûr ! Qantas n'avait même pas mis en application les inspections selon les instructions et recommandations des "Service Bulletins" ("SB of Non Modification") de RR . De l'aveu même de certains co-dirigeants d'Alan JOYCE, chez Qantas, la Direction n'avait même pas compris la nature "mandatory" / 'obligatoire' de ces SB ! Ben SANDILANDS ne connaît pas assez bien les faits, ... et ne connaît, donc, pas le dossier !

Ou bien, s'il connaît ces détails, il n'en comprend pas la signification.

But all of this leads to another matter.

Whatever the merits of outsourcing anything more complex or costly than regular operational or line maintenance of aircraft or engines, the QF32 incident ought to end forever the accountants dream that out of sight power-by-the-hour arrangements to let someone else, even the engine maker, assume responsibility for ‘total care’, is smart, when in reality it is ‘total stupidity’.

"Accountants' Dream" ? A-t-il parlé avec les "Experts Comptables" ("Chartered Accountants" ou CPA / "Certified Public Accountants", par exemple ? Il n'est pas venu nous voir ! Dommage, .. il aurait, peut-être, appris quelque chose !

"Total Stupidity " ? Opinion personnelle de Ben SANDILANDS ! Du DPO, 'pur jus' ! Son avis prsonnel compte pour des prunes ! Ben SANDILANDS raconte des bobards ! Sa crédibilité est proche de zéro ! Et cela n'est pas un avis personnel ! C'est un fait, selon plusieurs sources, au sein de son pays !

With the benefit of hindsight after what is probably the world’s most expensive repair of an airliner after an in-flight incident that scared the hell out of everyone, outsourcing ‘total care’ without retaining control and knowledge is fraught with brand threatening risks.

The foolish dumbing down of the airline game into ‘virtual airlines’, where everything that used to be integral to an airline’s performance, reputation and brand, gets shunted off to a shed somewhere run by whomever tenders the cheapest price, is a nasty, dangerous piece of work.

Certains disent (et les Australiens d'abord) que Ben SANDILANDS est a "nasty, dangerous piece of work" !

Il exagère beaucoup, et trop souvent ! Ce faisant, Ben SANDILANDS ne fait que miner encore plus le peu de crédibilité de ses écrits !

And, to be fair to some of the proponents of virtual airlines, that is not what they envisaged either. But the virtuality argument took on a life of its own once it escaped into the wild, and in the process, a great deal of sensible and rational work as to how to successfully run airlines in a world flying into open skies and fiercer competition was lost.

The magic combination of greed and stupidity came into play, especially in much of what passes for supposedly robust financial analysis of airline competition.

QF32 ought to be remembered for being a very loud wake-up call for airlines and air safety regulators world wide. Airlines can’t afford to be inefficient. But they can’t afford to turn into killers either. In the world beyond Qantas we can find too many instances of airlines where no responsibility, no control, and indeed, no clue seems to summarise the parameters of managements that emerge from business school with a near total contempt for technical or specialised knowledge, and a focus on short term gain that is totally at odds with any industry in which skills have to valued, nurtured, recruited, retained and rewarded.

Qantas can, and no doubt will, continue to outsource just about everything that moves in order to save money. But it must not outsource its diligence, its attentions, and its knowledge of precisely what the engine maker, or airframe maker, or systems maker, is up to for a single minute, because their priorities are not the priorities of Qantas.

At the end of the day, whether it ends in a fireball and 469 dead passengers and crew, and a dead brand, or a superb recovery from a ‘tricky situation’, no airline, Qantas included, can outsource its responsibilities.

Alan JOYCE ne va jamais être d'accord avec Ben SANDILANDS ! Il ne va jamais avouer que "Qantas externalise ses responsabilités" !

Réactions ?